The Missile Plains: Frontline of America’s Cold War

Historic Resource Study
Minuteman Missile National Historic Site, South Dakota

Prepared for
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Midwest Regional Office

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Antiballistic Missile Installations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Air Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Staff</td>
<td>Air Force Air Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARDC</td>
<td>Air Research and Development Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Corps</td>
<td>Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Bombardment Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMW</td>
<td>Bombardment Missile Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Bombardment Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Bombardment Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEBMCO</td>
<td>Corps of Engineers Ballistic Missile Construction Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convair</td>
<td>Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Declaration of Excess</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWO</td>
<td>Emergency War Order</td>
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<td>FMMS</td>
<td>Field Missile Maintenance Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>General Service Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HICS</td>
<td>Hardened Intersite Cable System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPSS</td>
<td>Improved Minuteman Physical Security System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISST</td>
<td>ICBM Super- High- Frequency Satellite Terminal</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>Launch Control Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCF</td>
<td>Launch Control Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>Launch Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALA</td>
<td>Missile Area Landowners Association</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPT</td>
<td>Missile Procedures Trainer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>National Park Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMMS</td>
<td>Organizational Missile Maintenance Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORI</td>
<td>Operational Readiness Inspections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RON</td>
<td>Remain- Over- Night</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officers’ Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<td>SALT Treaty</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
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<td>SELM</td>
<td>Simulated Electronic Launch- Minuteman</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLFCS</td>
<td>Survivable Low- Frequency Communication System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Strategic Missile Squadron</td>
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<td>SMW</td>
<td>Strategic Missile Wing</td>
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<td>START Treaty</td>
<td>Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Transporter Erector</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultrahigh frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>WADC</td>
<td>Wright Air Development Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDD</td>
<td>Western Development Division, extension of ARDC</td>
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Preface

The purpose of this study is to bring to light the history and context of Minuteman Missile National Historic Site. To achieve this goal, a number of individuals and organizations have generously shared their knowledge and resources. Our special thanks extend to the staff of the National Park Service, including project manager Ron Cockrell, Minuteman Missile National Historic Site Historian Sue Lamie, Badlands National Park Superintendent William R. Supernaugh, contract manager Ron Eilefson, Mary McVeigh and Dan Savage of the Denver Service Center, Historic American Engineering Record staff, and additional National Park Service staff that reviewed and commented on the study.

We would also like to thank individuals at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota who offered support and provided access to research materials, including Tim Pavek, Environmental Engineer with the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron; Cheryl Cordray, Rich Kauk, and Dan Rexroad in the Real Estate division of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron; and Staff Sergeant Dennis Wilkinson of the Ellsworth Air Force Base the 28th Bomb Wing History Office.

We are especially grateful to the individuals who took the time to be interviewed thereby providing valuable insight on many topics of this study. Our thanks go to: Jay Davis, Ted Hustead, John LaForge, Wendy McNiel, Gene Williams, and Tom Wilson.

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In addition our thanks go to the staffs of the various repositories with whom we consulted during the course of research for this project: Dr. Frederick Shaw and Joseph Caver and the staff of the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama; the Air University Library at Maxwell Air Force Base; Bill Burr and the staff of the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C.; the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston; the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas; the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri; the National Archives and Records Administration; the Boeing Archives; and the South Dakota State Historical Society State Archives.

This report was prepared under the direction of Dr. Jeffrey A. Engel, Principal Investigator. Christina Slattery of Mead & Hunt served as the project manager and primary author, with contributions from Mary Ebeling, Erin Pogany, and Amy R. Squitieri of Mead & Hunt. The report was also prepared with assistance from Emily Schill, Matthew Becker, and Victoria Redstone of Mead & Hunt.

Introduction

Establishment and Purpose
In 1999 President Bill Clinton signed into law (Public Law 106-115) an Act of Congress providing for Minuteman Missile National Historic Site. Congress stated the purpose of the new park as follows:

To preserve, protect, and interpret for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations the structures associated with the Minuteman II missile defense system;

1. to interpret the historical role of the Minuteman II missile defense system—
   a. as a key component of America’s strategic commitment to preserve world peace; and
   b. in the broader context of the Cold War; and

2. to complement the interpretive programs relating to the Minuteman II missile defense system offered by the South Dakota Air and Space Museum at Ellsworth Air Force Base.

To accomplish this purpose, the Secretary of the Interior was empowered to administer the site in accordance with the provisions of law generally applicable to units of the National Park System, including the establishing act of the National Park Service, approved 25 August 1916 (16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) and the National Historic Sites Act of 21 August 1935 (16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.).

Geographic Location
Minuteman Missile National Historic Site, historically a part of Ellsworth Air Force Base, consists of Minuteman II Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Launch Control Facility (LCF) Delta-01 and Launch Facility (LF) Delta-09, located adjacent to Interstate 90 about fifty miles east-southeast of Rapid City, South Dakota. The LCF and the LF lie approximately ten miles apart. The Minuteman LCF Delta-01 site occupies an open, grassy tract of land on the west side of Jackson County Road CS 23A, approximately one-half mile north of Interstate 90, Exit 127. Minuteman LF Delta-09 site is located approximately ten miles west-northwest of LCF Delta-01. The LF Delta-09 occupies part of an open, grassy tract of land straddling Pennington County Road T512, about 0.6 miles west and south of Interstate 90, Exit 116. A visitor center will be the third component of Minuteman Missile National Historic Site and is planned to be located near Interstate Highway 90 and in proximity to the two historic sites.

Significance of Minuteman Missile National Historic Site
Delta-01 and Delta-09 were part of the Minuteman I and II missile systems that once dotted the landscape of South Dakota, North Dakota, Missouri, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. Minuteman III missiles remain in Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, Colorado, and Nebraska. For nearly thirty years these missiles and their facilities remained on continuous alert and served an important role in America’s triad of defense, including land-based ICBMs,
submarine-launched missiles, and manned bombers. To deter Communist aggression, the United States developed Minuteman I with the ability to respond to an enemy attack with immediate and massive retaliation. In 1961 the Kennedy administration shifted the national policy to one of controlled response. The upcoming Minuteman II design was modified to allow for the launching of one or more missiles and providing a greater survival rate for the site with support facilities hardened below ground that were built to withstand the surface burst of a nuclear weapon. The first Minuteman II squadron went on alert in 1966 and in the following years Minuteman I facilities across the country were upgraded.

The Delta Flight Complex of Ellsworth Air Force Base, originally Minuteman I systems and updated in the early 1970s to Minuteman II, received new weapons, but the original structures were not modified and continued to represent the massive retaliation strategy of the early years of the Cold War. Facilities at other Minuteman deployment areas were configured or modified to implement the new controlled response strategy.

Minuteman II sites, with the exception of Delta-01 and Delta-09 of Ellsworth Air Force Base and Oscar-01 of Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, were destroyed or converted to Minuteman III sites in agreement with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty. The remaining site on Whiteman Air Force Base, Oscar-01, is an underground Launch Control Center. Oscar-01 no longer has an associated LF and never included an aboveground LCF support building because it was supported by the surrounding base. Oscar-01 was originally constructed to reflect the later controlled response era of the Minuteman design with the construction of ground support facilities hardened (blast-proof) below ground.

Minuteman Missile National Historic Site is the only intact Minuteman II site remaining in the United States that contains an LCF and LF. Delta-01 and Delta-09 are also the only remaining intact examples that demonstrate the original Minuteman I configuration (modified to Minuteman II), designed to implement the Cold War policy of massive retaliation. Minuteman Missile National Historic Site provides the opportunity to interpret the Cold War and the role of the Minuteman missile defense system and what it meant to work with the missiles and live near the sites.

**Organization of the Historic Resource Study**

To assist in the interpretation and understanding of the cultural, political, social, and economic history of Minuteman Missile National Historic Site, the Historic Resource Study is divided into three main sections.

*Section I – The Cold War and National Armament* will provide the global and national context for Minuteman Missile National Historic Site. Chapter 1 of Section I, the history of the Cold War, focusing on the 1950s and 1960s, will describe how nuclear systems developed. This chapter will also focus on the political climate and foreign policy decisions of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and how these factors affected development of strategic missiles and nuclear armament systems. Chapter 2 will provide a background on ICBM program beginnings and liquid-fuel ICBMs, placing the development of solid-fuel ICBMs into context. Chapter 3 will discuss development and capabilities of both the Minuteman I and Minuteman II missile systems and provide an overview of the development of Minuteman III and the future generation of missile development.
Section II – Life on the South Dakota Plains: Before, During, and After Minuteman will present the history of the Minuteman missile in South Dakota in five chapters. Chapter 1 will provide a brief overview of the prehistory and history of the region discussing Native American history, land speculation and settlement, and continued agricultural uses. This background will describe the landscape and environment prior to the establishment of 150 Minuteman I and II LFs and fifteen LCFs throughout the state.

Chapters 2 to 5 will continue to discuss the development, construction, and activities of the missile sites in South Dakota from the 1960s through the 1980s when the sites were still active, with an emphasis on LCF Delta-01 and LF Delta-09. A history of the U.S. Air Force highlighting the Strategic Air Command and Ellsworth Air Force Base in Chapter 2 will provide the background for a discussion of the 44th Strategic Missile Wing, which commanded the Minuteman sites in South Dakota. Chapter 3 will provide the history of the location, land purchase, and construction of the Minuteman sites in South Dakota. This chapter will also discuss both immediate economic and social impacts to the region, as well as the effects over the years. The location and features of Delta-01 and Delta-09 will be described and illustrated in Chapter 4. Section II will continue with a discussion of the day-to-day activities of the personnel assigned to the missile sites in Chapter 5. This discussion will include the training, roles, and responsibilities of the missile combat crew, facility manager, security and maintenance personnel, and the cook. Section II will conclude by addressing changes in the roles, responsibilities, and personnel at the sites during the Minuteman’s tenure, including the introduction of female missileers and addressing racial issues among personnel at the sites and within the greater community.

Section III – Peace Movement, Nuclear Disarmament, and the Future will return to the national and international arenas discussing the opposition to nuclear armament, the end of the Cold War, and the future for Minuteman Missile National Historic Site. The national peace movement discussion in Chapter 1 will feature regional protests conducted at the missile sites. Chapter 2 will focus on nuclear arms treaties, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty and the deactivation of the Minuteman sites. The deactivation discussion will focus on the sites in South Dakota, including landowner issues, the inactivation of the 44th Strategic Missile Wing, and the opportunity to retain Delta-01 and Delta-09 for interpretive purposes. Chapter 3 will highlight the process to establish Minuteman Missile National Historic Site and the cooperation between the U.S. Air Force and the National Park Service towards this effort.
Section 1 – The Cold War and National Armament

Chapter 1: The Cold War (1945–62)

Introduction

The story of the Minuteman missile program is a Cold War tale. Journalist Walter Lippmann’s 1947 book, *The Cold War*, first used and popularized the term “cold war” to refer to the post-World War II confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two years earlier, British author and journalist George Orwell called a world living in the shadow of a nuclear war “a peace that is no peace” and referred to it as a “cold war.” The term, Cold War, would come to define the political, social, and economic history of the second half of the twentieth century. More than merely a military standoff, the Cold War offered a stable international system forged by the world’s emerging two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—that lasted more than four decades. This system formed almost immediately following World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union epitomized the differences between a capitalist and a communist world. The conflict that arose between these two fundamentally irreconcilable systems, paradoxically based upon stability through mutual destruction, helped spawn development of new weapons systems, including the Minuteman I and II.

The use of the atomic bomb at the end of World War II forever altered the tone of international relations. The devastation caused on 6 August 1945 at Hiroshima and 9 August 1945 at Nagasaki led the world to fear an atomic war, and to fear what atomic weapons could do, even to their inventors. As H. V. Kaltenborn, one of the most respected American broadcasters of the period, told his listeners on the night of 6 August 1945, “We must assume that with the passage of only a little time, an improved form of the new weapon we use today can be turned against us.” This fear dominated the Cold War, as policymakers and pundits alike recognized that any potential conflict could escalate to the point of global destruction once both superpowers possessed these weapons. Hiroshima changed everything, the Congressional Aviation Policy Board concluded in 1948, “Militarily speaking, at that same hour the security frontiers of all nations disappeared from the map. National defense, in the traditional sense, is no longer possible. The cycle of history has turned, and once again civilization stands vulnerable to annihilation.”

With the benefit of hindsight, we may now clearly state that this overt threat of nuclear annihilation kept both sides from pursuing a more aggressive or expansionistic foreign policy as the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were very aggressive in maneuvering with third world countries in an attempt to tilt the theoretical balance of power in their own favor.

With nuclear weapons and the atomic bomb at the heart of this threat, American policymakers believed their country had to stay technologically ahead of the Soviets if it was to survive. They were determined to maintain their atomic monopoly as long as possible, and thereafter to use their technological superiority for diplomatic leverage. The Soviet Union was bent upon global domination, policymakers reasoned, and if the Soviets believed that the American force could be defeated, it seemed likely that Moscow would strike. Technological superiority, in other words, when coupled with the ability to deliver unprecedented force, was required to maintain the peace.

The Minuteman missile program and the efforts of the military and civilian personnel of the 44th Strategic Missile Wing of Ellsworth Air Force Base are each a product of this Cold War system. In order to deter communist aggression, the United States developed the Minuteman I missile system with the ability to
respond to an enemy attack with immediate and massive retaliation. The origins of the Cold War help to identify how the Soviet-Americ relationship deteriorated and the two sides became entrenched for over four decades—this background is fundamental to understanding why such powerful military weapons were deployed in South Dakota—some thousands of miles from the Soviet border. In the Cold War, as we shall see, the front line was everywhere.

Origins of the Cold War

Zones of Contention
The mutual antagonism of the Soviets and Americans, leading to the Cold War, developed after World War II as the two sides competed over a number of geographic and political zones of contention. In several confrontations and diplomatic situations, American policymakers in particular learned important lessons, including that the Soviet Union was no longer an ally, that Moscow intended to expand the physical realm of communism, and that the Soviets could only be deterred by force and the threat of force.

Two major conferences—Yalta and Potsdam—were held in 1945 with the Soviets, British, and Americans to determine the fate of Europe and defeated Germany. The Yalta Conference, at the Russian Black Sea resort in February, was the last meeting of the Big Three allied leaders—American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. At the conference, debates over Poland's postwar borders and government put Roosevelt and Churchill at odds with Stalin. Within months of Yalta, Soviet control over Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe had evolved into a serious concern for the future of Western Europe.  

Leaders of the three countries met again at the Potsdam Conference, outside of the captured Berlin, from 17 July to 2 August 1945. This was the last major conference of World War II, and its participants attempted to build upon the efforts of the Yalta Conference. However, the United States and Britain found themselves again unable to come to an agreement on many diplomatic issues with the Soviet Union. President Harry S. Truman, who had taken office following Roosevelt's death on 12 April 1945, and many Potsdam attendees, saw the Soviet Union shifting from a wartime ally, even a frequently difficult one, to an outright adversary.

The postwar battle over the control of Germany and Berlin demonstrates how tensions evolved dividing Europe into East versus West. Germany was physically and ideologically divided between the two sides. For the United States, a strong rebuilt Germany capable of sustaining its own redevelopment while supporting its neighbors seemed vital to the success of Western Europe, while Soviet leaders longed for a ravaged Germany, incapable of ever again attacking the East. The superpowers' division over Germany's fate was centered symbolically on the country's former capital, Berlin. The United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union each had military troops stationed in Berlin—110 miles into the heart of the Soviet occupation zone and the future East Germany—and their presence led to the 1948 Berlin Blockade (discussed below).

American financial assistance toward the reconstruction of Europe following the war also contributed to a deteriorating relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States emerged from the war with a strong economy, and was in the position to provide aid to Europe, a situation ultimately resented by the Soviets. Initially the United States offered aid on a country-by-country basis, with $3.75 billion going to the British in 1945–46 and $1.2 billion to France the following year. The Soviets requested $1 billion in aid in 1945, but due to crumbling East-West relations, the Truman Administration never formally approved an aid package for Moscow. State Department officials claimed to have “lost”
the Soviet request, though later historians have proved their story was fabricated so as to provide justification for rejecting Moscow’s plea. No matter the reason, Moscow’s failure to garner American postwar aid proved a contentious issue in Soviet- American dealings.

The United States also faced conflict with the Soviets outside of Europe. The fate of China, for example, as a result of its civil war, was of crucial interest to the two superpowers if for no other reason than its status as the world’s most populous country. Led by Mao Zedong, China’s Communists eventually won power, leading to greater American concerns over the future of the capitalist system without its most populous member and to domestic attacks against the Truman Administration for “losing” China. Communism’s victory in this crucial early Cold War battle helped American policymakers understand the growing threat of this dangerous new ideology and gave the United States a new and bitter adversary in Asia.

The Iranian Crisis of 1946 also contributed to the polarization of Soviet- American relations. Following World War II the Soviets agreed to end their occupation of northern Iran and remove their troops within six months of the conflict’s end. When the Soviets did not comply with their wartime promise and continued to occupy northern Iran and use political and military pressure to gain oil concessions, President Truman threatened war and mobilized troops to the area. These actions forced the Soviets to withdraw without concessions, offering proof to American policymakers that the Soviets responded only to force. By 1947, therefore, tensions ran high between the East and West and American leaders had developed an increasingly hostile view of Russia.

Declarations of Cold War

Tensions between the two countries escalated during the post- World War II period and declarations by leaders on both sides, including Stalin and Churchill, and strategists, such as United States diplomat George Kennan, began to formally announce the existence of a Cold War. At the heart of their message was recognition of the posturing by the two superpowers with opposing ideologies and world views.

Such declarations of Cold War began as early as 1946. In February of that year, Stalin’s Soviet Party Congress speech made the growing East- West conflict seem inevitable. Cold War historian Walter LaFeber discussed how Stalin’s speech cast a pall over contemporary East- West negotiations,

“In an election speech of February 9, the Soviet dictator announced that Marxist- Leninist dogma remained valid, for ‘the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries’ could lead to ‘violent disturbance’ and the consequent splitting of the ‘capitalist world into two camps and the war between them.’ War was inevitable as long as capitalism existed. The Soviet people must prepare themselves for a replay of the 1930s by developing basic industry instead of consumer goods and, in all, making enormous sacrifices demanded in ‘three five- year plans, I should think if not more.’ There would be no peace, internally or externally. These words profoundly affected Washington. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, one of the reigning American liberals, believed that Stalin’s speech meant ‘The declaration of World War III.’”

Two weeks after Stalin’s speech, in late February, United States diplomat George Kennan responded to a State Department request for an analysis of Soviet expansionism and global intentions with what became another such declaration of a Cold War. Kennan’s response, later given the descriptive title “The Long Telegram,” warned that Soviet policies assumed western hostility and that Soviet expansionism was inevitable. Moscow would only be deterred by forceful opposition, be it political or military, and Kennan thus recommended that the United States employ a policy of “long- term patient but firm and
vigilant containment.” His analysis was well received by United States policymakers who felt that the
telegram confirmed their views and the tougher stance the Truman administration was taking with the
Soviets.

One month later, in his March 1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri, ex-British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill presented his views on the East-West conflict. Churchill coined the term “iron curtain” in
this speech and outlined a global alliance between Europe and the United States, “From Stettin in the Baltic to
Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the
capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest,
Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must
call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very
high in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.”

During the final passage of the American Treasury loan to Britain in July 1946, American Congressional
leaders outlined their own declaration of Cold War, as they described the world as half free and half
communist in order to win approval for the politically contested loan. Leaders, such as Speaker of the
House Sam Rayburn, argued that the United States must support its longtime ally in Britain, especially as
the bipolar division of the world seemed impossible to overcome. The United States committed $3.75
billion in loans to Britain for reconstruction of its economy, which was, in the words of historian Derek
Leebaert, the “first distinctly postwar commitment of U.S. economic and political power.” As Rayburn
explained in defense of the loan, “I do not want Western Europe, England, and all the rest of Europe
pushed toward an ideology that I despise” and “I fear that if we do not cooperate with our great natural
ally [Britain] that is what will happen.” As Cold War historian Dr. Jeffery A. Engel has written, to
thinkers like Rayburn, “Only a strong Great Britain, an unsinkable American island-base of anti-
communism set off the coast of Europe could prevent Soviet domination of the continent, he argued, and
only an economically strong Britain, a Britain strengthened by a $3.75 billion loan, could possibly remain
solidly in the American camp.”

**American Cold War Policy**

By 1947 it had become apparent to most observers that the world was splitting in two-East and West-
leaving the inevitable conflict of the Cold War. Quickly the lines in the sand were drawn even deeper as
the Soviets and Americans clashed ideologically and militarily on a number of fronts. In February, for
example, Britain’s decision to cease aid to Greek forces fighting a Communist insurgency prompted the
Truman Administration to assume new responsibilities throughout all of Southern Europe. The ensuing
“Truman Doctrine” committed $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey—a huge sum given
Congressional fiscal conservatism at the time—and offered a precedent for further American assistance to
any “free peoples” engaged in a struggle against “terror and oppression” and “the suppression of personal
freedoms.” Truman’s Manichean worldview pitted the world in two, good against evil, for to American
policymakers, Communism seemed everywhere on the march. “Like apples in a barrel infected by one
rotten one,” Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained, “the corruption of Greece would infect Iran, and
all to the East.” Without American aid, Europe and Africa would be next, he continued and “we and we
alone could break up the [Soviet] play.” Western Europe subsequently received its own brand of
American economic stimulus later that year, with the Marshall Plan designed to promote economic
recovery and stability as a vaccine against the Communist “infection.” The Soviets refused to participate
in the plan, which Foreign Minister Molotov denounced as a “new venture in American imperialism.”
The Soviets offered their own aid package for Eastern Europe and, with dollars flowing to one half of the
continent and rubles to the other, the division of East and West grew even deeper. The Truman
Administration later followed-up this aid program to Europe with “Point Four,” a program similarly
designed to spread American technical know-how and dollars throughout the developing world as a
means of countering Soviet expansion.”
Conflict continued with the Soviet Union determined to push the United States and its allies out of West Berlin. In June 1948, the Soviets imposed a blockade on West Berlin in an attempt to cut off supplies to the city. The United States and its allies began to supply the city with a massive airlift of unprecedented size, and the Soviets ended the blockade in May 1949. The United States’ commitment to Western Europe’s defense, exemplified by efforts during the Berlin Blockade, led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949. NATO provided for a collective defense of its members, as the organization’s charter promised that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. NATO represented the United State’s commitment to its European allies and would become an important key to containing the Soviet Union in Europe.

Shortly after the lifting of the Berlin Blockade, in August 1949, the Soviet Union broke the American nuclear monopoly by developing its own atomic bomb. The Soviets had matched the United States’ key technology sooner than most expected. This development forced the United States to reevaluate its defense posture and accelerated the creation of even more powerful weapons, such as the hydrogen bomb, to regain its nuclear superiority. An analysis of the United States’ defense position was presented to President Truman in the National Security Council Paper Number 68 (NSC 68). NSC 68, authored largely by Paul Nitze of the State Department policy staff, would come to shape American policy for many years. NSC 68 outlined that the United States needed to be prepared globally for Soviet or communist expansionism and that containment should become a global policy. The directives outlined in NSC 68 were written prior to the North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel but were not adopted until September 1950, after this conflict proved to many the necessity of American military buildup.

By the early 1950s American foreign policymakers knew that the Cold War was here to stay. Communism seemed everywhere on the move, exemplified by the crises described above and then most dramatically with the North Korean invasion of June 1950 that began the Korean War. Western policymakers believed countries at risk from Communist aggression might fall if their neighbors succumbed, like the rotten apples of Acheson’s metaphor or, more commonly, like so many dominoes: if one country was lost to the Communists, so too would be the next, and the next. Communism had to be stopped, but at what cost? The increasing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and the arms race would shape the United States strategic defense program and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) development. In the Cold War, the United States would maintain its stance that the only way to halt the expansion of communism was through development of increasingly advanced weapons systems. As we shall later see, one such system would be the Minuteman. Before that missile would be deployed, however, there would be events and developments, international and technological, which would shape this weapon and the communities that housed it.

Eisenhower and Waging Peace

The Cold War and the directives of NSC 68 led to a significant increase in American military spending. Just over $13 billion was spent on the country’s defense in 1950, while only three years later total American defense spending exceeded $50 billion, or nearly forty percent of the federal budget.” Much of this increased spending can be attributed to the Korean War; however, many United States policymakers believed that defense spending would continue at this elevated level for the foreseeable future. Their predictions ultimately proved correct, as spending on American forces dipped after the war to approximately $34 - $38 billion a year, while military and financial aid delivered to allies in the name of halting communism averaged nearly $12 billion annually throughout the remainder of the decade. This level of Cold War spending became the norm until the height of the costly Vietnam War.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953 with a pledge to lower the cost of waging the Cold War, what he called “waging peace.” He feared a prolonged military conflict and a commensurate expansion of the military and federal government might undermine the country’s democratic values. President Eisenhower did not dispute NSC 68’s basic principles, in particular its contention that Soviet Communism was inherently expansionistic and thus a threat to the United States, but he feared the effects of a broad Cold War fight on America’s economy and society. Increased military spending could warp the marketplace, while efforts to combat Communism at home, if not carefully regulated, might ultimately undermine American civil liberties. As Eisenhower stated, his administration was charged with defending “a way of life,” not just a territory and “We could lick the whole world if we were willing to adopt the system of Adolph Hitler.”

These were hardly idle concerns. During this same period, Senator Joseph McCarthy led the charge against Communism at home, popularly known as the Red Scare, with largely unsubstantiated accusations that Communists had infiltrated the federal government and the State Department in particular. McCarthy’s accusations caused a sensation. Following televised Congressional hearings in 1954, where McCarthy accused the Army of harboring Communists, he was censured by the Senate for his actions. The country’s rabid anti-Communist hysteria began to slow, though Cold War fears continued to color American political and cultural life for more than a generation. As Eisenhower had feared, anti-Communism, as espoused by McCarthy and others, was distorting American values.

As Commander-in-Chief and as a former Army General, Eisenhower at least exerted greater control over the military. He believed in the conservative (what earlier generations would have called republicanism or classical liberalism, terms that change over time though their meanings remain the same) ideal that democracy and militarism are forever at odds, as he held significant faith in civilian rule. Based on these beliefs he called for a reconsideration of the country’s Cold War policies upon taking office. He initiated “Project Solarium”—named for the room of the White House where the project was discussed—which requested three blue-ribbon, top secret panels to separately consider and propose a strategy for America’s Cold War policy.

Group A was headed by diplomat and Soviet expert George Kennan. Kennan’s group concluded that since the Soviet threat remained strong, the previous administration’s containment policy should be continued. They recommended continued expansion of defense spending and military buildup. As reported by Group A, “If we can build up and maintain the strength of the free world during a period of years, Soviet power will deteriorate or relatively decline to a point which no longer constitutes a threat to the security of the United States and to world peace.”

Group B was led by Air Force Major General James McCormack, an expert on atomic weapons. The members of McCormack’s group proposed drawing a “line of no aggression” around the Communist Bloc and areas necessary to the United States security. Entry or expansion beyond the line would result in an atomic attack on the Soviet Union. Group B’s plan offered the advantage of limiting military spending, but featured two major obstacles: where to draw the line, and how to procure Congressional and public support for an atomic war should the Soviets cross the line.

Vice Admiral Richard Conolly headed up Group C in the discussion of the nation’s future Cold War policy. His group advocated an aggressive approach to winning the Cold War and reversing Communism, a policy publicly dubbed “roll back.” They stated that the United States should “prosecute relentlessly a forward and aggressive political strategy in all fields and by all means: military, economic, diplomatic, covert, and propaganda.” Through aggressive means, Communism would be swiftly eradicated and democracy “restored.”
President Eisenhower ultimately adopted none of the three options, choosing instead a combination of the first two, which were drafted into National Security Council Paper Number 162 (NSC 162), his administration’s Cold War blueprint. NSC 162 advocated extensive reliance on nuclear weapons as the country’s primary deterrent to Communist expansionism and aggression. It advocated vigilance against future Communist expansion but not direct roll back unless the United States was in position for victory. The policy focused on keeping America safe, but as importantly, also fiscally secure. No one in 1953 could predict how many years the Cold War would last and the administration felt strongly that it needed a policy that could be sustained for possibly a decade or more. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey explained, “if we mean to face this Soviet threat over a long time, we must spend less than we now are spending and do less than we now are doing.”

Following Project Solarium and the revision of the document to NSC 162/2, the United States had a new doctrine for winning the Cold War at an affordable cost. NSC 162/2 called for the use of an atomic strike force capable of deterring the Soviets from action. To contain Communism, Eisenhower authorized the expansion of the country’s nuclear arsenal and the stage was set for the continued development of nuclear weapons, including what would later be called the Minuteman missile. The number of atomic weapons grew from one thousand in 1953 to more than eighteen thousand by the time President Eisenhower left office in 1961. During this same period, America’s military budget dropped from $50 billion in 1953 to an average of $34 billion with savings achieved largely through reductions in troop levels. The increase in the country’s nuclear arsenal and the idea that Soviet threats and expansionism would be met with awesome power became known as the policy of “massive retaliation.”

The Problem of Massive Retaliation
Massive retaliation limited the Eisenhower administration’s policy options. The 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis in Vietnam, for example, demonstrated the limitations of too great a reliance on the nuclear response. Since 1945 the United States had supported France’s efforts to defend its colonial presence in Indochina, both militarily and economically, and in 1953, France and the United States adopted the Navarre Plan to prevent the Communist-led Viet Minh takeover of the region. That same year French General Henri Navarre established a military base at Dien Bien Phu in northwestern Vietnam in hopes of luring the Viet Minh into battle. The Viet Minh laid siege on the French and a standoff occurred, with the United States airlifting supplies to the French.

Many of Eisenhower’s advisors, including National Security Council (NSC) Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford, believed the only way to save the French was by dropping atomic bombs on their opponents. Eisenhower rejected this suggestion, arguing that nuclear weapons were too destructive to use in a limited conflict, and perhaps too politically damaging to use at all. “You boys must be crazy,” he said. “We can’t use those awful things against the Asians for the second time in ten years. My God.” Without support from either American ground forces or nuclear weapons, the French garrison fell to the Viet Minh on 7 May 1954.

The decision not to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam called into question the administration’s policy of massive retaliation and deterrence. Massive retaliation might have been a successful policy for keeping the Cold War in balance and an option for stopping a major Soviet advance into Western Europe—although it was never put to this test—but it did not answer everything. If the administration was not ready to use nuclear weapons in all situations, Eisenhower’s strategists reasoned, other options needed to be available to American leaders. Ironically, at an earlier time, Eisenhower had publicly stated that nuclear bombs were like any weapon, and could be “used just exactly as you would a bullet or anything else.” In
private, however, the president and his top advisors were each beginning to doubt the wisdom and utility of relying solely on the atomic threat. Despite their concerns, Soviet developments would soon prompt the United States to continue and even to expand its nuclear capabilities.

**Sputnik**

On 4 October 1957 the Soviets launched the world’s first satellite, named Sputnik I. The launching shocked much of the world, not only for its scientific importance, but also because of the implications of this technology for American and Free World security. If the Soviets had rockets to launch satellites, many concluded that they would soon be able to develop ICBMs that could reach the United States. The Soviet achievement moreover demonstrated their technological lead in this field over the United States, and began the space race. As American security was predicated on maintaining technological superiority, Sputnik terrified the nation.

President Eisenhower responded by increasing spending on missile development. In January 1958, three months after the Soviets, the United States successfully launched its own satellite, after a number of publicized failures. At this same time, the Pentagon’s feasibility studies for intercontinental missiles, including the Minuteman missile, had been completed, and planning was underway for funding and development of this American military response.

**Kennedy Administration and the First Minuteman Deployment**

By the end of the 1950s, many Americans believed their country needed new Cold War policies. They feared for national security in an age of ballistic missiles, and they also questioned the effectiveness of the Eisenhower administration’s policies for halting Communist expansion in the Cold War’s periphery—those areas outside of Europe and the United States. Many observers believed the next great Cold War conflicts would occur in just these regions. Congress asked for hearings in 1959 to review the United States position in the space race, and Democrats subsequently campaigned against Republican Cold War policies, charging that they had allowed the Soviets to get ahead of the United States in missile development, creating a missile gap. The “gap” represented the difference between the number of missiles it was believed the Soviets possessed and the number of American missiles. Ironically, a missile gap did not exist. In actuality, the Soviets possessed significantly fewer missiles than most Americans believed and Democrats had claimed. Espionage and photographs from U-2 spy planes proved the deficiencies of Soviet nuclear arms, but the administration could not publicly state this fact without compromising national security and letting the world and the Kremlin know about the American spying capabilities. In the 1960 presidential election, Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Vice President Richard Nixon. Nixon had refused to compromise national security by leading a countercharge that refuted Democratic claims of a missile gap, and a new administration took office.

Kennedy promised to improve American Cold War capabilities, including defense. He supported the Minuteman program and the country’s continued development of ICBMs. Kennedy and his administration focused on a new Cold War policy to maximize policy options beyond a massive nuclear retaliation. This new policy became known as “flexible response,” and included creation of new Cold War institutions, such as highly trained combat troops known as Green Berets or Special Forces, and even the Peace Corps. Kennedy also advocated vigilance towards the Soviets. His refusal to bend to Soviet pressure contributed to the Berlin Crisis of 1961 (when he activated his military reserves in response to Soviet demands that the West evacuate its military presence in the city, a crisis that culminated in Soviet construction of the Berlin Wall) and the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year, precipitated by Moscow’s planned installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba, only ninety miles from the American coast. An
American quarantine of Cuba, and a secret agreement to dismantle Jupiter missiles in Turkey in exchange for removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, ultimately eased tensions and avoided disaster, though the world stood closer to the brink of nuclear war than arguably at any other time. Each crisis increased nuclear tensions between the superpowers, who wielded destructive power unknown and unimaginable to previous generations. It is in this context that the Minuteman was deployed and played its Cold War role.
Plate 1. The Big Three Conference at Yalta, 12 February 1945, from left to right: British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin (AP/Wide World Photos)
Plate 2. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, United States President Harry S. Truman, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin meeting at the Potsdam Conference, August 1945 (AP/World Wide Photos)
Plate 3. First official picture of the Soviet satellite Sputnik I, issued on 9 October 1957, showing the four-antennaed baby moon resting on a three-legged pedestal (AP/World Wide Photos)
Plate 4. President Kennedy (center) with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (far left), SAC Commander General Thomas S. Power (right), and Lt. General Howell M. Estes, Jr. (right background) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, March 1962 (Courtesy U.S. Air Force, History Division)
Chapter 2: U.S. Strategic Missile and Armament Systems (1950s–60s)

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program Beginnings
The Minuteman program was a Cold War story, but development of the missile system offers its own history. This section explores the evolution of America’s ballistic missile program, of which the Minuteman would play a vital role. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 the United States had succeeded in developing nuclear missiles with intercontinental range. However, America’s early forays into strategic missiles suffered from a lack of funding, bureaucratic infighting, and interagency tensions that slowed early research into missile armament systems. Although the progression from piloted weapons systems to missiles seems obvious in retrospect, that conclusion remained uncertain at the onset of the Cold War.

Many high-level politicians and military officers began to think more seriously about Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) development in response to these tensions, leading the Air Force to initiate a crash program in ICBM development through the newly formed Air Research and Development Command (ARDC). The ARDC and the new crash program built on previous missile research conducted by the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair) for Air Force contract MX-774. Convair’s contract had been canceled in 1947 as part of the Air Force’s post-World War II cuts in military spending.

The news in 1949 that the Soviets had tested an atomic bomb sparked revived interest in air defense systems, though of course, in an age of aerial warfare, the potential for long-range Soviet strikes upon American soil had never been far from the minds of Washington strategists. “Attacks can now come across the arctic regions, as well as across oceans, and strike deep...into the heart of the country,” General Carl Spaatz, commander of American strategic bombing in World War II told a Senate Committee in 1945. “No section will be immune,” he warned, “the Pearl Harbor of a future war might well be Chicago, or Detroit, or Pittsburgh, or even Washington.”

North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea—an attack perceived by many Western strategists as part of a concerted global strategy by the Soviets—an attack perceived by many Western strategists as part of a concerted global strategy by the Soviets—made Western fears of attack seem all the more prescient.

Air Research and Development Command
The Air Force established the ARDC in 1950 specifically for development of the Air Force missile program. Many issues remained to be solved before the ICBM could get off the ground. Development of the ICBM program was hampered by resistance on the part of one branch of the Air Force, the Air Force Air Staff (Air Staff), and inefficient cooperation between different branches of the military. The Air Staff was the planning body within U.S. Air Force Headquarters. As a Major Command, the ARDC (later known as the Air Force Systems Command) was below the Air Staff in the hierarchy of the U.S. Air Force. Initially the Air Force opposed further research and development on the grounds that available technology was not advanced enough for the successful development of missiles with intercontinental range. Members of the Air Staff questioned the reliability and effectiveness of ICBMs. Additionally, the culture within the Air Force at the time favored development of bombers and the integration of missiles with aircraft development. Achievement of high rank in the service required pilot training and command of squadrons or wings, and only officers could be pilots. These flyers were thus naturally hesitant to endorse a new and potentially significant weapons system that carried the potential of diminishing the value of their skills (as pilots) to the Pentagon. Indeed, the Air Force went so far as to designate its missiles “pilotless aircraft,” implicitly signifying that any real aircraft carried a human commander. The lack of an integrated development plan further hampered missile research and development and budgetary issues resulting from President Truman’s economy drive compounded the problems of
developing the ICBM program. Only after the Air Force began to integrate its missile program with its aircraft program did it become apparent that missile development needed a separate, focused effort.\(^3\)

The Air Force had competition in missile development from both the Army and the Navy. Missile development programs underway at the beginning of the 1950s included the Army’s Redstone project, headed by Wernher von Braun and the Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, as a joint venture between the Army and Navy.\(^3\) The Air Force found itself in a position of losing its defensive capabilities and therefore stature in the armed forces if it did not keep up with missile technology.

Rather than allowing themselves to fall behind technologically, the Air Force overcame its reticence and approved a contract with Convair in January 1951 for development of a ballistic missile carrying a heavy nuclear payload with a five thousand-mile range and a circular error probable (acceptable radius of target error) of 1,500 feet.\(^4\) This new missile project, known as the MX-1593 or Atlas, was largely based on Convair’s earlier Air Force project, the MX-774. Convair now built on earlier engineering efforts to create the Atlas ICBM.\(^5\)

In 1952 Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbot, asked the Air Force for performance specifications and a justification of the deployment schedule for the Atlas. The response from the ARDC asserted that “the ballistic rocket appears, at present, to be the ultimate means of delivering atomic bombs in the most effective fashion.”\(^4\) Funding for the Atlas remained limited, however, and important logistical problems had to be overcome in its development before it could meet the Air Force’s requirements.

Bomb weight, maximum range, and nose cone design to withstand reentry were three formidable early problems faced by missile developers. However, scientific advances created thermonuclear devices that were lighter than earlier generations of nuclear weapons while possessing more destructive capability—in 1952 the validity of thermonuclear detonation was proven. During this same period, more powerful liquid-fuel engines became available and it became clear that ICBMs with a range of over five thousand miles could be built. The combination of more powerful engines and lighter bombs solved the problem of limited missile range. The development of a blunt, copper heat-sink in 1952 to absorb the fierce heat of the reentry vehicle solved the third problem.\(^6\) Now the ARDC and Convair needed to transfer these new technologies to its Atlas missile system

The Air Staff did not agree with the ARDC on Atlas development and funding and refused to commit the necessary funds for full-scale development. The ARDC refused to give up, citing the urgent need for an ICBM in the interest of national security. The ARDC favored full-scale development on an accelerated schedule, whereas the Air Staff preferred additional research before committing more funding to the program. After two years of political maneuvering, the Air Staff and ARDC reached a compromise in 1953. This agreement produced a development plan that called for the research and development phase for the Atlas to be completed by “sometime after 1964” and for an operational missile by 1965.\(^6\)

**Teapot Committee and RAND Report**

While American leaders worked to develop their own strategic missile force, they also strove to evaluate United States military defense capabilities in relationship to their closest rival. Two committees were formed during this period to study the Soviet Union’s potential threat. The Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, code name Teapot Committee, was formed in 1953 by Trevor Gardner and was chaired by famed mathematician Dr. John von Neumann of the Institute for Advanced Studies. The Teapot Committee was developed to evaluate current programs and the level of technology of potential enemies...
(mainly the Soviet Union), and to recommend solutions for identified problems. A concurrent study focusing on similar questions was conducted by the RAND Corporation, a security studies think tank with long ties to the Air Force.

Both studies produced alarming findings. They each independently determined that Soviet missile technology had advanced significantly in the short period since World War II, and that only a major push in missile development in the United States could overcome this technology gap. Policymakers of this period fervently believed that falling technologically behind the Soviets in the defense arena would be inviting the disaster of a Soviet attack. The reports also concluded that development of an operational ICBM system within six years was an attainable goal if the Air Force would commit the appropriate talent, funds, and management strategies to the project. According to Teapot, the Atlas program in particular—as the most advanced American missile program then under development—had to be accelerated for the sake of national security. President Eisenhower took these findings most seriously, and ordered work on the ICBM program accelerated by assigning it “the highest national priority.”

The Western Development Division (WDD), an extension of the ARDC, was created and assigned to spearhead the development of ICBMs.

Western Development Division
Trevor Gardner, Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan F. Twining, and Lieutenant General Donald Putt received approval for a management agency within the Air Force, the WDD, whose primary purpose would be to develop an ICBM. The WDD was created “solely for the prosecution of research, development, test, and production leading to a successful intercontinental ballistic missile.”

The WDD facilitated the rapid development of the Atlas system, and its employees worked long hours to get the job done. For example, Lieutenant General Otto Glasser reported that a normal work week consisted of ten-hour days, six days a week, with extra time often being put in on Sundays. The main function of this working group was not to actually build an ICBM, but to work together with private contractors to design the new weapon as quickly and cheaply as possible.

The project became a race against time, with the goal of an operational ICBM by the end of the 1950s—the estimated date for an operational Soviet ICBM. To many of the workers, the very safety and security of the United States seemed to hinge on the success of their program.

To help meet its goals, the WDD contracted with the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation of Los Angeles, California to provide technical direction. This joining of forces speaks to the increased size and importance of the ICBM program in the Air Force’s eyes. The number of Ramo-Wooldridge staff members assigned to assist the WDD on the ICBM project started with 170 staff members at the beginning of 1954 and grew to 5,182 by the end of 1960.

The WDD opened its office in a former elementary school in Inglewood, California, in 1954 with General Bernard A. Schriever, a forty-three year-old well respected brigadier general, appointed as its head. In an attempt to maintain a low profile for this top-secret project, military staff stationed at the WDD wore civilian clothes. ICBM chronicler and journalist Roy Neal described the WDD headquarters in these words, “No sign identified the white schoolhouse as the Western Development Division... The windows were frosted and heavily barred. All outside doors, except one, were locked. The only entrance was across a chain-link fenced parking lot. A security guard manned the door... Some of the old-timers recall... the comment of the school boy who was sauntering by the school buildings. Eying the frosted glass and steel-barred windows, he said to a chum, ‘Boy am I glad I don’t go to school here.’”

The WDD staff began their work designing and coordinating the construction of the Atlas ICBM. In 1955, the WDD requested and received Air Force approval to develop a second ICBM, the Titan, concurrently.
Minuteman Missile National Historic Site

Historic Resource Study

with the Atlas. The WDD initiated the research and development on the Titan in the hope that if Atlas was delayed, Titan with slightly different engineering could be made operational by the end of the 1950s and keep the United States from falling behind in the missile race.59

Liquid-Fuel Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles: Atlas and Titan

One of the most important early problems tackled by missile developers working with the WDD was that of fueling the rocket, or more accurately, of finding a fuel that would be effective in flight, but also safe on the ground. Early ICBMs were powered by a highly volatile liquid-fuel mixture of liquid oxygen and kerosene or nitrogen tetroxide.60 This mix powered both the early ICBMs–Atlas and Titan. Problems with liquid fuel were evident from the early days of development and posed challenges and safety issues for on-site crews. Liquid fuel was heavy and unstable and dangerous to handle and store. Other practical issues included the need to store the fuel outside the missile, loading the fuel just prior to launch. This complication made it necessary to develop a safe system of pumps, storage tanks, and mixing chambers to store the fuel.

The other option for powering the new ICBMs was solid fuel, which was only in the beginning stages of research and development when the Atlas missile program began in earnest in 1954.61 Given the mission of the WDD to produce a working ICBM in the shortest possible timeframe, liquid fuel was the only viable option for the first ICBMs.62

Atlas

The Atlas missile was the first ICBM activated by the Air Force. The development and deployment of this ICBM was the result of a massive, fast-tracked effort on the part of the WDD, the ARDC, and its contractors. By December 1955, one year after the Atlas development program was taken over by the WDD, there were fifty-six contractors working on the Atlas program.63 By 1957 the list of contractors had grown to 157.

Early specifications for the Atlas missile required a 240,000 pound vehicle with two 135,000 pound booster engines and a sixty thousand pound sustainer engine. Although Atlas development utilized certain elements of existing technology, including propulsion systems designed for the canceled Navaho cruise missiles, the Atlas design was state-of-the-art.64 The Atlas missiles had to be pressurized while on alert, because the stainless steel shell was so thin—a requirement of flight—that only pressure kept it in place while on the ground. If the missile was fueled and launched, the liquid oxygen fuel inside the missile created the necessary pressure to hold the missile’s shape. This system allowed for a much lighter airframe, but required continual maintenance to prevent structural collapse. In layman’s terms, an unpressurized Atlas missile might best be understood as a deflated balloon.65

The first Atlas ICBM was tested successfully on 17 December 1957 and the first Atlas missile went on alert at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California on 31 October 1959.66 Atlas missile crews were in place at numerous air force bases by 1961, and a year later, twelve Atlas squadrons were on alert, in addition to the missile at Vandenberg.67

Three generations of the Atlas missile were deployed by the Air Force—Atlas D, E, and F. Technological advances would be seen in each new generation of Atlas produced, most notably through improvements in thrust, launch, and guidance system. As the Atlas is the direct predecessor of the Minuteman missile, some key details of the progression of this system will shed useful light on the Minuteman’s origins.68
Atlas D

- First deployed in 1959.

- First deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, and Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska.

- F.E. Warren Air Force Base had two squadrons with six missiles. Vandenberg Air Force Base and Offutt Air Force Base had three squadrons for a total of nine missiles at each base.

- Possessed 360,000 pounds of thrust and measured eighty-two feet long.

- Propelled by a one- and- one- half stage liquid- fuel rocket.

- The missile was stored horizontally and housed aboveground in soft complexes with gantries or “coffins.”

- To launch, the missile roof was pulled back, the missile raised to a vertical position, fueled, and fired.

- The launch sequence began when the two boosters and the sustainer engine were lit. Two small vernier engines above the sustainer ignited shortly after lift- off (2.5 seconds). Booster engines burned once in flight, and these, along with the turbo- pumps, were discarded quickly once a signal was received from the ground station. The sustainer engine was the last to extinguish and the vernier engines were responsible for course and velocity corrections.

- Three missiles, a control center, and a radio guidance system were controlled by a single missile crew.

- The radio guidance system was accurate to one and one-half miles and could only control one missile at a time.

- Armed with a one-megaton thermonuclear warhead.

- Range of approximately 6,400 miles.

Atlas E

- First deployed in 1961.


- Nine missiles comprised a squadron. Fairchild, Forbes and F.E. Warren Air Force Bases had three squadrons. Vandenberg had one squadron.

- Atlas E was more powerful than Atlas D, with 389,000 pounds of thrust.
• Range of approximately 9,400 miles.
• Controlled by a self-contained, automatic inertial guidance system accurate to within one and one-half miles.
• Armed with a one-megaton thermonuclear warhead.
• Missiles were stored in aboveground coffins.
• To launch, the Atlas E was raised to a vertical position and fueled.
• A separate launch crew staffed each missile site.

*Atlas F*

• Placed on alert in 1962.
• Twelve silos and a support base formed a squadron.
• One squadron was deployed at each of the six bases mentioned above.
• More powerful than Atlas E, with 390,000 of thrust.
• Range of approximately 9,400 miles.
• Armed with a one-megaton thermonuclear warhead.
• Controlled by self-contained, automatic inertial guidance system accurate to within one and one-half miles.
• Missile stored vertically in hardened underground silo.
• Missile raised to surface on elevator during launch sequence.
• A single missile was housed in the Atlas F silo with an adjoining underground launch control facility.  

By 1962 the number of Atlas missiles scattered across the country had grown to 126. Though first, the Atlas was never intended to be the only American strategic missile. It was destined to be eclipsed in its role by the more advanced Titan and Minuteman systems to follow. The last Atlas missile was launched at Vandenberg on 24 March 1995. Rather than a nuclear payload, this Atlas E carried a Defense Meteorological Weather Satellite to orbit.  

*Titan I*

The development of the Titan missile resulted from the decision of the WDD and the Eisenhower administration in 1955 to move forward with the development of a second ICBM, in case the Atlas ran into
The WDD developed Titan ICBMs concurrently with the Atlas. Titan I had several distinct advantages over the Atlas, including greater range, speed, and warhead size. As with the information detailed on the Atlas above, some key moments and statistics for the Titan program will help provide context for the more exhaustive Minuteman discussion to follow. Features of the Titan I include:

- Combat crews began working at the Titan I missile sites in 1961.
- First Titan I went on alert in 1962 at Lowry Air Force Base in Colorado.
- In 1962 Titan I ICBMs were deployed in six squadrons having three missiles each.
- Measured ninety-eight feet long and possessed a self-supporting frame.
- Three missiles were housed in adjacent silos and controlled by a single launch control facility, thereby making this system more efficient for the Air Force to operate.
- A single Titan I, with a range of over 6,300 miles, was capable of launching fifteen minutes after the order was received.
- Two additional Titan I ICBMs in the squadron launch at seven-and-a-half-minute intervals after the first missile.
- Propellant consisted of a two-stage liquid oxygen and kerosene system.
- Missile housed in a 165-foot-deep silo and was raised to the surface for launch.
- Armed with a single four megaton thermonuclear warhead.
- Used to successfully test a “hot” launch directly from the silo. The ability to launch directly from the silo without raising the missile to the surface resulted in a quicker launch time.

Titan I remained on alert for only three years—from 1962 until 1965—before being replaced by the Titan II.

**Titan II**

Titan II was approved for development in 1959 and was designed to correct some of the perceived shortcomings of the Titan I system. Fifty-four Titan II ICBMs, deployed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas, and McConnell Air Force Base in Kansas, remained on active duty until deactivation began in 1982 and was completed in 1987.

Features of Titan II include:

- Improved inertial guidance and fuel systems.
- Armed with a nine megaton thermonuclear warhead.
• A maximum range of nine thousand miles.

• Employed storable propellants.

• Ability to launch in two minutes.

• Improved rocket engines featured 432,000 pounds of thrust in the first stage and a second stage with 100,000 pounds of thrust.

• Based on the successful tests conducted with Titan I, the Titan II could be launched directly from the silo without having to be raised to the surface.

• Squadrons consisted of nine missiles, each in an underground silo and controlled by a neighboring underground Launch Control Center.

• Two officers and two enlisted combat crew staffed the Launch Control Facility. Beginning in 1978 the first female crewmembers served on the crew of Titan II, setting the precedent for the later mixed-gender Minuteman crews.

As the above discussion demonstrates, both the Atlas and Titan programs offered significant improvements over the manned strategic weapons systems that preceded them. However, each had its shortcomings. The Minuteman was designed to overcome these deficiencies. It is to the Minuteman itself that we next turn.
Plate 5. Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and Development Trevor Gardner (left) and Major General Bernard Schriever (right)—two champions in the development of the ICBM
(Courtesy U.S. Air Force, History Division)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles


Plate 7. Drawing of Titan I, the United States’ first two-stage ICBM (Lonnquest and Winkler, To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program, 228)
Chapter 3: Minuteman and the Next Generation (1960s–present)

The Missile Gap and Minuteman

Although the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan systems were operational by the early 1960s, the Air Force actively sought to develop another Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)—one powered by solid fuel that would be more cost-effective, smaller, and better suited to mass production. This push for improved technology was largely driven by the desire to surpass Soviet missile technology and overcome what seemed a growing “missile gap.” The Soviet Union’s successful launch of “Sputnik,” the world’s first man-made orbiting satellite, in 1957, had rattled American policymakers and military strategists to their core. Sputnik seemingly demonstrated that the Communist World was clearly in the lead in missile technology, and on 23 October 1957, a board of civilian consultants told Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Allen Dulles that the United States trailed the Soviets in this vital field by “two to three years.” Production of a Soviet ICBM capable of striking the United States was “nearly” a reality, they warned, and they predicted Soviet deployment of a dozen such missiles by the end of 1958. In their words, the United States was entering “a period of grave national emergency.” Within two years, Congressional hearings concerning the “missile gap” provided the public with a view into the superpower race for rockets, whole they simultaneously offered the Air Force opportunity to promote expensive new missile systems. Estimates of Soviet capabilities varied widely through these years. The Kremlin did not publicize its military plans and what claims it did make were rarely trusted in the West, nor did it need to endure the public process of Congressional funding as the Pentagon. Senator Stuart Symington, formerly the first Secretary of the Air Force, used CIA estimates to inform Eisenhower during the Summer of 1958 that the Soviets might have as many as 500 ICBMs by 1961. Flights by high-altitude spy planes such as the U-2 in 1959 and 1960 later fostered lower estimates of Soviet capabilities, though no one in the West could know for certain the true measure of Soviet missile strength.

Though Democrats would make the “missile gap” an important political issue in the 1960 election, later records disproved its existence. The United States actually possessed greater nuclear strike capabilities at this time. Not only did Western forces field larger bomber forces, but though exact numbers of Soviet capabilities remain impossible to state with accuracy, a problem compounded by their varied range and destructive capabilities, so too was the West ahead in missiles. Before departing office, for example, the Eisenhower Administration increased the scope of its second-generation missiles to 384 Polaris and 540 Minuteman, as opposed to less than one hundred fully capable Soviet ICBMs. Everyone expected both sides to only increase their nuclear strike capabilities in the years to come—just as American policymakers planned to deploy systems such as the Minuteman for decades at least, though in the final analysis, domestic politics and budgetary restraints (or opportunities) affected American missile deployments as much as estimates of Soviet capabilities. As historian Peter Roman has concluded, “ironically, the administration had finally initiated the buildup that the missile gap critics had clamored for—and did it just as intelligence estimates of Soviet missiles were being revised downward.” Indeed, the Air Force took advantage of the political atmosphere fostered by the Congressional inquiries and public concern over the missile gap to present an initial plan to Congress for accelerating the Minuteman program beginning in 1960, calling for 445 Minuteman missiles to be operational by January 1965 and eight hundred missiles by June 1965, leaving an exasperated Eisenhower to exclaim “perhaps we should go crazy and produce ten thousand Minutemen.” In an era of Cold War fear, the only proper number of nuclear arms seemed the number capable of installing confidence in one’s own public, and confidence of an assured retaliation in one’s enemy. The new Minuteman missile, designed to be hidden and protected in a hole in the ground, was referred to by President John F. Kennedy following the Cuban Missile Crisis as his “ace in the hole.” This was also the title of Roy Neal’s 1962 history that chronicled the development of the Minuteman missile.
Development of Solid-Fuel Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The development of solid fuel for ICBMs occurred simultaneously with the deployment of the Atlas and Titan ICBMs. The liquid fuel that powered these rockets added weight to the missile reducing its range, while the extreme volatility of liquid fuels made them dangerous to work with. Solid fuels promised to allow for smaller and cheaper missiles with greater effective range, while simultaneously eliminating the need for a problematic liquid- fuel system.8

By 1955 missiles propelled with solid fuel proved practical for shorter flights and two years later solid- fuel technology had progressed sufficiently for scientists to recommend large- scale development of a solid- fuel ICBM. Buoyed by these results, the Air Force authorized a series of studies that same year to develop a solid- fuel ICBM that was smaller than either the Atlas or Titan. Contracts to study solid- fuel missiles were finalized in 1956, and, rather than being completed in- house by the WDD, the work was awarded to the Wright Air Development Center (WADC), a private corporation contracted by the Air Force for missile development. The WADC directed the work of companies such as Aerojet- General, Thiokol, and Phillips Companies as they proceeded with solid- fuel feasibility studies.84 General Bernard Shriever, who headed the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (the WDD prior to renaming in 1957) during the first years of the Minuteman program, felt that the transition from liquid to solid fuel, with its more powerful engines, greater range, and increased safety, was the most significant advancement in ICBM development, allowing the United States to jump ahead of the Soviets in missile technology.85

Minuteman I

Development

The Minuteman grew from this massive effort, and a further illumination of the role played by its principal designers in the early years of development offers valuable insights into the Minuteman’s initial design. While WADC oversaw its solid- fuel studies, Lieutenant Colonel Edward (Ed) Hall of the Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) had been transferred from the faltering Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile program to his own office within the BMD. General Shriever gave Hall the freedom to design a solid- fuel missile, designated at that time Weapons System Q. Hall distilled the growing mass of information produced by the variety of contracted studies on solid fuel and other missile technologies. Hall generally worked alone, at first without even an administrative assistant. The one person Hall collaborated with regularly was Barney Adelman of Ramo- Wooldridge. Hall and Adelman worked to produce a design for a solid- fuel missile.84

Hall ultimately incorporated technologies developed by a series of recent Air Force studies, including new swivel nozzles to control missile direction and an accurate method of shutting off the engines. In addition, he used previous studies to calculate warhead size and weight and research on solid fuel to determine the distance the missile could travel. Hall’s final feasibility study, produced in 1957, outlined a series of missiles powered by the new fuel technology he named the “Minuteman” as a symbolic reminder of the country’s military past and to reflect the quick response time of the missile system. Minuteman was designed to be an efficient, reliable weapon that could be mass- produced, stand unattended for long periods, be operated and maintained by small crews, stored and launched from underground silos, and automatically monitored for condition and combat readiness. It offered, in short, the solution to the troubling missile gap.86

The Air Force accepted Hall’s design—retaining the name Minuteman— in March of 1958, and began planning for funding and developing a Minuteman force.86 The Pentagon initially planned to deploy one hundred Minuteman missiles by 1964 and another four hundred by 1965.87 Delays and budget troubles plagued the early development of the Minuteman, however. Though the Air Force positioned itself
solidly behind the development of the Minuteman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not share their enthusiasm for the Minuteman program, preferring other strategic defense options, such as the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, Thor and Jupiter. Rumors of stalling tactics on the part of the JCS began to circulate. The Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee and the Office of the Secretary of Defense backed the Minuteman development, but a request for $150 million for fiscal year 1959 was initially reduced to $50 million. Without those extra funds, the Minuteman’s supporters warned, the missile would not be ready for operational deployment by the early 1960s.

Funds were not forthcoming until the BMD and the Air Force persuaded General Sam Anderson, commander of Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White, Vice Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, and Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas of the viability of the Minuteman. General Schriever asserted to these men that there were no problems with either the concept or design of the new missiles and he asked for flexibility in carrying out the first part of a development program. He stated that he could prove his point within six months, if given the funding.

After the general finished convincing his immediate superiors of the viability and utility of the program, he turned his attention to the three men who would make the final decision on Air Force program funding–Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Holaday, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles. General Schriever arranged a deal whereby the BMD received $50 million for the first six months of 1959. If in that time the BMD could prove the efficacy of the Minuteman, the remaining $100 million would be released for Minuteman development.

By 7 January 1959, the Air Force established an operational schedule for the Minuteman. The first flight test was to take place in December 1960 with an operational weapon system in place by 1963. This ambitious schedule generated a great deal of skepticism on the part of outside scientists and government officials, but Schriever and his team were certain that the program could succeed. To close the “missile gap,” and more importantly to prove that they were the best service to do so, the Air Force needed the Minuteman, and in a hurry.

Testing
The BMD successfully launched a “tethered” Minuteman I prototype on 15 September 1959. This test showed that the Minuteman could be fired directly from an underground silo, prompting the Air Force to fast-track the program in the hopes of having the first Minuteman I on duty by 1962. The production of the first operational Minuteman I force was approved in March 1960 and consisted of 150 missiles assigned to a single missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. The wing had three squadrons with fifty missiles each. Construction on the operational facility to house the missile wing at Malmstrom began in March 1961.

The previous month at Cape Canaveral, the first full test of a Minuteman I proved successful—the missile deposited its warhead 4,600 miles from the launch site. During these tests the missiles did not employ armed atomic warheads. TIME magazine reported that an awed observer murmured “Brother, there goes the missile gap” and described the successful test flight as follows, “Even for sophisticated missile watchers, the men who have marked the flight of so many of Cape Canaveral’s great fire-breathing birds, last week’s show was a dazzling spectacle. The blast-off was swift and sure; there was none of that heart stopping hover of other tests when liquid-fueled monsters seemed to balance in uncertain equilibrium before they picked up the momentum of flight.” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a longtime advocate of a strong strategic defense and the elimination of the missile gap, became a leading advocate, within the new Kennedy Administration, of the Minuteman program following a March 1961 visit to the BMD. During this visit scientists demonstrated their advances in solid-fuel technology. McNamara walked away from this meeting more convinced than ever of the need, and of the value, of the new Minuteman missile system. The production of the
Minuteman Missile National Historic Site

Historic Resource Study

Minuteman I proved successful, and by 1964 McNamara determined the Minuteman missile force would consist of one thousand missiles. As with any program of this size (and expense), his determination of this number was reached only after lengthy consultations with the JCS, the National Security Council, the White House, think tanks such as RAND, and congressional leaders. By June 1965 the Air Force was on the way to meeting this target, with an operational force of eight hundred Minuteman I missiles located at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming.

**Design**

Minuteman I was designed to be a “highly reliable, three-stage, solid-propellant weapon” that could endure long periods in storage and travel over five thousand miles to reach its target. This was further than any of the earlier generations of ICBMs. Yet the Air Force required more than simply a new missile to make the Minuteman system work. Launch Facilities (LFs) and other support structures had to be designed in order for the Minuteman to prove an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression.

The initial Minuteman I force was divided into five missile wings of either three or four missile squadrons per wing. Fifty missiles made up a squadron, and each squadron was further divided into five flights of ten missiles. A flight had its own Launch Control Center (LCC) that monitored ten LFs. To reduce its vulnerability to enemy attack, each flight was dispersed across several miles, with the LCC located a minimum of three miles from any missile and the missiles similarly distanced from each other.

In Minuteman I wings I and II electrical and environmental support equipment were initially located aboveground in the Launch Control Facility (LCF) support building. The missile system was constructed during a time when the doctrine of “massive retaliation” directed strategic planning—the military expected to launch the entire Minuteman I force in retaliation for a Soviet attack, and though a grim prospect, post-attack survivability of more than several hours for the crew was consequently not considered an essential feature of the design. This strategy changed with the construction of Minuteman I wings III to V, and LCC support equipment moved underground as part of the new “controlled response” strategy, which called not only for the possibility of a limited or controlled American nuclear response, but also consequently for post-attack missile survivability. No one thing prompted this change in American strategic thinking. Rather, “controlled response” developed organically by the close of the 1950s as a potential answer to the limitations of “massive retaliation,” most specifically the way an all- or- nothing nuclear response to potential superpower conflicts threatened to too severely limit the options available to policymakers engaged in a crisis. By developing the ability to strike with limited components of their nuclear arsenal, American policymakers hoped to achieve not only greater flexibility in the international arena, but also greater success as well, as “controlled response” led to the Kennedy Administration’s famed “flexible response” policies, which called for non- nuclear and even irregular (such as the Special Forces) applications of military might. Not every crisis warranted a full-scale nuclear response, after all, and by the 1960s, American leaders demanded the tools necessary to meet the changing needs of a Cold War fought increasingly in the global periphery.

**Contractors**

Boeing received the original contract for the design, assembly, and testing of Minuteman I in October 1958 and later contracted to develop hardware and electronics and check operational facilities. Other associate contractors for the Minuteman system included AVCO and General Electric for reentry vehicles designed to deliver nuclear warheads to their targets, Autonetics Division of North American Rockwell for guidance systems, and Bell Aerosystems for post-boost control and a navigation system for the reentry vehicle. The post-boost controls served the critical function of controlling the reentry vehicle after it had separated from the missile and began to descend to its target. Sylvania won the contract for the ground electronics system and TRW Systems headed up systems engineering and technical direction.
Three contractors were chosen to develop the three solid-propellant stages for Minuteman I. Each of these three stages performed specific functions. The first stage launched the missile, the second stage provided additional thrust as the missile traveled towards the target, and the third stage propelled the reentry vehicle with its nuclear payload back into the atmosphere and to its designated target.

The Thiokol Chemical Company built the first stage—the M55 motor. The M55 produced two hundred thousand pounds of thrust using a combination of Thiokol synthetic rubber, powdered aluminum, and ammonium perchlorate (AP). Its steel casing utilized four small, swiveling nozzles for propulsion and navigation. Aerojet-General constructed the sixty thousand-pound thrust second-stage engine, which was fueled by polyurethane and AP, while also employing swiveling nozzles and a steel casing. Aerojet-General replaced the steel casing initially employed in its engine with lighter and stronger titanium in 1962. The third stage was constructed by Hercules and consisted of a thirty-five thousand pound thrust motor with a composite AP propellant and a technologically advanced glass-fiber filament-wound casing. By employing so many contractors for the Minuteman I project, the Pentagon managed to spread earnings from the lucrative missile program throughout the American aerospace industry, providing jobs for thousands of workers and profits for even more investors, and pleasing politicians with companies in their home districts. The variety of contractors also ensured the widespread dissemination of advanced technologies and procedures throughout the industry, in what was effectively a Pentagon-sponsored investment in the education and research of its most vital defense firms.

Minuteman Production Board
Boeing and a group of other associate contractors managed the design and building of the Minuteman I missiles. Because of the large number of contractors involved in the project, contract management for Minuteman production became quite cumbersome and in 1962 Major General Thomas Gerrity, head of the Ballistic Systems Division of the BMD, brought the associate contractors together to seek a more efficient production program in order to ensure a timely completion. Representatives from Boeing, Thiokol, Hercules, Aerojet-General, AVCO, Space Technology Laboratories, and Autonetics were invited to the meeting, which ultimately established the Minuteman Production Board. This group of associate contractors had unprecedented direct participation in assembling the Minuteman system. Each associate contractor had a member on the board. Board members also had the authority to commit to corrective measures to address any production problems that arose. By putting their reputations on the line, and by simultaneously providing each contractor with the flexibility and opportunity to solve any unforeseen problems in their own product, Gerrity’s production board managed the Minuteman program with impressive efficiency.

Capabilities
The missile the Air Force and contractors produced was a marvel for its time. Minuteman I stood 55.9 feet long and, when fueled and armed, weighed sixty-five thousand pounds with a maximum speed exceeding fifteen thousand miles per hour. The first Minuteman I, model IA, could travel approximately 4,300 miles, which fell short of the expected range of five thousand miles due to a problem with the swivel nozzles that controlled the missile’s propulsion. The Air Force subsequently produced the Minuteman IB, which had an improved second-stage motor housing made of titanium. The new housing improved on the steel housing used for the Minuteman IA, lightening the missile and increasing its range over the Minuteman IA. The Minuteman IB traveled approximately six thousand miles to its target. Both missiles featured an inertial guidance system designed to deliver a single warhead to a preprogrammed target halfway around the world in less than half an hour after launch.
National Site Selection
The Air Force went through a rigorous process of selecting sites to house its Minuteman missiles. During the early stages of Minuteman I deployment, the site location was restricted by the maximum flight distance of the Minuteman IA. This range led the Air Force to search for sites in the northern United States, bringing the missiles within closer range of the Soviet Union.

Other factors restricted site selection for the new Minuteman. For example, sites had to be within the continental United States lest foreign states argue that the housing of missiles on their territory gave them a say in their use. In the early days of the Cold War, for instance, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations encountered the British government’s insistence that nuclear weapons aboard American bombers based in the United Kingdom could only be used with London’s approval. Additionally, the Air Force required that Minuteman I ICBMs be spaced far enough apart to be considered separate targets, so that one Soviet strike would not debilitate a significant number of American missiles. The missiles also had to be far enough inland to be outside the range of sea-launched Soviet missiles, yet still within effective range of identified enemy targets. To reduce the expense of deploying Minuteman I, the Air Force located the command and support facilities for the new Minuteman weapon system at existing Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases. (For a discussion of SAC, see Section II, Chapter 2: U.S. Air Force, Strategic Air Command, and Ellsworth Air Force Base). By using existing bases, the Air Force took advantage of existing infrastructure, and avoided the need to develop a site from the ground up.

Army Corps of Engineers
The Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) held the responsibility for construction administration and construction of the Minuteman LFs and LCFs. Once the support bases were identified by the Air Force, the Army Corps, the BMD, and SAC Headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska sited the individual silo sites. The team worked together, conducting soil analyses and topographical and geographical surveys to help locate the specific locations for the missile silos. By 1960 decisions on site locations had been made and the construction of the Minuteman I LFs and LCFs was well under way.

Given the location of most Minuteman sites on the upper plains, the Omaha District of the Army Corps of Engineers (Omaha District) oversaw the construction of the Minuteman LFs and LCFs. The construction of the LFs was, in the words of historian Ernest Schwiebert, “the largest financial outlay of the ballistic missile program.” However, the construction of the facilities for Minuteman I at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota in the early 1960s were estimated by the Army Corps to cost $400,000 per silo, which was significantly cheaper than the cost of the earlier Atlas and Titan systems in the late 1950s and early 1960s at $2 million per silo. The special fueling facilities required for the liquid-fuel ICBMs and smaller size of the Minuteman I resulted in this difference in price, further proof of the Air Force’s claim that the Minuteman would save money while providing a more powerful nuclear deterrent.

Typically, the Omaha District supervised the Minuteman installations and planned for their specific location, and then hired private contractors to build the facilities. Omaha’s Peter Kiewit Company won the right to serve as prime contractor for construction at many of the missile sites. The Omaha District provided design services and contract management for construction of Minuteman’s ground facilities at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, for example, as well as Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, and Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. The construction at Minot Air Force Base displays the scope of the effort required to construct the LFs and LCFs for the Minuteman missile. The Minot site demanded construction of 190 silos and fifteen LCFs in a twelve thousand-square-mile area. During peak construction, Kiewit and its subcontractors employed six thousand workers, 1,100 vehicles, and 115 cranes to keep construction on pace to meet the aggressive project schedule.
By December 1962 Minuteman IA had been deployed at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. The Air Force also deployed the upgraded Minuteman IB with a titanium second-stage engine case at Ellsworth Air Force Base, Minot Air Force Base, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. The Minuteman I missiles at these bases were clustered around former Atlas complexes. By June 1965, eight hundred silos across the country housed the new Minuteman I ICBMs. The complete installation of the Minuteman I ICBMs eventually took ten years and faced a range of challenges dependent on the specific conditions at each site. Adverse conditions varied from particularly trying winters to soil conditions that required special engineering techniques to construct structurally sound missile silos and underground LFs.

Once activated, the Minuteman missile was always in a state of readiness requiring less maintenance than earlier missiles and this impact was described by Lt. Col. George V. Leffler, commander of the 100th Strategic Missile Squadron, “The Minuteman is like getting a new car and not getting the keys. You can’t drive it. You have no sense of ownership. With a liquid missile, you can run it up out of the silo on the elevator, fuel it, go into the countdown. We can’t touch a thing.”

Minuteman II

Development and Design

Even as the Air Force began deploying Minuteman I missiles in 1962, research and development into the Minuteman II had already begun. The new Minuteman was created to improve on the missile guidance systems, payload capacity, and anti-missile defenses of the Minuteman I. Minuteman II facilities offered survivability more in line with the Kennedy administration’s “controlled response” doctrine. The first test launch of Minuteman II occurred at Cape Canaveral in 1964 and the first operational launch occurred one year later. As part of the Force Modernization Program begun in 1966 to modernize the Air Force missiles, the Minuteman II ICBMs eventually replaced the entire fleet of Minuteman I ICBMs. In 1968, just three years after the first test launches, 350 Minuteman II ICBMs were in the ground. Between 1969 and 1975, the program replaced the Minuteman I with Minuteman II missiles, and upgraded LCFs and silos to accommodate the more sophisticated missile.

Capabilities

The second generation of the Minuteman missile, Minuteman II, differed from its predecessor in several important ways. It was a larger missile designed to accommodate increased engine and warhead size, measuring 57.6 feet long and weighing seventy thousand pounds. As with its predecessor, Minuteman II was capable of reaching speeds in excess of fifteen thousand miles per hour. Minuteman II offered an improved second-stage engine manufactured by Aerojet-General, improved targeting system, extended range, electronic autopilot, all-inertial guidance system, and an Avco Mark IIC reentry body with a one-to-two-megaton nuclear warhead. These improvements allowed the Minuteman II to strike targets from a greater distance with greater precision. New anti-missile technology increased the chances of the missile avoiding an enemy’s defenses and delivering its warhead. The missile gap had become a thing of the past by the mid-1960s, as American intelligence proved beyond doubt the superiority of American missiles over their Soviet counterparts. However, this fact did not keep the Air Force from continuing to improve its product.

National Site Conversion

Much of the work for site selection had already been completed with Minuteman I. When Minuteman II was ready for deployment, the Air Force established priorities for replacement of the Minuteman I missiles, and the first Minuteman II was deployed at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, in August 1965. The first operational Minuteman II squadron, the 447th Strategic Missile Squadron, went on
alert at Grand Forks Air Force Base in 1966. Minuteman II ICBMs eventually went in the ground at another five SAC bases (Malmstrom Air Force Base, Ellsworth Air Force Base, Minot Air Force Base, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, and Whiteman Air Force Base). Malmstrom Air Force Base was also selected as the location for an additional Minuteman squadron, and LFs and LCFs were consequently constructed at this base.126

**Minuteman III and the Next Generation**

In July 1965, after the entire Minuteman I force was declared operational and prior to Minuteman II deployment, the Air Force contracted with Boeing for research and development for the next phase of Minuteman, Minuteman III.127 Minuteman III represented a change in the United States’ strategic planning, and consequently resulted in additional advancements in missile technology. Minuteman I was designed based on the theory of “massive retaliation” which required the missiles to launch at one time in retaliation to an attack. Minuteman II was designed based on the theory of “controlled response” which required some of the missile fleet to survive a nuclear attack. Minuteman III was designed under a theory of “flexible response” which required the missile to be able to fire independently and target multiple potential aggressors.128 Like the earlier Minuteman missiles, Minuteman III underwent rapid development. Five hundred fifty Minuteman IIIs were in the ground by 1977 and Minuteman III sites were later located in Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. Four hundred fifty Minuteman II and fifty-four Titan II ICBMs remained on alert at this time, after retirement of Atlas and Titan I.129

**Capabilities**

Minuteman III stands 59.8 feet long and weighs 76,000 pounds. The new generation of Minuteman employed an upgraded third-stage engine, post-boost navigation control of the reentry vehicle, and an MK12 reentry vehicle possessing three nuclear warheads that could be independently delivered to multiple targets. The upgraded engine and the greater navigation control enabled the weapon to reach multiple targets more quickly and accurately than the previous generations of Minuteman. Previous Minuteman missiles carried a single nuclear warhead and therefore could only strike a single target.130

**Advancements in Missile Technology and the Cold War**

Much of the research and development effort to improve missile technology in the later part of the twentieth century centered on increasing the sophistication of the Minuteman III system. Efforts to increase the accuracy of Minuteman reentry vehicles and to design these vehicles to be less detectable by radar were ongoing in the 1970s.131 Today the Minuteman system is commonly thought of as part of a “triad” defense system involving land-based missiles, submarine-launched ICBMs (known as SLBMs) controlled by the Navy, and Air Force manned nuclear bombers. When analysts use the term triad, they refer to these three independently operated nuclear systems (land-, air-, and sea-based), reasoning that three such disparate systems would collectively prove less vulnerable to enemy attack than any solitary system might be.132

The purpose of America’s nuclear program was, at its most basic, one of deterrence. With the ability to launch unprecedented destruction, American strategists reasoned that no foreign foe would dare strike at Western vital interests. Throughout the Cold War, none did. The superpowers fought bitter and brutal wars on the Cold War’s periphery, through proxy states and powers. Korea, Vietnam, and Angola provided stark examples of Cold War geopolitics played out on a local stage, often with deadly results. Minuteman was never designed for such conflicts; it was instead a product built and deployed for one purpose: to deter a direct Soviet strike at Europe or at the United States itself. Its was a global mission.
Ultimately, the Cold War system that spawned Minuteman and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction through nuclear deterrents came to an end. The details of the Cold War’s final chapters will be discussed in greater depth in later sections. For now, it is important to note that the Minuteman II system lasted through the end of the Cold War, but not long after. The international system experienced dramatic changes throughout the 1980s. Renewed American military spending following the pain of Vietnam, initiated by the Carter Administration but later taken to new heights by President Ronald Reagan, helped exacerbate East-West tensions following the period of relative détente of the 1970s. Simultaneously, Communist leaders behind Europe’s Iron Curtain faced a new spirit of change and reform. Such calls for reform were prompted in part by outside forces (such as Reagan’s vitriolic anti-communist rhetoric, improved access to Western media including television broadcasts, and calls for change from prominent human-rights advocates such as Pope John Paul II), but found their greatest expression in domestic reform movements such as Poland’s Solidarity. The tide of discontent, when coupled with a growing awareness of their country’s inability to match American military spending (and technological advancement more broadly) prompted dramatic changes in the Soviet system by a group of political reformers led by Mikhail Gorbachev. As we shall see, Gorbachev prompted political, economic, and social reforms at home, and helped create a new atmosphere of East-West cooperation, in particular following Reagan’s departure from office. The Cold War informally ended in 1989, when West and East Germans spontaneously gathered in Berlin to tear down the hated wall that had divided them for a half-century. It formally ended two years later, when a failed coup attempt in Moscow led ultimately to the dissolution of the Soviet empire in favor of a democratic regime headed by Russia’s first post-Cold War president, Boris Yeltsin.

Whether the threat of nuclear annihilation had safeguarded superpower relations during the Cold War, keeping them from mutual assured destruction, can never be fully known or determined. What is clear is that deterrence worked, in the sense that the two sides never came to direct nuclear blows (though as we shall see, they came close), in no small part because of the fear of widespread nuclear war. Minuteman was one such deterrent...against global communism. As we shall see, it was a weapon that came to shape the American landscape, leaving a mark on the men and women who operated it.
Plate 10. From left to right, scale drawings of Atlas, Titan I, and Minuteman I ICBMs (John C. Lonnquest and David F. Winkler, To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program, 65)
Plate 12. Line drawings showing the evolution of the Minuteman ICBM (Lonnquest and Winkler, To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program, 243)
Plate 13. Line drawing showing an exploded view of Minuteman II and the Minuteman II Transporter Erector (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, HAER SD-30- sheet 3)
Plate 14. Flight sequence of Minuteman II ICBM

(Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, HAER SD- 50- sheet 4)
Section II – Life on the South Dakota Plains: Before, During, and After Minuteman

Chapter 1: Life and Landscape Before Minuteman (to the 1960s)

The Minuteman changed the northern plains, but clearly the missile system was one small moment in the region’s far broader history. It is a land rich in geological, archeological, and sociological detail, with stories that range as far back as prehistory. In order to place the relatively short life span of the Minuteman (less than two generations) into the story of a land whose past is best measured in millennium, we now turn to the plains in the time before the Cold War.

South Dakota Plains Geological Formations

South Dakota lies within the boundaries of the Missouri Plateau, a continental landform that displays a variety of geological features, including three main geologic divisions. The first division, the Central Lowlands, lies east of the Missouri River and was formed through glacial activity between ten thousand to seventy-five thousand years ago. The second division extends west from the Missouri River and is known as the Western Plains. The Western Plains of South Dakota are part of the Great Plains and are the least populous section of the state. Landforms in the Great Plains are unglaciated and retain soils formed by shallow seas that covered the region approximately seventy-five million years ago. The state’s third major geologic region, known as the Black Hills, was formed by pressure from the earth’s tectonic plates that forced subsurface rock upward to create a sixty-mile-wide and 125-mile-long region known for its natural beauty.

The seas that once covered South Dakota’s Western Plains deposited limestone and sandstone overlain by soft Pierre shale. As the shale eroded through water and wind action, the rolling terrain in the Western Plains emerged, leaving short-grass plains mixed with eroded river valleys. The Badlands lie within the Great Plains. The striking landscape of the Badlands emerged from the process of erosion caused by water and wind, which created tall spires of sedimentary rock and exposed rich fossil deposits. Native Americans and white settlers alike viewed the landscape with respect and awe. In 1939 President Roosevelt established the Badlands National Monument and in the 1960s Congress expanded the monument by adding more than 130,000 acres of Oglala Sioux tribal land. The National Park Service and the Oglala Sioux jointly manage these lands. In 1978 Congress designated the Badlands a National Park, further safeguarding the region’s future.

Native American Settlement

The presence of Native American cultures in South Dakota spans thousands of years and includes five major periods—Paleo-Indian, Archaic, Woodland, Plains Village, and the plains Sioux. The Western Plains has experienced continuous occupation by native people who were removed to reservations through either treaty or the series of nineteenth-century wars fought between the Sioux and the United States Army.

These Native American cultures adapted to the changing environmental and political factors at work in the region. Environmental factors influencing native cultures included the availability and size of animals
for use as a food source and the availability of technologies for utilizing natural resources. Political factors directing cultural change included intertribal warfare and the arrival of, and ensuing population pressure from, Euro-Americans. Euro-Americans brought with them foreign political, agricultural, and property systems, as well as diseases that changed the power structure in the region.

The earliest people to reside in the area that later became South Dakota, the Paleo-Indians, practiced nomadic big game hunting, taking advantage of plentiful large game, such as Mastodons. Archaic period hunter-gatherers established themselves after the big game had disappeared. This group took advantage of available smaller game and the nuts and berries that grew wild in the area. As the Woodland tradition developed, a settled agricultural economy complete with a complex agricultural tool kit and a sophisticated religion blossomed. The Plains Village communities, typified by the fortified settlements of the Arikara, or Ree, tribe were present when the first white explorers arrived in South Dakota. The Arikara tribe established a dominant culture during the sixteenth century. Decimated by smallpox brought by the Europeans, the Arikara had entered a state of decline by the time the Sioux began arriving in the area in the eighteenth century.

When the early French, Spanish, and Euro-American explorers arrived in the region in the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, they initially encountered the Sioux, as well as remnants of the Arikara. The Sioux were a confederation of nomadic tribes, whose culture centered on the bison, which the tribe followed across the plains. The Teton Sioux, who controlled the western part of the state, were known as fierce warriors and expert horsemen, thus giving the Sioux their warrior-nomad reputation. Other branches of the Sioux, such as the eastern, Yankton tribe, did not participate in warfare to the same extent.

Starting in the 1850s, the Sioux began to feel pressure from the United States government to cede their land so that the area could be opened to Euro-American settlement. Conflict and treaties between the Sioux and the federal government continued through the second half of the century. Treaties negotiated in 1851, 1858, and 1868 reserved western South Dakota, known as the Great Sioux Reservation, for the Sioux and in return the tribe left their lands east of the Missouri River.

These early agreements did not end the conflict between the settlers and the Sioux, however. Additional agreements would be necessary as Euro-Americans pressed further west. Increasing demands for land from white settlers and the discovery of gold in the Black Hills in 1874 resulted in mounting encroachments into Sioux territory. As land-hungry settlers continued to arrive in increasing numbers, the government persisted in pushing the Sioux out of sections of the Western Plains and the Black Hills until finally the majority of South Dakota’s lands were under the control of either homesteaders, miners, or the government. Sioux lands remaining in South Dakota are presently on eight reservations: Cheyenne River, Crow Creek, Lower Brule, Pine Ridge Oglala, Rosebud, Sisseton-Wahpeton, Yankton, and Flandreau Santee. The Air Force made a conscious effort to avoid reservation lands when constructing Minuteman sites. Minuteman installations in South Dakota are bordered by the Cheyenne River reservation on the north, Pine Ridge Oglala and Rosebud on the south, and Lower Brule on the east.

To understand the forces acting on the Sioux during the nineteenth century into the middle of the twentieth century, it is necessary to trace the history of European and Euro-American exploration and settlement of South Dakota. The following section summarizes the settlement of South Dakota by Euro-Americans.
Early European Exploration and the Fur Trade

Three major expeditions through the lands that would include the future state of South Dakota paved the way for occupation by Euro-American settlers. France and Spain, which both laid claim to the territory prior to the United States purchase of the land in 1803, sent representatives to the area in search of a mythical western sea and to identify ways to exploit the area’s lucrative fur trade. After the Louisiana Purchase, the Lewis and Clark expedition followed in 1804-1806. Lewis and Clark spent fifty-four days in what would become South Dakota in the fall of 1804 recording information on the region’s natural environment and its inhabitants. Following the successful return of their expedition in 1806, fur traders increased their activities in South Dakota, beginning fifty years of intensive harvesting of beaver and bison pelts for market.  

The period between 1827 and 1840 saw the most intense fur-trading activity in South Dakota. By the beginning of the 1850s, changes in current fashions reduced the demand for furs, and the industry consequently declined. The edge of Euro-American settlement simultaneously moved west towards the Missouri River, leading the federal government to further pressure the indigenous Sioux population to cede lands west of the Missouri to the settlers.

Euro-American Land Speculation, Settlement, and Immigration

Settlement of the area increased after the federal government established the military post at Fort Randall on the upper Missouri River in 1856. Threats from Teton Sioux who were responding to encroachments on their native land to travelers on the Oregon Trail prompted a government decision to send troops to the area. General William Harney led a force of approximately one thousand soldiers to the territory with orders to address the issue in western South Dakota territory. During this time, the government began negotiations with the Yankton Sioux for the territory between the Big Sioux and Missouri Rivers. The Yankton Sioux eventually agreed to leave this area in 1858 and move to a reservation, marking the formal beginning of white settlement of South Dakota.

Congress established the Dakota territorial government in 1861, encompassing the future states of North and South Dakota. The Civil War, harsh climate, and troubled negotiations with the local Sioux populations hindered settlement until the 1870s, however. In 1860, for example, just 500 settlers had made the southeastern section of the territory their home. By the 1870s conditions had improved—the war had ended, the drought and grasshopper invasion had ceased to threaten crops, the Sioux had been confined to reservations, and the railroads had arrived.

The Homestead Act of 1862 and completion of the Dakota Southern Railroad between Sioux City, Iowa, and Yankton, South Dakota, in 1873 played a major role in encouraging the region’s settlement. Eager to boost immigration to the region, the railroads distributed pamphlets that promoted South Dakota’s agricultural promise and favorable climate. Though not always accurate, these pamphlets encouraged thousands to move, and the increased rate of settlement is reflected in U.S. census data, which records ten thousand settlers in South Dakota by 1870. Early settlers were primarily of Norwegian, Irish, Swedish, Dutch, Danish, and British descent. Between 1869 and 1874, Czechs and German-Soviets, as well as Hutterite, Mennonite, and eastern European Jewish religious groups, immigrated to the territory and established communities.

Euro-American settlement of the South Dakota Territory stalled during the financial panic that gripped the nation from 1873 to 1877. A shaky economy, highlighted by the 1873 stock market crash, combined with a resurgence of the grasshopper plague, effectively halted large-scale settlement until 1878.
The Black Hills gold rush provided the only source of continued settlement activity during this period. The discovery of gold in the Black Hills during the summer of 1874 created enormous pressure from settlers to gain entry to the Black Hills, which were still held by the Sioux. Prospectors could not be deterred from entering the area surreptitiously, and the United States government found itself forced to begin negotiations with the Sioux for access to the area. The rush peaked in 1877, and in the same year the government ratified a treaty with the Sioux that ceded the Black Hills west of the 103rd meridian and additional lands formed by the forks of the Cheyenne River. The Sioux also granted right-of-way for three wagon trails in the Black Hills. To date this treaty remains controversial in the region.

The Black Hills gold rush resulted in the beginning of Euro-American settlement in the western portion of South Dakota. Rapid City was established in 1874 and quickly became the "eastern gateway" to the Black Hills region. Other communities such as Deadwood and Lead also developed during this period. New civil divisions developed after the ratification of the treaty with the Sioux in 1877, including Custer, Lawrence, and Pennington Counties. Almost a century later, Pennington County would become the home of several Minuteman installations, including the Delta-09 Launch Facility (LF).

Western South Dakota’s gold rush began to wane in 1877 as surface gold deposits became exhausted. Homesteaders would not arrive on South Dakota’s Western Plains in large numbers again until the 1890s. However, settlement in the eastern section of the state began to increase rapidly. The Great Dakota Boom saw the influx of thousands of new settlers. The population in the eastern half of the state more than tripled between 1880 and 1885, rising from eighty-two thousand to two hundred and forty-nine thousand. By 1889 South Dakota gained recognition as a state.

Western Plains Settlement and Agricultural History
The settlement of South Dakota’s Western Plains is inextricably tied to agriculture. Early agricultural history of the region focused on raising livestock and ranching. Pennington County, created in 1877 during the Black Hills gold rush, and Jackson County, established in 1883, are located in what developed as prime ranching territory starting in the 1880s and in what became missile country during the twentieth century. Ranchers began driving their Texas Longhorns through the Black Hills as soon as the treaty with the Sioux opening this area was finalized. Large open range ranching operations dominated the landscape prior to the mid-1880s. During this period, ranchers, often financed with out-of-state capital, found tracts of unfenced, unsettled land that could support large operations. By 1884 between seven hundred thousand and eight hundred thousand cattle roamed South Dakota’s Western Plains, most of which were destined for markets in the East.

The environmental and political forces at work in the late 1880s resulted in a shift to moderate and small-scale livestock production. The climate on the Western Plains left large open range ranching operations susceptible to severe weather patterns. For example, the winter of 1886-1887 brought devastating storms that decimated the cattle herds and put many of the large ranches out of business. Homesteaders also pressured the ranchers by erecting fences around their claims. The new fences impeded ranching operations, which depended on large tracts of open range to feed their cattle. This issue caused strained relations between the homesteaders and the ranchers and further complicated the ranchers’ situation as they tried to recover from heavy livestock losses.

Additionally, as homesteaders arrived in greater numbers, the large ranchers found themselves increasingly out of favor politically, as public opinion tended to favor the permanent settlement that came with homesteading. By this time the surviving large ranches had been relegated to leasing lands from
Native American reservations that had not yet been opened for settlement. The 1890s saw a boom in the smaller ranching outfits and these outfits joined the growing number of homesteaders seeking success on South Dakota’s Western Plains.

By the turn of the twentieth century, settlers were distributed across the state. From the end of the nineteenth century to 1915, the state experienced the second Dakota Boom, which focused on the Western Plains area. Several factors helped to spark the renewed interest in settlement. The opening of additional Native American lands for settlement starting in the 1890s drew homesteaders to the Western Plains. The opening of these lands also sounded the death knell of the large range cattle operations, as the reservation lands formed the last stretch of open land in western South Dakota.

The government distributed lands on the newly opened reservations through a two-pronged system. Sections were either distributed among potential claimants through a lottery system or, in the case of Pennington County, through the more traditional route of the claims office. The claims office processed applications by homesteaders desiring to settle sections of land and attempted to impose some order on the homesteaders rush for land.

The completion of the Chicago and Northwestern and the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroads west of the Missouri River in the first decade of the twentieth century opened the area for further settlement. The railroads facilitated trade and brought a wave of new settlers. Towns appeared along the rail lines almost overnight, as prospective homesteaders made their way west. Rail connections linked Pierre and Chamberlain on the Missouri River with Rapid City and Lemmon with Mobridge in the northwest by 1907.

Located in Pennington County, Wall was one of the towns that appeared along the route of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad. Established in 1907, Wall received its name from the eight-mile-long outcropping that forms the Badlands, commonly referred to as “the wall” by cattlemen. Wall would later become famous as the home of the tourist mecca Wall Drug. It is the closest community to the 66th Strategic Missile Squadron that included Delta-01 and Delta-09.

The second boom was also largely motivated by proponents of the dry-farming movement who asserted that the western South Dakota plains could be successfully farmed with drought-resistant plants using new techniques, including deep plowing and cultivating fallow. Availability of water in an area that receives less than nineteen inches of rainfall every year had been the most persistent concern for homesteaders in this region. Proponents of dry farming hoped to improve the area’s agricultural economy and encourage a more permanent, stable settlement than the ephemeral ranching that previously dominated the region. Followers of the movement came to western South Dakota to practice the new farming method, but because dry farming is a labor-intensive method, they faced more difficulties than they had anticipated.

Starting in 1907 the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) conducted a series of farming experiments designed to improve agriculture in western South Dakota. The beginning of the program focused on testing dry-farming techniques in semi-arid climates. In 1912 the USDA’s Newell Station began receiving water from the Belle Fourche Irrigation Project. The USDA investigated the merits of irrigation in the region to determine which type of agriculture was best suited for the region. Their irrigation and dry-farming experiments established that dry farming was preferable to irrigation in western South Dakota, largely because irrigation could not be counted on to save crops in times of severe drought. In addition to the comparative study of dry farming versus irrigation, data was collected to determine which trees might produce the best shelterbelts; the best crop rotation and tilling methods; methods of cultivation to reduce erosion; which fertilizers were most effective; and successful livestock
Although the studies conducted by the USDA showed that dry farming held the promise to improve agriculture west of the Missouri River, most farmers did not adopt the labor-intensive, dry-farming system. A growing number of homesteaders on the Western Plains turned instead to cattle, sheep, or horse ranching in combination with a system of diversified farming.

The challenge of homesteading on the Western Plains of South Dakota extended beyond the normal concern about availability of water. The regularity with which droughts and severe weather affected the ability of homesteaders to produce even a subsistence crop caused many farms to fail, and homesteaders to permanently leave the area. The drought of 1910-1911 stopped the early twentieth-century homesteading boom. Homesteaders were hit hard as crops failed when the rains did not come. Those who survived the drought resigned themselves to the wild variations in climate that was simply a fact of life on the western South Dakota plains.

Drought prompted many farmers across the state to attempt to further diversify their production. In particular, dairy farming became important to the homesteaders, and cooperative creameries were established, extending as far west as Rapid City. The government aided in educating farmers about drought-resistant crops and diversified agriculture by creating the South Dakota Agricultural Extension Service in 1915. In 1917 the state legislature provided further aid to farmers. For example, it passed a rural credit law authorizing the state to provide loans to farmers and created a state office to promote the state’s agricultural products.

World War I fostered a bubble in agricultural prices as demand for food in the European markets increased. Livestock producers in western South Dakota reaped huge profits as meat and grain prices tripled. However, the boom was followed by an equally dramatic bust as farm prices dipped after the end of the war, creating a depression in western South Dakota’s farm economy during the 1920s. Indeed, it has often been said that the Great Depression of the 1930s in fact began a decade earlier for the country’s farmers and ranchers.

Also during the 1920s, a myriad of technological advances offered the homesteader the ability to cultivate larger tracts of land in less time than had previously been possible. Tractors and combines increased the number of acres any one farmer could cultivate and had the unintended effect of encouraging farmers to bring marginal lands under cultivation. Consolidation of lands also reduced the number of homesteads on the Western Plains.

Wall Drug continued to provide economic activity in the Western Plains town of Wall during the Depression. Ted Hustead purchased the store in 1931, and moved his wife, Dorothy, and son, Bill, from Sioux Falls, Iowa, to Wall. Typical for the Depression, the store had difficulty bringing in customers. Although tourists drove by on their way to Mount Rushmore and Yellowstone, they did not normally stop at Wall Drug until Dorothy Hustead had an idea. Dorothy suggested giving away free ice water and putting signs on the tourist routes advertising the water. The strategy worked brilliantly, and soon tourists were stopping for water and purchasing other items while at the store. By the time Bill Hustead took over management of the store in 1951, Wall Drug had become a success. The Husteads expanded the store over a period of forty years, beginning in 1951, to better serve the growing number of tourists that arrived daily. Roadside advertising on a worldwide scale has further raised the profile of Wall Drug. Today, in the opinion of Ted Hustead, Ted and Dorothy’s grandson, Wall Drug “is probably the number one roadside
attraction in America.”

The success of businesses like Wall Drug stands in stark contrast to the hardships experienced by many, if not most, homesteaders on the Western Plains. Farmers on South Dakota’s Western Plains were already reeling from the effects of the drop in prices after the close of World War I when the Depression and the six-year drought, known as the Dust Bowl, hit the plains. The effect of the drought cannot be overestimated. A single storm in May 1934 removed approximately three hundred thousand tons of topsoil from the Great Plains.

Beginning in 1933, the Roosevelt administration and Congress approved several measures to alleviate hardship on the country’s farmers. The Resettlement Administration, which became known as the Land Use Program, was established in 1935 to oversee the reclamation of marginal farmland. The program affected South Dakota’s Western Plains significantly. The government purchased 850,000 acres of marginal lands from homesteads in the Western Plains of South Dakota. The government then tore down the homestead buildings and reseeded the land with native grasses. In 1954 the National Grasslands were created out of South Dakota’s reclaimed agricultural land at Buffalo Gap, Fort Pierre, and Grand River.

During World War II, farmers in South Dakota experienced price fluctuations similar to those seen during World War I. By 1951, however, prices returned to a profitable level. The development of a cattle-feeding industry in the 1950s in the eastern part of the state complemented the cattle raising and grazing on the Western Plains. Livestock raising accounted for seventy-nine percent of South Dakota’s agricultural production in 1966.

The evolution of the state’s highway system throughout the twentieth century further aided the economy on the Western Plains. During the Depression, United States Highway (USH) 14 formed the major east-west route crossing the state. USH 14, also known as the Black and Yellow Trail, provided tourists with an alternate route to the popular Yellowstone National Park and also provided a means of transporting agricultural products to eastern markets. The highway proved quite popular, and the segment between Rapid City west to the Wyoming state line was upgraded from a two-lane to a four-lane road in 1953.

The passage of the Federal Highway Act in 1956 set the ambitious goal of completing an interstate highway system within fifteen years. The Federal Highway Act had its origins in the Defense Highway Act of 1941 that focused federal funds to a Strategic Network of Highways with defense uses, such as roads to military bases and defense manufacturing plants. Also near the end of World War II the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 called upon states and the Bureau of Public Roads to designate a national system of interstate highways, connecting state capitals, principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers by direct routes. The segment of USH 14 near Rapid City, with its recent upgrade to a four-lane road, was well positioned to become part of the new interstate system and was incorporated into the system shortly after the passage of the Federal Highway Act.

USH 14, later roughly shadowed by Interstate 90, bisected the lands that would soon be dotted with Minuteman missiles. Beginning in 1961, the Air Force constructed 165 Minuteman missile installations on the Western Plains of South Dakota, directed by the 44th Strategic Missile Wing based at Ellsworth Air Force Base. Moving from east to west across the plains, Ellsworth’s three squadrons were located near the towns of Wall, Union Center, and Sturgis. The squadron near Wall operated the Launch Control Facility and Launch Facility now comprising Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in Jackson and Pennington Counties. Before detailing these specific facilities, we next turn to the Air Force.
Plate 15. The gently rolling plains of western South Dakota (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)

Plate 16. The striking landscape of the South Dakota Badlands (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 17. A western South Dakota homestead, 1936 (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA- OWI Collections, Reproduction number LC- USF34- 004666- D DLC)
Chapter 2: U.S. Air Force, Strategic Air Command, and Ellsworth Air Force Base (1940s–90s)

Establishment

Air combat became the dominant brand of warfare during World War II, prompting a major restructuring of American military aviation after 1945. Following establishment of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1946, the National Security Act of 1947 established the U.S. Air Force as an independent branch of the military. These were the institutions that directed America’s strategic deterrent through the Cold War. Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, established in 1942 as an Army airfield, became part of the Air Force and SAC. As the following pages will demonstrate, in the mid-twentieth century SAC activated intercontinental bomb and missile wings at Air Force bases throughout the country that assisted in deterring a major conflict between the world’s superpowers. Of course the superpowers battled throughout the Cold War in proxy wars throughout the developing world (in Korea and Vietnam most famously), but the type of awesome destructive power embodied in the Minuteman program was designed for another purpose: for the global thermonuclear conflict no one wanted to fight.

The U.S. Air Force originated as the Aeronautical Division of the Army Signal Corps in 1907. In the words of one official Air Force history, this predecessor oversaw “all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects.” In subsequent years, the Army Aeronautical Division became the Air Service, the Air Corps, and finally the Army Air Forces, before emerging as the U.S. Air Force.

Aviation strategists argued throughout World War II that an independent airpower branch could best manage the complexities of modern air warfare. American pilots, moreover, chafed at the independent air forces they saw within the British and Soviet militaries. The establishment of the Air Force as an independent agency was the particular vision of General Henry H. Arnold (known to his men as “Hap”), a thirty-nine-year veteran of the United States military. In a report on the conduct of the air war during World War II Arnold suggested “three autonomous services, each of which has an equal and direct share of the total responsibility.” He speculated that a separated Air Force, Army, and Navy would form a balanced military that ensured efficiency by reducing duplicate efforts. On 26 July 1947, when the National Security Act became law, Arnold and those like him finally had their wish, and two months later President Truman appointed W. Stuart Symington as Secretary of the Air Force and General Carl A. Spaatz as the first Chief of Staff.

When the Air Force separated from the Army, it gained control over all surface-to-surface aircraft and strategic missiles through SAC. While the new service took command of all area air defense missiles, the Army retained control of missiles used to protect Army field forces from air attack. In the 1950s, when the nation entered the Space Age with the development of nuclear strategic weapons and ballistic missiles, the Department of Defense called upon Air Force bases around the country, such as Ellsworth Air Force Base, to operate and maintain bombers and missiles administered through SAC. Air Force personnel began training for new duties as missileers and missile support staff. Today, the Air Force continues to operate Minuteman III and Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) administered by U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), SAC’s successor.

To better explore the strategic role of South Dakota’s Minuteman ICBMs, a brief history of SAC, Ellsworth Air Force Base, and the 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) follows. (A chart outlining the organizational structure of the U.S. Air Force is located at the end of this chapter.)
Strategic Air Command

The U.S. Army Air Forces established SAC on 21 March 1946 as one of three major combat commands of the agency. While the Air Defense Command provided protection for the continental United States and the Tactical Air Command supported the Army and the Navy in the field, SAC, the offensive branch, became the foundation of the nation’s defense against the growing threat of atomic war. SAC became a part of the Air Force in 1947, but continued its role as chief administrator of all of the military’s strategic nuclear weapons and central communication node for deployment of these powerful weapons.

Located first at Bolling Field in the District of Columbia, SAC’s headquarters quickly moved to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. Initially, SAC was comprised of the 8th Air Force, headquartered at Fort Worth, Texas, and the 15th Air Force, headquartered at Colorado Springs, Colorado, and included eighteen bases and nine bomber groups. The command’s first atomic weapon operation was “Operation Crossroads,” which tested the effects of air-dropped and submerged atomic detonations on naval targets off the Bikini Islands in the South Pacific.

With expanding responsibilities, however, SAC eventually required larger facilities. In November 1948 the Air Force relocated SAC Headquarters to Offutt Air Force Base in Bellevue, a suburb of Omaha, Nebraska, well beyond the existing nuclear range of the nation’s enemies at that time. Remaining in the Washington, D.C., area would have interrupted SAC’s training missions, due to the existing heavy air traffic in the area. Furthermore, although forty bases were candidates for SAC’s new headquarters, Offutt provided a good mid-continent location that had existing runways, large hangars, and support facilities. The organization’s successor USSTRATCOM remains headquartered at Offutt to this day.

With the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 and subsequent invention of the hydrogen bomb—a device capable of creating a far greater destructive force than the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the arms race between the superpowers significantly accelerated. President Eisenhower called for a reexamination of the national defense upon entering office in 1953, and his demand, made partly to alleviate the country’s need for an expensive massive standing army, resulted in an increased reliance on nuclear weapons and air power to deter warfare. His administration consequently invested more of the nation’s defense funding in the Air Force than his predecessors had, and much of this new money went to SAC. While retaining key elements of the nation’s security policy devised under President Truman, such as the doctrine of containment, the Eisenhower Administration publicly advanced a policy of “massive retaliation” in which the U.S. would not limit its response to future aggression. Soviet military incursions into Europe, for example, would be met by nuclear strikes at Moscow. If such an awful event came to pass, SAC would deliver the blow. By the end of 1953 it administered seventeen atomic wings, eleven of which were equipped with armed bombers and crews, and the number of personnel continued to grow. In the 1950s SAC personnel grew from 85,000 to 262,000, many of whom were civilians employed for SAC support.

Armed with the mission of deterring aggression, SAC employed both air- and surface-launched guided missiles. Air-launched missiles included the Quail and Hound Dog fired from the B-52 bomber and the Short Range Attack Missile, launched from the B-52 and the FB-111. Surface-launched missiles included the Snark, the Thor and Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles, and the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman ICBMs. By the 1960s the combination of the Air Force’s bombers and ICBMs with the Navy’s missile-launching submarines formed SAC’s “triad” in deterring nuclear warfare against the nation. With three nuclear options, American strategists reasoned, no foe would be able to silence America’s potential nuclear response.
While SAC oversaw these programs and made decisions regarding bombers and missiles, the Air Force bases supported the organization’s installations. Although the Air Force operated and maintained the missiles, SAC gave all orders pertaining to strategic weapons in the military, including wing assignments and which military bases would be assigned nuclear weapons. SAC decided on the location of ICBM installments, assigned squadrons, and installed missiles near existing Air Force bases to take advantage of their support facilities. SAC also gave orders on the proximity of ICBMs to other silos and communities.

SAC commanders determined when strategic bombers and ICBMs were activated, when they were placed on alert or heightened alert status, and when they were deactivated. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, SAC required for the first time that all twelve Series F Atlas ICBMs go on alert at four Strategic Missile Squadrons (SMS), including the 550th SMS at Schilling Air Force Base in Kansas, the 551st SMS at Lincoln Air Force Base in Nebraska, the 577th SMS at Altus Air Force Base in Oklahoma, and the 578th SMS at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas. A decade later, in October 1973, SAC placed the 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) at Ellsworth Air Force Base on increased alert status as a result of anticipated Soviet interference in the Arab-Israeli War. Of course, the execution of these commands came only at the order of the President and his National Security Council.

Another duty of SAC in overseeing the Minuteman program was determining the effectiveness of the Air Force’s combat crews. SAC assigned an Inspector General (IG) to each Air Force base. Each IG would perform Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) at ICBM Launch Control Facilities (LCFs) at their base. The first ORI took place at the 706th SMW at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in July and August 1961. While SAC rarely distributed excellent ratings, Ellsworth’s 44th SMW received several excellent scores throughout its history.

Throughout its existence, according to Air Force lore, SAC’s emblem and motto symbolized the institution’s goals. The emblem was a sky-blue, shield-shaped image with an armored arm grasping a green olive branch and three red lightning bolts. Official histories note that the blue background represented Air Force operations, while the armored arm symbolized strength, power, and loyalty. The olive branch symbolized peace and the lightning flashes represented speed and power, all qualities of SAC’s mission. The group’s original motto, “War is our profession–Peace is our product,” proved offensive to some, however, and the slogan was changed to “Maintaining Peace is our Profession.” The Air Force changed the motto once more in 1958 (after an artist found there were too many words to paint on a sign that advertised a reenlistment campaign), choosing the pithier “Peace is our Profession.”

All discussion of slogans and emblems aside, SAC proved a uniquely dedicated and motivated organization throughout its history. Its crew, staff, and pilots believed their work necessary to maintaining the peace, and to deterring Soviet aggression worldwide. In its early years especially, under the leadership of its hard-charging commander General Curtis LeMay, SAC’s personnel developed a reputation for working harder, faster, and longer than the bomber wings that preceded it. Its planes set records for endurance in the air, and maintained a constant presence in the skies in case of surprise Soviet attack. LeMay’s reputation as a military hawk, and his belief that nuclear war could be won—at a time when many leaders, Eisenhower in particular, considered nuclear war a sure loser for all—prompted criticism from historians, peace activists, and even his political superiors. President John Kennedy, for one, never forgot or apparently forgave the General for advocating immediate bombing missions at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, advice the President believed would have led directly to the nuclear war he strove to avoid. Indeed, even movie directors lampooned LeMay, as the bombastic and paranoid General Buck Turgidson (played by George C. Scott) of Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb was modeled after the SAC Commander. He preferred to cultivate another image, that of the hard-working and dedicated public servant, charged with a mission others neither liked nor would accept, the kind of commander pictured in the Jimmy Stewart classic film,
1955’s *Strategic Air Command*. LeMay and SAC aided in the production of the latter, even assigning a colonel as the movie’s technical director. Not surprisingly, *Dr. Strangelove* never received the Air Force’s official endorsement. Nine years (and successive world crises such as Berlin and Cuba) made quite a difference in cinematic portrayals of SAC and its commander. 

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, SAC was officially deactivated 1 May 1992 and was replaced by the U.S. Strategic Command, known as USSTRATCOM. On 1 October 2002 USSTRATCOM and U.S. Space Command both disestablished and a new U.S. Strategic Command stood up at Offutt Air Force Base, responsible for both missions.

**Ellsworth Air Force Base**

One Air Force Base under SAC’s administration was Ellsworth Air Force Base near Rapid City, South Dakota. Although Ellsworth became a significant SAC Air Force base, operating and maintaining both bombers and missiles, its history predates the atomic age. The U.S. War Department established the Rapid City Army Air Base, which eventually became Ellsworth Air Force Base, in January 1942. Shortly after the U.S. joined World War II the base served as a training location for B-17 Flying Fortress crews. Weather reconnaissance and combat squadrons briefly trained at the base after the war, until operations ceased in September 1946. When the base reopened in March 1947, the 28th Bombardment Wing (BW) with the flying B-29 Superfortress was stationed at the Rapid City Army Air Base.

In January 1948 the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl A. Spaatz, renamed the installation Weaver Air Force Base in honor of Brigadier General Walter R. Weaver, a pioneer in Air Force development. Five months later, at the public’s request, the base was returned to its original name, Rapid City Army Air Base. However, President Eisenhower traveled to South Dakota in 1953 for yet another ceremony renaming of the air base. This time, the base was named in memory of Brigadier General Richard E. Ellsworth, commander of the 28th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, and one of twenty-three crewmembers who perished in a plane crash over Newfoundland in March of that year.

Over the years SAC continuously reassigned units to Ellsworth and upgraded facilities, manpower, and technology on the base. Ellsworth Air Force Base officially began its role in the Space Age in 1960 with the construction of Titan I ICBM facilities. The 850th SMS, originally assigned as the 28th BW, was assigned to operate and maintain the Titans. Two years later SAC activated the 44th SMW, and within that the 66th SMS was the first of three squadrons to operate 150 Minuteman I ICBMs throughout western South Dakota. The 44th SMW, whose motto was “Aggressor Beware,” not only hosted two generations of ICBMs—Titan and Minuteman I—but was the only wing to have two generations at that time. Furthermore, after SAC activated Minuteman II ICBMs in the early 1970s, the base was known at the “Showplace of SAC” for their operation and maintenance of two of SAC’s “triad” of nuclear deterrence, strategic bombers and Minuteman II ICBMs.

With advancements in missile technology, as well as the evolution of the Cold War, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered SAC to accelerate the phase-out of the Atlas and Titan I ICBMs on 16 May 1964. By February of the following year, SAC had removed all Titan I missiles from their silos at Ellsworth, leaving only Minuteman I ICBMs. McNamara then approved “Project Long Life,” a series of operational tests hosted by Ellsworth Air Force Base. The program called for a realistic test of the Minuteman IB system through short-range base launches of three modified ICBMs. The first test missile, loaded with enough propellant for a seven-second flight and a range of approximately two miles, was launched from Launch Facility (LF) November-02 on 1 March 1965 at Ellsworth and was the only Minuteman missile ever launched from an
operational silo. “Project Long Life” demonstrated the ability of SAC’s missile crews to actually launch Minuteman ICBMs, and marked an important moment in the history of the Minuteman project.  

When SAC finished converting the Minuteman I missiles in South Dakota to Minuteman II ICBMs in 1973, Ellsworth Air Force Base was selected to host the “Giant Pace Test 74-01.” This program administered the first Simulated Electronic Launch- Minuteman (SELM) exercise. During the test missilleers successfully simulated the launch of eleven SELM- configured missiles on the command of both underground LCFs and the Air Force’s Airborne Launch Control System. This test proved the effectiveness of the Minuteman’s communications systems, a key component for a weapon designed to operate in a crisis situation under the most stressful conditions.

By the mid-1980s major changes were taking place at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The Air Force began deactivating the maturing fleet of B-52s and started to prepare the 28th Bombardment Missile Wing (BMW) for a fleet of B-1B Lancer bombers. In 1986 the Air Force hired contractors to construct dormitories, security police headquarters, and maintenance facilities for the supersonic craft. They also revamped the runway. By January 1987 Ellsworth accepted the first of thirty-five new bombers.

Changes continued into the 1990s at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The signing of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) in July of 1991 significantly affected the base’s operations. On 27 September 1991 President George H. W. Bush ordered the removal of all Minuteman II ICBMs from alert status. The Air Force took the missiles off alert immediately and began removing them from the underground silos. In 1991 the Air Force began deactivation procedures and later dismantlement, including imploding the empty LFs and dismantling the LCFs. The START Treaty allowed for the preservation of an LCF and LF to serve as an interpretive tool. LCF Delta-01 and LF Delta-09 of Ellsworth Air Force Base, the subjects of this study, were chosen to be preserved for interpretation. Ellsworth remains an operational base to this day, home of the 28th Bomb Wing.

44th Strategic Missile Wing
One of SAC’s several missile wings during the Cold War included the 44th SMW, based at Ellsworth. This wing maintained both Titan and Minuteman missiles through its thirty-year tenure in South Dakota, and a brief history of the 44th and its strategic squadrons follows.

The 44th SMW originated as the 44th Bombardment Group (BG) on 20 November 1940, a unit first activated in January of 1941 at MacDill Field in Florida. The Air Force soon thereafter moved the 44th BG to Barksdale Field in Louisiana. Known as the “Flying Eight Balls,” the group was equipped with the B-24 Liberator, a four-engine long-range bomber. After serving in World War II the 44th BG was deactivated and reactivated several times. On 1 January 1962 the Air Force deactivated the 44th BG a final time, though it was redesignated that same day as the 44th SMW at Ellsworth Air Force Base under the command of the 821st Strategic Aerospace Division, headquartered at the base.

SAC assigned four strategic squadrons to the 44th SMW, including three Minuteman squadrons—the 66th, 67th, and 68th—and one Titan squadron, 850th. The wing received its first operational Titan missile on 22 June 1962. The other squadrons originated as the 66th, 67th, and 68th Bombardment Squadrons (BS) in the fall of 1940 at MacDill Field in Florida, where they too were equipped with Liberator bombers. In addition to the four SMSs, the 44th SMW also employed several support units at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The Missile Wing Command Section included the 44th Missile Wing Commander and Vice Commander who oversaw missile combat crews and the support staff. The 44th Maintenance Support Squadron provided administrative support and training of maintenance groups that serviced the missiles and their
facilities. The 45th Missile Security Group and the 44th Missile Security Squadron had the task of securing the missile sites and protecting them from sabotage.

On 1 July 1962 SAC activated the first of South Dakota’s Minuteman squadrons near Wall. The Minuteman I ICBMs were assigned to the 66th SMS, including fifty officers and two enlisted members. The Air Force only allowed officers to serve as launch crews, hence the unusual ratio of ranks. When the Air Force activated the 66th SMS they also activated SAC’s first Minuteman IB squadron. Minuteman’s first variant, IA, contained a flawed first stage that reduced its range by two thousand miles. Rather than stall the nation’s defense effort, SAC approved the installation of the flawed 150 Minuteman IA ICBMs at Malmstrom Air Force Base. Additional Minuteman I deployments consisted of the upgraded Minuteman IB, with the first 150 missiles activated at Ellsworth Air Force Base.

The Boeing Company installed Ellsworth’s first Minuteman IB ICBM in February 1963 in the Bravo flight of the 66th SMS. The squadron’s first Minuteman missile was activated in April 1963 and the first total flight of ten missiles was activated 20 June 1963. The 67th SMS was located around Union Center, northeast of Rapid City, and the 68th SMS was situated around Belle Fourche, northwest of Rapid City. The last Minuteman I ICBM flight was accepted by the 44th SMW on 23 October 1963. SAC declared all three of Ellsworth’s Minuteman SMSs combat ready on 1 November 1963, and ordered all of its Titan I ICBMs deactivated soon after. By February of 1965 all nine Titan missiles at Ellsworth were removed from their silos. One month later, on 25 March 1965, SAC deactivated the 850th SMS.

As technology advanced, so did the need to improve training. In November 1965 the Air Force installed Ellsworth’s first Missile Procedures Trainer (MPT) to help missileers of the 44th SMW meet training requirements. To simulate the later Minuteman II ICBMs, SAC installed a second MPT at Ellsworth in April 1970. The MPT assisted the crews of the 44th SMW in competing in the Olympic Arena Competition, a contest between all of SAC’s missile wings at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. In 1970, 1982, and 1992 Ellsworth crewmembers won the coveted Blanchard Trophy for the “Best of the Best.” In the following years they frequently claimed other top awards. Other ICBM bases that competed against Ellsworth’s 44th SMW in the Olympic Arena knew them as the “Black Hills Bandits.”

In June 1971, SAC deactivated the 821st Strategic Aerospace Division and named the 44th SMW the host wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The 44th SMW was then reassigned under the command of the 4th Air Division (AD) at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Additional organizational changes took place within the 44th SMW in 1975. In an effort to increase efficiency and improve missile maintenance, SAC deactivated the 44th Missile Maintenance Squadron on 30 September 1975 and activated the Field Missile Maintenance and Organizational Missile Maintenance Squadrons.

Reorganization and deactivation continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1982 the 44th SMW transferred to the command of the 57th AD of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota and then six years later was transferred to the to the 12th AD, relocated to Ellsworth and became the new host unit for the base. When President Bush signed the START Treaty, SAC ordered that all Minuteman II ICBMs be deactivated immediately. Deactivation at Ellsworth Air Force Base officially began when SAC removed the first Minuteman II ICBM from Golf-02 near Red Owl, South Dakota on 3 December 1991. Dismantlement was complete when SAC imploded LF Kilo-06 on 16 September 1996. The 44th SMW formally inactivated on 4 July 1994 during a ceremony at Ellsworth Air Force Base. Colonel Roscoe Moulthrop, the final 44th SMW Commander, stated that the inactivation “marked a step back from the brink of nuclear extinction and a step forward into the sunlit world of freedom for our children and their children.” Today, a replica missile at the South Dakota Air and Space Museum, located just outside of the main gate of Ellsworth Air Force Base, and Delta-01 and Delta-09 stand as symbols of Minuteman’s thirty-year era in South Dakota.
### Organizational Structure of the Air Force

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* - denotes those levels of organization that are no longer in use

**Air Forces**—A tactical level of command in the U.S. Air Force that is subdivided into wings, groups, squadrons, and flights. Air forces were both numbered and named originally, but only numbered air forces are still in existence.

**Wing**—There are three different types of wings: operational, air base, and specialized mission. Operational wings and air base wings are essentially in charge of the maintenance and basic operation of a base. A specialized mission wing has a specific task such as intelligence or training.

**Groups**—Groups represent an intermediate level of command to provide a level of leadership between the squadrons or flights and the wings.

**Squadrons and Flights**—Squadrons and flights are the basic units of the U.S. Air Force. Their purpose can either be functional, such as performing duties to maintain the base, or organized to carry out a specific mission.

*Source: “Types of USAF Organizations,” 12 October 2001*

Plate 18. Location of Minuteman II missile sites in the United States, highlighting South Dakota and the Delta Flight. (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD- 50- sheet 2)

Plate 20. Pride hangar at Ellsworth Air Force Base (Courtesy of Ellsworth Air Force Base, Base Historian’s Office)


The Black Hills Bandits

44th Missile Wing

Plate 25. The Black Hills Bandits of the 44th Strategic Missile Wing (Courtesy of National Park Service)
Chapter 3: Minuteman Missile Sites in South Dakota (1960s-80s)

In the late 1950s the Air Force chose South Dakota as one of the locations to base the nation’s nuclear arsenal with the installation of Minuteman missiles. The Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) began surveying sites throughout western South Dakota by the fall of 1960, and subsequently began negotiating with landowners for rights-of-entry to construct Launch Facilities (LF) and Launch Control Facilities (LCF) on their property. The Minuteman I Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) construction program at Ellsworth Air Force Base progressed rapidly. Under supervision of the Army Corps, Peter Kiewit and Sons’ Inc. (Kiewit Company), the Boeing Corporation, and their subcontractors began construction of the 150 LFs and fifteen LCFs during the fall of 1961. Their work, both in construction and then in activation of the Minuteman I, furthered the nation’s defense program, but also affected western South Dakota economically and socially, an influence that remained through the Minuteman’s deactivation.

Site Location

The Air Force’s policy on site selection in South Dakota was multifaceted. Sites were primarily selected by balancing a variety of criteria, including maximizing Minuteman operations, minimizing each sites’ vulnerability to sabotage, using the taxpayers’ money wisely, and adapting individual sites to construction and operational needs, all with an eye to unique qualities of individual locations. Other factors that contributed to the selection of sites were the physical features of the land, including the geology and terrain of the area, the types of soil, and the amount of available ground water.

For cost and efficiency, the Air Force located missile sites near the existing Ellsworth Air Force Base in order to provide logistical support to the facilities. The missiles were located within an area approximately one hundred miles east and north of the base, in an expanse covering approximately 13,500 square miles of western South Dakota. The three Minuteman I ICBM squadrons at Ellsworth Air Force Base, each consisting of five LCFs and fifty LFs, were located in the vicinity of the communities of Wall, Union Center, and Belle Fourche.

The Air Force positioned each missile flight (one LCF and ten LFs) in the same geographic area, but individual LFs could not be directly adjacent to another LF or the LCF. Minimally, the Air Force required LFs and LCFs to be geographically separated by an area large enough to withstand a ten-megaton explosion at an adjacent facility. Air Force specifications also required that the sites be separated so multiple facilities could not be targeted together. The Air Force additionally attempted to select sites that would have the least adverse effect on nearby communities and private property.

Land Purchase

The Air Force selected LF and LCF sites based on the surveys completed by the Army Corps, Omaha District Office. Prior to construction of the missile sites in South Dakota, right-of-entry, easements, and land purchase agreements needed to be made with hundreds of property owners. The acquisition for the 150 LFs, fifteen LCFs, and approximately 1,732 miles of Hardened Intersite Cable System (HICS) connecting the facilities included three phases. The first phase was securing right-of-entry for survey and exploration of proposed sites. Next, the Air Force worked with landowners to obtain right-of-entry for facility construction. The final phase included negotiations for land purchase or permanent easements and compensation for damages during the construction of the facilities.
Phase one began in the fall of 1960. The right-of-entry Air Force representatives inspected potential sites throughout western South Dakota to assess the soil, geology, terrain, and ground water for suitability for site construction. By early 1961 the locations for the LFs and LCFs were identified and HICS routes mapped. Following site selection, the Army Corps solicited landowner’s signatures for right-of-entry to commence construction of the LFs and LCFs on their property. For the construction of each LCF or LF the Air Force required temporary construction easements of between four to six acres for construction equipment and dirt removed from the silos. Following the right-of-entry for construction, the Army Corps negotiated with landowners to purchase the land. In land purchase and easement negotiations, the government was required to provide just compensation, defined as fair market value.

In addition to land purchase, the government obtained permanent easements at the LF and LCF sites. It needed these easements in order to restrict land use in the area surrounding each LF and LCF to certain types of construction and agricultural activities. The government also obtained permanent easements for the access road at both the LF and LCF and for the azimuth markers at each LF site, which were located outside of the fence and used to site the missile. Following construction the land was inspected by a real estate representative of the Army Corps and through negotiation an agreement was made with the owner for a cash settlement of any damages.

Army Corps representatives negotiated with several hundred more property owners for easements for the underground HICS connecting the LFs and LCFs. These cables, installed four to eight feet below ground and used to transmit data between missile sites, required a temporary construction easement of thirty-five feet in width for approximately 1,732 miles between all 165 sites. After construction was complete, the government obtained a permanent easement for a path sixteen and one-half feet wide. Following installation of the HICS, landowners could return to using the land above the cable for normal ranching or agricultural activities.

Such large-scale construction was not without its inconveniences, and to address some of the issues pertaining to land acquisition during this initial period, the Army Corps real estate field office distributed a pamphlet to property owners in western South Dakota titled “Facts About Minuteman Land Acquisition.” The pamphlet promised landowners that the government would negotiate for the purchase of property and address any damages and losses. The pamphlet reminded the property owners that the Constitution permits the taking of private property for public use as long as the landowner was paid “just compensation.” Even with the issue of national security at stake, policymakers had no desire simply to confiscate land. If the landowners and the government could not agree on compensation, however, the government had the right to acquire the land through condemnation. A declaration of taking was filed and compensation was deposited with the court for the property owner. Negotiations continued and if an agreement could not be made the condemnation case would be brought to trial.

Minuteman Missile Area Landowners Association

While construction crews built some of the Minuteman sites in South Dakota on land already owned by the government, such as LF Delta-09, contractors constructed most of the sites on private property. During the site-selection process, some landowners did not feel that the Army Corps provided enough information to sign rights-of-entry to their property. To ensure that the government took landowners’ rights into consideration during site selection and fairly compensated landowners, a group of farmers and ranchers formed the Minuteman Missile Area Landowners Association (MALA) in the early 1960s. MALA disseminated information to area landowners, believing that working collectively would aid the defense effort while safeguarding their private interests.
Members paid a minimal fee of one dollar to participate in the organization, primarily to cover the cost of postage and mailings. The MALA’s first president was Eugene Pellegrin of Enning, South Dakota, and the first vice president was Cecil Hayes of Elm Springs, South Dakota. Eight additional members, including Burle Dartt, Ray Naeschel, Ben Paulsen, Tony Oergerli, Robert Simpfendorfer, Delbert Paulsen, Ferdinand Schroeder, and Leonel Jensen, served as directors to assist in collecting and distributing information. In addition to nearly 150 MALA members supporting their cause, United States Senator Francis H. Case also attempted to assist negotiations between the landowners and the Air Force and Army Corps. Although Case was a longtime proponent of strong national defense and a supporter of the Minuteman I missile program at Ellsworth Air Force Base, he often corresponded with the landowner organization and the Army Corps concerning the project and advocated for fair and timely compensation.

Most landowners understood that the national defense program required the installation of Minuteman missiles, and the technical reasons why the Air Force required use of their land. Prior to signing any agreements, however, MALA members wanted the government to address the disadvantages of having a LF or LCF constructed within their property. Many landowners were concerned that the location of the proposed sites would disrupt irrigation systems, take irreplaceable land, or interfere with agricultural operations. While their primary stated goal was to obtain a reasonable settlement for land and construction damages, the group also wanted to minimize the effects of the missile system upon nearby schools, roads, and the local police force.

Prior to signing rights- of- entry needed for construction, the MALA voiced their concerns with Air Force and Army Corps personnel at several meetings in Rapid City in 1960 and 1961. MALA members questioned how the Air Force selected locations for the LFs and LCFs. Individual MALA members desired to know if selected sites could be moved to sections of their property less desirable for agricultural purposes. In early April 1961, an Army Corps real estate representative explained that the missiles were part of an interrelated system and the location could not be altered aside from minor changes. One property owner offered to donate the land if the Air Force would move the proposed LF to a corner of the wheat field instead of in the middle. His offer was rejected, and, in this case, the Air Force did not alter the proposed site for this facility.

MALA members also pressed the Air Force at these meetings for further information about compensation for their land and losses. Many wanted to know what assessment they should expect for their property, and if they would receive compensation for damages incurred during construction or from decreases in land value due to the presence of the missiles in the area. Army Corps officials responded that landowners were entitled to fair compensation for their losses and that the dollar value would be reached through negotiation between the government agency and individual property owners. Compensation for damages would be negotiated in much the same way. Although many landowners received compensation for their land and losses, some felt the settlement offered was inadequate.

After months of meetings and negotiations, seventy- five percent of the property owners of proposed missile sites signed rights- of- entry agreements by July of 1961. At the same time, approximately ninety percent of landowners involved with the underground cables had also signed agreements. MALA president Pellegrin stated in a newspaper article that many of the property owners who refused to sign the agreement were negotiating for damages unique to their property. In some cases, property owners never signed the rights- of- entry agreement needed to begin construction and in these cases, the Army Corps filed declarations of taking and deposited money with the court for the property owner. The Army Corps based the compensation on the government’s original estimate of fair market value for the property.
Despite efforts of the MALA to protect their rights and obtain compensation for their losses, some members of the public and government criticized the organization’s members. They condemned landowners for slowing the defense effort, termed them unpatriotic, and accused them of holding up new business created by the influx of construction workers and additional Air Force officers. The Air Force and Army Corps often reminded members of the MALA and other residents of western South Dakota of the importance of the Minuteman I ICBM program to the security of the United States. For example, the land acquisition pamphlet distributed to property owners stated, “like its prototype, the Minuteman of 1774, this immensely- important project for our national defense is authorized by the Congress of the United States.”

Criticism aside, however, not every delay in Minuteman construction could be pinned on reluctant landowners. As late as March 1961, Congress had not yet fully appropriated the funding for the Minuteman I ICBM missile program at Ellsworth Air Force Base. Therefore, property owners did not stall construction of the sites in South Dakota or the nation’s defense effort. In reality, the land acquisition and construction of the Minuteman I missile facilities in South Dakota was an accelerated program that exceeded many expectations. Approximately one year after Army Corps representatives started testing soil and mapping missile facilities contractors began construction. After the construction of the LFs and LCFs in western South Dakota the MALA disbanded. The organization remained inactive until the early 1990s when the Air Force began the deactivation process of the Minuteman II ICBMs and a new generation of property owners worked together to disseminate information and provide support.

Site Construction

In 1960 the U.S. Army established the Corps of Engineers Ballistic Missile Construction Office (CEBMCO) as an independent organization to supervise missile site construction across the country, including Ellsworth Air Force Base. With the new agency, the construction of ICBM facilities fell under uniform and centralized control. The commanding officer of CEBMCO appointed weapon system directors to manage the construction of Minuteman facilities at Ellsworth Air Force Base, as well as other ICBM construction sites. These directors worked at area offices, such as the one at Ellsworth Air Force Base, to directly supervise the construction of numerous contractors for the multiple phases of the construction process.

CEBMCO originated with a staff of twenty-seven to supervise the construction of the missile facilities throughout the United States. That number grew to three thousand employees working in seventeen states by the mid-1960s. In South Dakota, CEBMCO appointed Colonel Sidney T. Martin to direct the construction project, while Lieutenant Colonel George V. Svoboda was named deputy engineer, Lieutenant Colonel James M. Gale assistant engineer, and Warren Withee served as the Chief of the Construction Branch. At the time, constructing missile facilities was one of the largest construction projects undertaken by the Army Corps. In the 1960s CEBMCO and its predecessor agencies supervised the construction of 1,200 missile facility sites nationwide, including the 165 sites in South Dakota.

Although CEBMCO staff at Ellsworth did not physically design or construct the LFs or LCFs, they were responsible for soliciting bids, selecting contractors, and reviewing plans. After supervising contractors during construction, CEBMCO aided the Air Force site activation task force in fitting the silos with operational missiles.

In the summer of 1961 the Home Office Special Projects District at Kiewit Company in Omaha, Nebraska, won the bid to construct the Minuteman I ICBM silos for Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota. The Kiewit Company bid estimate of $56,220,274 was nearly $10 million less than government projections.
Using the designs developed by Parsons-Staven, a Los Angeles architectural-engineering firm, Kiewit Company was the primary contractor for the Minuteman I ICBM facilities in South Dakota. The contract included preparing sites for facility construction and installing facilities using prefabricated parts. They were also responsible for negotiating with landowners over damages caused by the storage of excess dirt excavated from the silo shaft.

Groundbreaking ceremonies for the construction of the Minuteman I ICBM silos in South Dakota took place on 11 September 1961 in front of a crowd of approximately two hundred onlookers at a site later known as Lima-06, located just north of Sturgis. Instead of the traditional shoveling of dirt to symbolize the start of construction, a small explosion signified the power of this immense undertaking. The ceremony theme was “Partners for Peace.”

To make for a more efficient construction process, contractors assigned crews specific tasks, which they then performed at numerous sites. Crews assigned to the Minuteman construction project in South Dakota varied in size from four to thirty, depending on the complexity of their task. The first step in constructing the LFs was the excavation and grading at each site. The construction crew assigned this task used a bulldozer and clam shovel to create a circular cut that they then excavated to a depth of approximately thirty-five feet. After this task, the crew moved on to another site to complete the same task until all 150 LFs were excavated. A second crew moved in and proceeded to dig the shaft for the silo using a large auger. The shaft was a circular hole with a diameter approximately fifteen to eighteen feet and extended over eighty feet below the ground. The next task involved a third crew that poured a concrete deflector plate into the bottom of the shaft. After this crew secured the bottom of the hole, steel contractors lowered a twenty-five-ton, sixty-two-foot prefabricated steel liner into position. The liner, which formed the skeleton of the silo, included a quarter-inch steel plate and rings of reinforced bars. Contractors then poured concrete around the exterior of the steel liner, forming a twelve-inch-thick wall. Additional crews constructed a lower equipment room around the silo and a support building adjacent to the silo, both of reinforced concrete and below ground level. Once this stage was complete, crews backfilled the sites with dirt originally excavated for the silo and facility.

Kiewit Company subcontracted much of the work to other firms. For example, Summit Construction Company was responsible for the initial site grading, excavating to the approximate thirty-five-foot level, and storing dirt from those tasks. The Gustav Hirsch Organization installed electrical conduit and backfilled the area around the conduit. Natkin and Company installed mechanical pipes and was responsible for the backfill and compaction around them. For the installation of the HICS, Kiewit Company retained American Bridge Design–United States Steel Corporation.

The construction procedure involved moving nearly twenty million cubic yards of dirt for the 150 LFs and fifteen LCFs. In addition, contractors poured nearly one hundred fifty thousand cubic yards of concrete and used thirty-five thousand tons of steel to reinforce the underground facilities. Although the numbers appear large, constructing Minuteman I ICBM LFs was much less challenging than the construction of earlier Atlas and Titan LFs. Minuteman I LFs were smaller than earlier ICBM facilities and they used prefabricated parts and standardized construction techniques. Furthermore, the Minuteman I LFs did not require the elevator that positioned the missile for launch or the complex loading system that burdened earlier missiles.

Despite steps taken to minimize costs and speed deployment, Minuteman construction did not always proceed smoothly. In some instances, work stoppages, weather, and injuries delayed construction of the 165 Minuteman LFs and LCFs in South Dakota. The famously unpredictable plains weather affected the construction of the sites with dust storms, heavy rains, snow, and even severe cold temperatures. Moreover, work at the missile sites in South Dakota stopped on several occasions due to labor difficulties.
For example, on 6 June 1962 the American Bridge Company millwright workers went on strike for two days to protest the Kiewit Company’s assignment of the setting anchor bolt task to ironworkers, which they believed to be their task. One week later Gustav Hirsch electricians protested the Kiewit Company’s requirement that they report for work directly to LFs instead of a central point. Contractors and workers dealt with such problems using “policies, procedures, and methods of adjustment” developed by the Missile Sites Labor Commission, the eleven- person agency appointed by President Kennedy in 1961 to aid in resolving labor disputes at missile and space sites quickly, and therefore without delay to the national defense program.

Worker safety was an important issue at the missile construction sites and the Kiewit Company required employees to wear hard hats. During the two- year intensive construction period employing thousands of workers, sixty- two injuries and two fatalities were reported at the missile facilities in South Dakota. In comparison, Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota experienced thirty- six construction- related injuries and two deaths, while Malmstrom Air Force Base suffered twelve injuries and one fatality. Clearly this was dangerous work, as with all heavy construction, though the Kiewit Company received the National Safety Council’s Award of Honor in 1962 for its missile construction efforts. During the second half of that year, the company logged over eight hundred thousand accident- free work hours, offering a safety record due in part to regulations set forth by the Army Corps. For example, the Army Corps required that any excavations at the sites had to have a slope on its bank so it would not cave in on anyone working inside the hole or shaft.

Despite delays and unfortunate incidents, construction in South Dakota was completed by the fall of 1963, in less than two years. Construction of Delta- 01 had been completed the previous year on 29 November 1962 at an estimated cost of just over $800,000 and construction of Delta- 09 was completed on 26 November 1962 at an estimated cost of $354,500. The final costs for the construction of the Minuteman missiles in South Dakota may have been as high as $75.7 million.

Missile installation
While Kiewit Company and other contractors worked to construct missile facilities throughout western South Dakota, the Boeing Company assembled the actual missiles, and developed much of the ground- support equipment, such as the launch control system, and the security system. More importantly, Boeing ensured that the missiles worked through testing, installed the missiles beginning in February 1963, and maintained them before transfer to the Air Force in the summer and fall of 1963. Delta- 01 and Delta- 09 were turned over to SAC on 30 June 1963, making them among the first Minuteman sites to be activated at Ellsworth.

The emplacement of the missile in the silo employed skilled crews using a Transporter Erector (TE). After operators backed the TE into place, the missile container was raised to a vertical position over the silo opening. The missile was then freed from its restraining harnesses and a large hoist lowered it into the launcher. Once the missile was in the silo, technicians attached the reentry vehicle on top of the guidance and control system. After installing the reentry vehicle, the missile was aligned and oriented to the North Star and a targeting team set the arming and fusing system. After Boeing finished installing all 150 missiles, the Air Force Systems turned the LFs and LCFs into operational facilities and SAC declared all three Strategic Missile Squadrons (SMS) combat ready on 1 November 1963.

Site Activation
The 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) at Ellsworth Air Force Base was activated on 1 January 1962. Air Force personnel assigned to the 44th Missile Wing began training even while construction and development of missiles for the South Dakota Minuteman program was underway. Ellsworth Air Force
Base received its first Minuteman I in February 1963. The Air Force placed the first total flight of Minuteman I ICBMs at Ellsworth Air Force Base on alert status in July 1963 when Base commander, Colonel Kenneth W. Northamer, handed over the keys for the flight to Colonel Virgil M. Cloyd, commander of the 44th SMW. By November 1963, the 66th, 67th, and 68th SMS of the 44th SMW were ready for combat. Each squadron was responsible for five flights of ten missiles, totaling 150 Minuteman I missiles.

**Economic and Social Impacts on the Region**

**Economic Boost to the Region**

Like earlier ICBM programs, the Minuteman program had many lasting effects on western South Dakota. The immediate and lasting impacts of the Minuteman missile program on South Dakota and its people are clearly a part of the missile story and were described by former missileer, Craig Manson,

> “It is a world historical event as well, … the communities, the people who lived in those communities—they are all part of the story, too. Wall Drug, where many, many, many missile crews had breakfast and lunch, that’s kind of part of the story. The Diamond Café in Newell, South Dakota, I don’t know if it is even still there, but that is part of the story because it would not have been there long if it hadn’t been for the missile crews, you know; Bear Butte in western South Dakota, Spearfish and Belle Fourche and towns like Philip and White Owl in the north central part of the state, and all of these communities are part of the story, too, and the way the people in these communities felt, whether they liked it or whether they didn’t like it, however they felt about living in the shadow of those missiles.”

The large influx of construction workers in the early 1960s and the presence of additional Air Force personnel over the following thirty years affected local communities both economically and socially. Construction of the Ellsworth Air Force Base Titan facilities outside of Sturgis, New Underwood, and Hermosa beginning in late 1959 boosted the local economy and real estate market by providing jobs and demands for housing and goods and services. This trend continued with the construction of the Minuteman I facilities in western South Dakota. Rapid City and smaller communities near the bases and missile sites benefited economically. Examples of increased economic activity brought by the expansion of the staff at Ellsworth Air Force Base are described in the following paragraphs.

The Kiewit Company alone employed nearly three thousand workers at the missile construction sites. The Army Corps and Boeing Company also employed large numbers of staff in South Dakota during the early 1960s. While some of the employees were transient and moved to South Dakota to work on the project, many area residents found work on the construction, therefore stimulating the local economy.

The employment opportunities offered to local residents during the construction of the sites was a significant impact on the local economy. When local resident Gene S. Williams was asked about how the public felt about the missiles being placed in South Dakota, he stated: “Well when they first were being constructed, you know, I think there were a lot of people that looked at them as jobs. It was very good to the local economy. There were high paying jobs, there were a lot of people that had an opportunity to work on the missile sites that, you know, that was probably as good a paying job as you could have gotten anywhere at the time. There were people that picked up skills associated with working on them that have used them the rest of their life.” In another case, Thomas Wilson, a Kiewit Company worker who had relocated to South Dakota, was asked about his feelings constructing missile sites, he simply stated, “I figured I had a job.”
By some estimates, the influx of new South Dakota residents, most of them union members, helped decide one of the state’s closest elections, George McGovern’s 1962 Senate victory. As activist Jay Davis recalled: “they were outsiders, they weren’t from here, they didn’t stay here long but they voted in that election….so George McGovern the great spokesman for peace may have owed his very election, as close as it was, to the workers who were building the missile silos to further the nuclear arms race.”

The missile sites themselves brought increased staff to Ellsworth Air Force Base to operate and support the facilities, while the crews and their families became a permanent part of the area’s economy and social fabric until the program’s deactivation a generation later. “It brought more people into the area,” Wall Drug owner Ted Hustead recalled. “There have been a lot of men that were stationed at Ellsworth Air Force Base during the ‘60s and even today, that found their bride in western South Dakota.”

Employment in the area increased not only from direct employment for missile construction, but through the industries that supported the influx of workers. Housing surrounding Ellsworth Air Force Base was needed to accommodate the temporary workers, for example, and Boeing planned three trailer parks in 1961 to accommodate 120 units each. Housing construction and an increase in demand for basic day-to-day needs, such as food and clothing, was an economic boom for the area.

Many local businesses, such as Wall Drug, benefited from the increased population during the Minuteman construction phase. Although the business did not permanently expand due to the presence of construction crews, the workers did have an impact on the business in the early 1960s. During this time Wall Drug would open its doors at 4:30 in the morning to prepare breakfast for the construction crews and pack box lunches. Wall Drug also experienced business from missileers and other Air Force personnel during the years Minuteman I and II ICBMs were on alert status in South Dakota. Many times, LCF personnel would stop at Wall Drug to pick up food for barbeques or personal essentials needed for their three-day alert tour that they may have forgotten on base. With the introduction of new Air Force personnel regularly traveling through the area, Wall Drug began advertising free coffee and donuts for Minuteman missile crews. This eventually led to free coffee and donuts to all veterans, truck drivers, hunters, snowmobilers, and honeymooners.

The local economy continued to benefit from the presence of the Minuteman at Ellsworth Air Force Base into the later part of the twentieth century. During the Force Modernization Program begun in 1971, the Air Force upgraded the Minuteman I missiles of the 44th SMW with Minuteman II missiles. The project continued until March 1973 and employed over three hundred local residents. Local businesses benefited from the sale of supplies for the project. Rapid City, as a regional center in the state, can be attributed in part to the number of people that were stationed at Ellsworth Air Force Base over the years to work at the base and the missile sites.

Public Improvements
In addition to the economic boost, public utilities were also improved during the Minuteman I construction phase. In the spring of 1961 the Air Force initiated an accelerated program to improve 327 miles of roads. Contractors needed improved roads throughout rural, western South Dakota to move heavy equipment to the missile sites, and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, Defense Fund provided funds that Congress allocated for road improvements. Many of the improved roads to the missile sites were paved, which was a significant improvement over the area’s typically unpaved rural roads. During the missile site construction in South Dakota the federal government designated specific routes for construction crews to follow to the sites. The government contracted with the involved county to conduct road repairs for damage from trucks hauling equipment or materials. In some cases, however, contractors did not follow designated routes, and their crews and equipment inadvertently damaged additional roads. Pennington County billed the government some $150,000 in 1962, to cite one example,
to offset the cost of road damage on undesignated routes caused by missile construction. Over the years of Minuteman I and II activation in South Dakota, the road networks continued to be maintained through federal, state and local funds to accommodate Air Force personnel and maintenance activities of the sites.

Many schools also felt a direct impact from the Minuteman construction phase in the early 1960s. The Rapid City schools grew by about one thousand additional students from the nearby Titan project. The Rapid City Journal in January 1961 reported that it was anticipated that a similar number of students would also enroll in the Rapid City schools as a result of the Minuteman site construction. It is unknown how much enrollment increased as a result of the influx of Minuteman workers’ children during the two years of construction.

**Race Relations**

The influx of workers during the construction of the missile sites and Ellsworth Air Force Base personnel over the years included people of various ethnic backgrounds, including African Americans. Racial inequality and discrimination, both on and off base, were not isolated to Ellsworth Air Force Base and the Rapid City area, but rather are likely a window into the racial tension and discrimination being experienced by the rest of the country. Rapid City and the region around the base were not very racially diverse, and as a result, African American base personnel pointed out the lack of social centers and ethnic opportunities off base.

Alan Gropman’s book, *The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964*, reports that African American airmen at Ellsworth Air Force Base “were rejected by the local communities, and base officials seemed to be indifferent to their plight. Many business establishments were closed to blacks, all taverns were segregated, and housing for blacks was extremely limited, substandard, and exceptionally expensive.” Initially, some members of the Air Force opposed becoming involved in integration issues within the communities outside of the bases, feeling this was outside of their realm of control. The passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act opened public accommodations to African Americans and allowed the Air Force to take more initiative in integration measures within the communities outside its bases. Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act, some racial tensions continued to some extent both on and off base for air men of different cultural backgrounds.

Oral interviews with past personnel of Ellsworth Air Force Base during the late 1960s through the early 1990s offered varying opinions on the degree of racial tension between African American and minority Air Force personnel and the surrounding community. Ken Bush, an African American stationed at Ellsworth Air Force Base during the mid-1970s and 1980s, stated that “I can honestly say that I was never mistreated anywhere I went.” However, he did recall an isolated incident from the 1980s where he and another African American were refused service at an establishment in Rapid City. The matter was taken to the Rapid City Council and the two did not pursue further action. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Wilson stationed at Ellsworth stated that race relations were not a problem on base, but that there were significant problems outside the base community and was surprised how African Americans and Native Americans were treated.

In the Rapid City area there has historically been racial tension between the descendants of Euro-American and Native Americans, but based on the oral interviews collected to date, there is no evidence of significant tensions between the military community at Ellsworth Air Force Base and the surrounding Native American residents, at least in terms of affecting base operations.

**Living Next to the Missiles**

As is often the case, the presence of a large military base has a significant impact on the region. Ellsworth has become an important fixture in the community. In these ways the Minuteman program left a lasting
social and economic imprint on western South Dakota, and not only in ways typically measured by statistics and numbers. An amateur baseball team in Sturgis has adopted the name Titans, referencing the Titan missiles that were once deployed a few miles east of Sturgis. In another example, several streets in Rapid City now bear names reflecting the history and heritage of the base, including Minuteman Drive and Atlas Street.

Initially the missiles brought jobs and money to the area, but as time went on the residents had to learn to deal with nuclear weapons in their backyards. Local rancher Gene S. Williams recalled that a lot of the people that had missiles sites put on their land were from an era that had traveled by horse and buggy or could recall this time, “and now you’re putting a hole in the ground for a missile that could launch and go, you know, fifteen thousand miles and blow up millions of people. I mean, these types of things I think were hard for people to even put their arms around.”

For the children growing up amongst the missiles and Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, the Cold War was a part of every day life and evokes vivid memories. Tim Pavek, an environmental engineer at Ellsworth Air Force Base, recalls from his childhood hearing the B-52s. “…I remember when I was a, a little boy in bed here on a hot summer night with the windows open and I’d hear the distant rumble of the B-52s here at Ellsworth taking off. And, and, almost lay in bed shaking wondering if that was a practice mission and they’d come back or if this was the real thing and within a few minutes we’d see the fireballs of, you know, nuclear weapons over western South Dakota. So, having lived next to this Air Force base, you know, we knew that we were a big red- and- white bull’s eye on the Soviet map, or that was my perception at the time.”

Tim Pavek recalled another childhood memory of the Cold War told to him by a gentleman who grew up in South Dakota, “… he says ‘I remember sitting down at the kitchen table with my parents and having a very frank discussion over what we should do with regard to this, the threat of nuclear war. Um, whether we should build a bomb shelter–the people down the street were building a bomb shelter. How we should prepare ourselves for this eventuality.’ ”

The missiles also perhaps left emotional scars. “And here you’re sitting with a thermonuclear device, that is a half mile from your house,” local rancher Gene S. Williams commented, “and you know well somebody punches the wrong signal code in or turns the wrong key and you’re just vapor. You don’t want to dwell on that too much but you also recognize that it wasn’t just the enemy that was going to blow you up, you could blow yourselves up.” Paradoxically, the missiles themselves, and their LFs and LCFs, were less physically imposing on the state’s landscape.

The Cold War Continues

The domestic and local impact of the Minuteman program in economic, political, and even psychological terms, all occurred in the context of sweeping movements within the international system. Whereas the program had begun in an era when only the two superpowers possessed nuclear weapons, by the close of the 1960s at least three nations (Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China) publicly possessed this ultimate power. Other countries, Israel and South Africa (clandestinely), and Pakistan and India (publicly) would join the nuclear club within a generation, while at the time of this writing, North Korea appears on the brink of doing the same. What once was the domain of only superpowers clearly has grown in scope. Minuteman was designed largely for a total global nuclear war, as a deterrent of awful destruction useful for warding off the complete devastation of a large-scale nuclear exchange. Whether such a system would and could help control this new era’s increased risk of limited nuclear exchanges remains to be seen.
The superpowers responded to growth of the nuclear club with alarm, and with a surprising amount of cooperation. Each led collective military organizations by the mid-1950s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact in Europe most famously. Each also believed their own nuclear sword sufficient for defending theirs and their allies’ interests. American policymakers thus hesitantly approved of Britain’s development of an independent nuclear capability in the 1950s, believing their objection would do little to halt Britain’s nuclear program in any event, and loudly criticized France’s nuclear program (and subsequent withdrawal from NATO) the following decade. For each of these new nuclear nations, possession of the ultimate weapon symbolized power in a changing world: the power not only to hold its own against lesser foes, but also the power to stand up to Washington or Moscow. “We must rely on the power of the nuclear deterrent,” British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan declared, “or we must throw up the sponge!” Moscow proved more adept at halting nuclear development among its allies (who largely lacked the technological and financial resources to develop such expensive weaponry in any event), save for China, which united the nuclear club only after its break with the Kremlin in the early 1960s. During their 1961 Summit in Vienna, Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev even obliquely discussed launching a joint air strike against China’s embryonic nuclear program, as both leaders considered an Asian nuclear bomb a threat to their individual and collective interests. Realizing such a move would lead to war, they pursued other paths.  

By the 1970s, therefore, the bipolarity of the international system seen in the first Cold War years had given way to a world of multiple points of power. Moscow and Washington remained the two largest powers—and possessed the two largest nuclear arsenals by far—but they were no longer wholly dominant. They retained the power to impose their will on others (as in 1954 in Guatemala or in Hungary in 1956 for the United States, to name only two cases), though as the Soviets would learn in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and the Americans in Vietnam throughout the 1960s, the use of force often carried negative consequence that far outweighed the potential gains of proving hegemony. In recognition of these changes, and of their profound implications for Asian security in particular, President Richard Nixon slowly developed the practice of what his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger termed “triangular” diplomacy. By warming American relations with China, including development of formal diplomatic and trade ties, Nixon hoped to gain leverage in Europe over the Soviets, forcing them to the negotiating table and towards the lessening of East-West tensions known as détente. The ongoing quagmire of the Vietnam War and domestic crises such as Watergate ultimately limited Nixon’s diplomatic options, but the point of his effort remained: that the second half of the Cold War was far different than the first. There were more nuclear powers, and they possessed even greater stocks of nuclear weapons than before.  

Some argued the world was a safer place because of these developments. Others saw the breakdown of Soviet-American relations by the close of the Presidency of James Carter as foreboding and a new and more dangerous phase of the Cold War. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, prompted in part by fear of the new Islamist government in neighboring Iran that drew its power at least in part by anti-Americanism, sparked a new crisis in superpower relations. Washington condemned Moscow’s move, which if successful would have given the Kremlin new influence in a region pivotal to the world’s oil trade, and American leaders spent heavily to arm Afghan resistance forces in their battle against the Red Army. Ironically, these same forces spawned anti-American Islamist movements such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda, groups that each began as Mujahadiin fighters, armed by the United States for their battle against Communism.  

Carter’s final year in office saw renewal of Cold War tensions. Contemporary critics such as Ronald Reagan, who won the White House in 1980, and later conservative historians and pundits eager to give Reagan credit for “winning” the Cold War, harshly rebuked what they perceived to be Carter’s tepid opposition of and even tacit acceptance of Communism. Such biased interpretations are largely incorrect. Carter accelerated America’s military build-up, and withdrew the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II.
(SALT II) from the Senate (where it lacked the votes to pass in any event). He embargoed American wheat and technology exports to the Soviet Union, and even withdrew American participation from the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. Like President Truman thirty years before, Carter announced his own “Doctrine,” vowing American intervention—most likely nuclear—against any Soviet threat to the vital Persian Gulf. The Cold War was on once more.45

President Reagan continued these policies of military strength and tough diplomacy against the Soviets. His rhetoric, and his long-standing visceral opposition to Communism more broadly, helped change the tone of the Cold War. Carter promised opposition to further Communist expansion. Reagan wanted to see Communism’s collapse. He called the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” and later declared that “Marxism-Leninism” was destined for “the ashheap of history.” He refused, in 1981 at least, to meet Soviet requests for arms reductions. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet economy could no longer support the country’s competition with the West. When Reagan announced plans for an expensive new space-based missile defense system termed “Star Wars,” or officially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Soviet leaders knew they could not afford to keep pace. Most analysts believed SDI to be technically infeasible. The very fact that Washington seemed willing to spend the money to find out, coupled with their inability to do the same, pushed the realization among Soviet leaders of the necessity of change. They had by 1985 only fifty thousand computers in their entire country, compared to America’s thirty million, and youthful reformers such as the energetic Mikhail Gorbachev began a series of radical changes of the Soviet system, with glastnost (openness to the West) and perestroika (economic reconstruction). Reagan wanted more. “Mr. Gorbachev,” he declared in Berlin while overlooking the most visible symbol of the East-West divide, “tear down this wall.” Gorbachev could not, at least not without prompting a right-wing revolt at home. The forces he set in play, however, those of change and of modernity, swept through Europe. In November of 1989, Berliners both East and West tore down the wall that had divided them for more than a generation.46

The Cold War was not officially over—it had never officially begun—but it was clearly at an end. It would be up to democratic reformers such as Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Gorbachev was a reformer, but he was no democrat) to move the remnants of the Soviet Empire into a new day of cooperation with its neighbors and the world. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously declared the progress of history to be finally at an end. With the close of the Cold War, “political liberalism” had finally won out over totalitarianism. The stability of democracies would thereafter reign. As events have sadly shown, the post-Cold War world did not bring the stability promised, leading some pundits to publicly long for the security the bipolar Cold War system offered. The threat of global thermonuclear war might have lessened after 1991, the very threat Minuteman was originally developed to counter and deter. But the world may be no less safe for it. To the question of who “won” the Cold War, while most evidence points to the West, as responsible historians we can only answer as Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai did when asked the significance of the French Revolution: “it is too soon to tell.”47
Plate 28. Aerial view of Delta-01 during construction (Courtesy of National Park Service)

Plate 29. Launch Control Center under construction in South Dakota (Courtesy of Peter Kiewit and Sons', Inc.)
Plate 30. Launch Control Center nearing completion in South Dakota (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-30)

Plate 31. Interior of a Launch Control Center during construction in South Dakota (Courtesy of National Park Service)
Plate 32. Launch tube under construction in South Dakota (Courtesy of Peter Kiewit and Sons', Inc.)

Plate 33. Aerial view of a launch tube under construction in South Dakota (Courtesy of Peter Kiewit and Sons', Inc.)
Plate 34. Launch Facility nearing completion in South Dakota (Courtesy of Peter Kiewit and Sons', Inc.)
Plate 36. Northern Heights Mobile Home Park in Rapid City that may have housed Minuteman construction workers (Boeing Archives)
Chapter 4: Delta-01 and Delta-09 (1960s–80s)

Overview of the Complex

The Minuteman missile is a technological wonder. Designed to launch at a moment’s notice, it is capable of achieving speeds exceeding fifteen thousand miles per hour and then striking its target half a world away. Though created to deter war, its destructive capabilities exceeded anything known to previous generations. This force waited beneath the ground, in silos buried eighty feet beneath the surface, directed by operators housed miles away beneath unimposing buildings that dotted the windswept plains. Untold numbers of unsuspecting travelers passed Minuteman installations as they drove across the region’s highways and roads. Those on a pilgrimage to such popular destinations as Mount Rushmore, Badlands National Park, Wall Drug, and the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, or those just traveling home or to a new life across America, passed a portion of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. This chapter explores the physical layout and features of the Launch Control Facility (LCF) and Launch Facility (LF), the structures that comprise Minuteman Missile National Historic Site.

Delta-01 and Delta-09 are located in rural South Dakota about fifty miles east-southeast of Rapid City, South Dakota. Built in accordance with the Air Force’s dispersal strategy, the LCF and the LF lie approximately ten miles apart. The two facilities were originally linked by a system of blast-proof underground cables and a radio communications network, known as the Hardened Intersite Cable System (HICS). On active duty from 1963 until 1991, the LCF and LF were part of an operational unit, collectively known as Delta Flight, consisting of one LCF and ten missile LFs. Delta Flight was one of five flights assigned to the 66th Strategic Missile Squadron (SMS) of the 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW), headquartered at Ellsworth Air Force Base, near Rapid City.

Delta-01 and Delta-09 were turned over to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) on 1 November 1963, making them among the first Minuteman sites to be activated at Ellsworth. With the introduction of modifications to the Minuteman missile, the Ellsworth missile field, including Delta-01 and Delta-09, was upgraded to a Minuteman II installation in the early 1970s. No major structural modifications were necessary for this conversion, and over the years, these facilities were subject to limited new construction and remodeling. In September 1991 all 450 of the nation’s Minuteman II missiles were taken off alert. Delta-01 and Delta-09 were deactivated in early 1993 and placed on “caretaker status.” Deactivation included the removal of the Minuteman II missile and warhead from Delta-09 and the removal of classified electronic equipment, hazardous materials, environmentally sensitive materials, and equipment saved for use at other sites from both Delta-01 and Delta-09. To the greatest extent possible, the facilities were left to appear as they had when they were first taken off alert.

In 1993 the United States Air Force and the Rocky Mountain Regional Office of the National Park Service initiated studies to determine whether Delta-01 and Delta-09 could be preserved as a unit of the National Park Service. In 1999 Congress designated Delta-01 and Delta-09 as a National Historic Site and the bill was signed into law by President Bill Clinton. The facilities, including all cultural materials of the sites such as furnishings and objects, have been transferred to the National Park Service. The buildings, structures, and landscapes are all important features of Minuteman Missile National Historic Site. The following pages offer a description of these facilities.

Launch Control Facility Delta-01

Delta-01 occupies an open, grassy tract of land on the west side of Jackson County Road CS 23A, approximately one-half mile north of Interstate 90’s Exit 127. Delta-01 occupies approximately 6.4 acres of the South Dakota landscape with approximately 1.85 acres located within the security fence.
Approaching the site from the Interstate, it looks like a lone ranch house in the open grassland. Over the years, most travelers on the nearby Interstate probably did not give the site a second look or even know what military capabilities lay within the South Dakota plains.

The area surrounding the site, outside of the security fence, is open grassland with a few small privately owned agricultural buildings located several hundred feet to the northwest. Terrain at the site rises gradually toward the north. A chain-link security fence, topped with strands of barbed wire, encloses the site’s buildings and structures. Access to the site is provided by a gently curving gravel driveway on the west side of the county road. The driveway passes over a steel cattle guard and through a remote-controlled, chain-link, sliding gate in the security fence. The LCF support building and the vehicle storage building are located just inside the security fence, with an asphalt drive and parking area to their front. The Launch Control Center (LCC), accessed from the LCF support building, is located below ground and is not visible. Even though Interstate 90 is visible to the south of the site, it has a largely isolated feeling, with the wind whipping across the plains frequently serving as the only companionship.

The remaining area encompassed by the security fence is covered with native grass that was routinely mowed by the Air Force. The area inside the security fence includes a variety of electronic, mechanical, and recreational features designed to support operations and provide diversion for crew assigned to the facility. These features include a volleyball court, horseshoe pit, underground diesel storage tank, aboveground diesel storage tank, water well, gas pump, basketball hoop, flagpole, and utility poles. A code burner, used to destroy security codes, consisting of an open metal drum mounted on metal legs, is located near the volleyball court. Larger-scale resources within the security fence include the hardened high frequency (HF) transmit antenna, hardened HF receive antenna, hardened ultrahigh frequency (UHF) antenna, survivable low-frequency communication system antenna, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) super-high-frequency satellite terminal antenna, television satellite dish, and HICS. A concrete helicopter pad, two sewage lagoons, and the cathodic protection rectifier are located outside of the security fence to the south. A barbed-wire fence with wooden posts surrounds the lagoons.

**Launch Control Facility Support Building**

The LCF support building is the most prominent surface feature at the site. Located inside the sliding security gate, the support building provided accommodations for Air Force personnel, served as a security control center for the entire flight, and housed environmental, mechanical, and electrical systems for the underground LCC. The support building is an unpretentious, one-story, ranch-form structure with its principal facade facing southeast. It is built of conventional wood-frame construction, and has a low-pitched, side-gabled roof. The main portion of the building is rectangular in plan, measuring approximately thirty-three feet wide and 128 feet long. The southeast wall projects forward near the northeast end to form a wide bay for the installation’s security center. A gabled-roof, one-story mechanical wing extends from the building’s northeast side, measuring approximately twenty-one feet deep and thirty-four feet wide.

The support building rests atop a concrete-slab foundation. The outer walls are sheathed with wide-lap, steel, clapboard-style siding embossed with a wood-grain pattern. Painted tan, the siding was installed between the mid-1970s and early 1980s to replace the original cement asbestos siding. The roof has minimal overhangs, and is covered with brown, asphalt, T-lock shingles. Large sheet-metal ventilator hoods are located on the roof and back wall of the mechanical wing, and several smaller ventilator hoods project from the roof of the main building above the kitchen and utility room areas. There are steel, ogee-profile gutters at the eaves. Fascia boards, gutters, and verge rafters are painted dark brown.

Windows in the support building are one-over-one, double-hung, sash fitted with white combination storm/screen units. These windows were installed in 1976 to replace the building’s original wood sash.
windows. Although most of the windows are arranged in groups of two or three, the security center windows are placed closely together, forming a nearly continuous band that extends across the southeast wall and wraps around both sides of the bay, providing the security controllers a clear view of the security gate and entrance road.

The southeast side of the LCF support building has a communication equipment room, water treatment room, and boiler room that are accessed through exterior doors. The boiler room can also be entered from the interior of the building. The rear of the support building has an attached very-high-frequency (VHF) antenna and an air conditioner.

The support building’s main entrance is located on the main façade, adjacent to the security bay. A doorway on the northeast side of the main entrance hall opens directly into the security control center. This room served as headquarters for the Air Force security police who maintained a constant vigil over the facilities of Delta Flight. Positioned beneath the windows inside the center is a desk-like console containing telephone and radio equipment. Guards seated at this console could observe the main entrance, operate the entrance gate, check the credentials of visitors to the site, and monitor radio transmissions. An expanded-metal cage set into one corner of the room provided storage space for weapons. A small enclosed vestibule behind the security center served as the sole access point to the underground LCC.

The support building includes both residential spaces, such as the day room, bedrooms, exercise room, and kitchen, and operational and mechanical spaces, such as the security control center, water treatment room, diesel generator room, and boiler room. The interior finishes of the residential spaces at Delta-01 largely date to the late 1980s. Interior spaces in Ellsworth’s LCF support buildings were decorated and furnished by the people who occupied them. As part of an ongoing “self help” program, the base supplied materials such as paint, tile, and wall paneling, and Delta Flight personnel supplied the labor required to put the materials into place.

The LCF’s main entrance hall leads into the spacious day room area. The day room provided dining and recreational space for topside support personnel. Furnishings include three couches, a television, and both dining tables and booths. The day room walls are covered with wainscoting of pre-finished hardboard or varnished wood. The east wall of the day room is decorated with a large mural depicting a woodland scene. The day room and other rooms in the residential area have suspended acoustical tile ceilings with recessed fluorescent lighting fixtures. A dedication plaque, dating to November 1966, is located inside the day room and reads “as a tribute to the goodwill and mutual understanding between the citizens of this community and the Air Force.” A kitchen and pantry are located off the day room. The kitchen and pantry feature metal cabinets and industrial kitchen appliances. The wall of the pantry retains a menu and price list of food items available for purchase by the staff. The kitchen walls are covered with melamine panels and the floors are vinyl.

A doorway off of the day room opens into a long central hallway flanked by seven bedrooms, men’s and women’s latrines, a boiler room, and a utility closet. The women’s latrine was added in the mid-1980s, when the Air Force began to assign women to the duty roster at Minuteman sites. The bedrooms feature carpeted floors, walls finished with fabric-covered sound board, and suspended acoustical ceiling tiles with recessed fluorescent lighting fixtures. The bedrooms were furnished with beds or bunk beds, a desk, and freestanding wardrobe closets. The facility manager was the only personnel to receive his or her own bedrooms. The VIP bedroom has two bunk beds and could sleep four. The two bedrooms assigned to security personnel were outfitted with blackened windows and were provided with sound insulation to allow for daytime sleeping as security alert team personnel and flight security controllers rotated twelve-
hour shifts on their three-day alert. One of the bedrooms for security personnel also includes a locker for weapons and a rifle clearing barrel or a secured can to dummy fire weapons into to verify that they are unloaded.

The wing on the east end of the support building originally contained a single-stall garage and two mechanical equipment rooms. The garage was enclosed in 1975 and converted into an exercise room for staff. The equipment rooms contain a diesel-fueled generator for emergency power, as well as air conditioning and filtration equipment for the LCC.

**Launch Control Center**

Buried approximately thirty-two feet below ground, the LCC is entered from the LCF support building through a ten-foot-square, reinforced-concrete access shaft that descends from a small vestibule at the back of the security center. This structure served as the command post for the ten dispersed missiles of Delta Flight. Its entry shaft contains a small elevator and a steel-rung ladder surrounded by an open safety cage. The base of the shaft opens into a low-ceilinged vestibule that provides room for a bank of lockers and swing space for an eight-ton, steel-and-concrete blast door that seals the entrance to the control center. One wall of the vestibule is painted with art work depicting a missile labeled “USAF” blasting through the tattered flag of the former Soviet Union.

A small sign on the wall of the vestibule and a yellow line painted across the floor demarcate the beginning of the control center’s high-security “no-lone zone, two-man concept mandatory.” Any person entering the restricted area had to be accompanied or observed by a second person who was trained to detect erratic behavior, improper activity, or sabotage attempts. Launch control officers carried sidearms to protect the nuclear resources controlled from within the “no-lone zone,” and use of “deadly force” was authorized. A piece of art work on the blast door serves as a darkly humorous reminder of the LCC’s defining purpose. Emblazoned on the door’s outer face is a crudely painted depiction of a red, white, and blue pizza delivery box, labeled “Minuteman II.” A hand-lettered legend framing the illustration reads: “World-wide delivery in 30 minutes or less, or your next one is free.”

Decoration of the blast door and the area outside LCCs was common. Another Ellsworth LCF site, Oscar-01, featured a portrait of Sesame Street’s Oscar the Grouch with missiles in his paws painted on the wall.

The blast door is secured by twelve hydraulically operated latchpins placed around its perimeter. Emergency procedures allowed for the door to be opened by the facility manager from outside the LCC, but this would take about fifty minutes. When these pins retract, the door swings open on massive roller-bearing hinges to reveal a low, tunnel-like passageway leading to the LCC. Approaching the LCC, one passes the enormous blast door, crouches down to pass under a header of the tunnel, crosses a narrow walk between the outer and inner shell of the capsule, and then through an opening into the control center.

The LCC itself consists of two separate structural elements, nestled one inside the other. On the outside is a protective shell, shaped like an enormous gelatin capsule, that measures twenty-nine feet in diameter and fifty-four feet in length (outside dimensions). It is constructed of heavily reinforced concrete, with walls three to four feet thick, and is lined on the interior with a quarter-inch-thick steel plate. Suspended inside the shell is a box-like acoustical enclosure containing the launch control consoles, communications equipment, missile monitoring equipment, and spartan accommodations for the two-person Air Force launch crew. The acoustical enclosure is rectangular in plan, measuring approximately twelve feet wide and twenty-eight feet long. It rests atop a twelve-foot-by-thirty-two-foot, steel-framed platform. The corners of the platform are suspended by a large pneumatic cylinder called a “shock isolator.” Hung from heavy chains attached to the ceiling of the shell, the isolators are designed to let the enclosure bounce as much as two feet in any direction without major damage. An articulated,
steel-plate bridge spans the gap between the platform and the access tunnel. The floor of the acoustical enclosure is made of removable steel plates covered with sheet vinyl. A strip of light brown carpet lies over the floor plates.

Compartments beneath the floor contain survival equipment, emergency batteries, and a motor generator. The walls and ceilings of the enclosure are made of hollow-walled, perforated-steel panels filled with sound-absorbing material. One early visitor to the Ellsworth facilities, Richard B. Stolley, reported that the noise inside the LCC was “almost overwhelming—a high electrical whine. It was comforting proof that all equipment was working, but my ears rang for hours after I left the capsule.” A beige fabric headliner is attached to the ceiling framework with Velcro. The headliner was installed in 1990 to help reduce noise levels inside the enclosure, which had previously disturbed crewmembers. Four recessed fluorescent lighting fixtures centered in the ceiling illuminate the enclosure’s interior. Emergency task lighting is provided by adjustable spotlights mounted on the ceiling. Virtually every surface inside the enclosure is painted pale green. “It’s a color we’ve learned to detest,” observed one Ellsworth missile crew member in 1964.

Upon entering the LCC, one feels that he or she may have stepped back in time or onto a movie set as the communication and computer equipment within largely dates to its installation in the 1960s. The equipment appears “ancient” by today’s standards, but continued to be fully functional into the early 1990s when the site was deactivated. The LCC contains two desk-like consoles placed about twelve feet apart. Positioned in front of each console is a swiveling, high-backed, aircraft seat fitted with seat belts and a shoulder harness. The launch control (commander’s) console is located at the east end of the acoustical enclosure, directly opposite the entrance. It has an illuminated panel that allowed the commander to continually monitor the operational and security status of each of the ten missiles and launchers in Delta Flight. The communications control (deputy commander’s) console is centered against the south wall of the enclosure. It contains an array of radio and telephone equipment that enabled the crew to communicate with other LCFs, base headquarters, and SAC. At the side of each console is a small panel containing a spring-loaded, key-operated launch switch. The keys to these switches were kept in a double-padlocked, red steel box mounted above the deputy commander’s console. If crew members had received an order to launch their missiles, they first would have unlocked their padlock (placed on the box at the beginning of their shift) on the red steel box and removed the launch keys and preset authenticators. Then, if the Emergency War Order (EWO) had been determined to be authentic, the missile combat crew members would have inserted the codes they had received into the enabling panel, inserted the keys into the switches, and turned them in unison. If their launch command was verified by a second LCC, one to ten Minuteman missiles would have blasted out of their silos and streaked toward preassigned targets halfway around the world. This system was designed to make it impossible for a single individual or crew to launch the flight’s missiles.

Lining the walls of the acoustical enclosure are heavy aluminum electronic racks containing computer equipment, radio transmitters and receivers, a telephone relay system, and a power control panel. The acoustical enclosure is also equipped with a stainless steel latrine, a small refrigerator/microwave oven unit, and a curtained sleeping compartment. Installed in 1991, the sleeping compartment replaced a military cot that had occupied the same space. Virtually everything in the LCC was strapped down or permanently mounted, including the coffee pot and seat belts for the combat crew seats.

The LCC ordinarily used commercial electrical power to run its motor generator, and drew its clean and cool air supply from air-conditioning equipment located aboveground in the LCF support building. However, the center was also capable of operating for sustained periods of time without any support from topside. In the event of a nuclear attack or higher state of readiness, an automatic blast valve system was designed to seal the capsule off from the surface. For extended periods of time crew members would then
activate a hand-pumped oxygen regeneration unit to obtain breathable air. The storage batteries and motor generator beneath the floor would provide emergency electrical power and an emergency air-conditioning unit would prevent vital electronic equipment from overheating. Crew members trapped in the capsule after an attack could theoretically reach the surface through a three-foot-diameter, corrugated-steel escape tube that angles upward from the east end of the LCC. To maintain rigidity, the tube is sand-filled and plugged at its lower end. To make their exit, crew members would have removed the plug, dug out the sand, and climbed up the tube to ground level.

**Heated Vehicle Storage Building**
A large vehicle storage building, erected in 1968 to provide heated parking for vehicles, stands near the northwest corner of the LCF support building. It is a one-story, three-stall, wood-frame garage with a low-pitched, front-gabled roof. Resting on a concrete slab, the building is rectangular in plan, measuring approximately thirty-two feet by forty feet. Its outer walls are sheathed with wide-lap steel, clapboard-style siding embossed with a wood-grain texture and painted tan. The roof has slight overhangs and brown asphalt T-lock shingles. The main facade includes a large central garage door flanked by two slightly smaller openings. Each of the three openings contains an insulated-steel, overhead door with horizontal flush panels.

The building was constructed to accommodate a front end loader used for snow removal, among other vehicles. Its interior walls are sheathed with hardboard panels. The ceiling is insulated but unfinished. Steel pipe columns between the bays provide additional structural support for the roof. A small enclosed furnace room is in the building’s west corner. An enclosed tool storage room, built c.1986, adjoins the rear wall.

**Communication Antennae**
Delta-01 includes numerous antennae. A blast-hardened, HF transmit antenna, constructed in 1963 and deactivated in the early-1970s, stands near the east side of the compound, about 140 feet due south of the access road. This structure consists of an underground, reinforced-concrete cylinder, approximately twenty-one feet in diameter and fifty feet deep (outside dimensions). The well of the cylinder contains a telescoping, four-sided radio antenna originally capable of extending to a maximum height of 120 feet.

A hardened HF receive antenna is set into the ground about 160 feet south-southeast of the LCF support building. Built in 1963, this structure consists of a reinforced-concrete cylinder covered by a concrete cap and measuring approximately sixteen feet in diameter and thirty-seven feet deep (outside dimensions). Distributed evenly around the perimeter of the structure are five small ports. Each port contained a slender, ballistically actuated, steel, monopole antenna. This antenna system was deactivated c.1987-88. When it was still in use, one monopole extended from the cylinder at all times. If the exposed antenna were to have been damaged during an attack, a replacement could have been quickly deployed through the detonation of an explosive squib in an adjacent port.

A hardened UHF antenna stands near the southwest corner of the LCF support building. It was installed by the Motorola Company in 1976 to provide “unprecedented reliability to radio communications between the base and the missile field.” The hardened UHF antenna consists of a massive, cast-steel frustum, bolted to a thick, reinforced-concrete slab sixteen feet square. Surmounting the frustum is a conical, white fiberglass weather dome.

The survivable low-frequency communication system (SLFCS) antenna is buried in the ground about 140 feet east of the LCF support building and is not visible from the surface. Installed in 1968, the SLFCS is part of the facility’s EWO communication system. The ICBM super-high-frequency satellite terminal
antenna was installed at the rear of the LCF support building c.1992, at the same time missile sites were being deactivated in Ellsworth’s 67th Strategic Missile Squadron (SMS).

Other structures associated with Delta-01 include the cathodic protection rectifier, television satellite dish, and HICS. An electronic device installed in 1963 to protect underground features such as fuel tanks from corrosion, the rectifier is located just outside the security fence on the north side of the access road. Its aboveground portion consists of a white-painted steel electrical box mounted on a wood pole, while the below ground portion consists of a well approximately 220 feet deep, containing eleven graphite anodes. A television satellite dish installed in 1987-88 sits in the grassy area in front of the LCF support building. The HICS was an underground communications link that connected the LCC at Delta-01 with all ten Delta-Flight LFs, including Delta-09 and the rest of the LCFs and LFs of the 66th SMS. The system employed a double-walled cable, pneumatically pressurized so that ruptures could be readily identified. In accordance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), the HICS link was permanently disabled. To demonstrate compliance with the START Treaty, the HICS cable was severed and portions were removed.

A concrete helicopter pad and two sewage lagoons are located outside of the security fence to the south. The two large sewage lagoons used for treating waste materials lie approximately 240 feet southeast of the LCF support building. The original sewage lagoon, constructed in 1963, is an open settling basin, 118 feet square, surrounded by an eight-foot-high earthen berm. In 1970-71, an additional lagoon was appended to the southeast corner of the original structure. The new overflow lagoon is irregular in plan and is considerably larger than the earlier basin. Built in 1970-71, the large helicopter pad provided a safe landing area for the helicopters that were used to transport personnel and equipment between the LCF and Ellsworth Air Force. The helicopter pad consists of a flat concrete slab fifty feet square, surrounded on all sides by a wide shoulder of gravel and asphalt.

**Launch Facility Delta-09**

Delta-09 is located approximately ten miles west-northwest of LCF Delta-01. It occupies part of an open, grassy tract of land straddling Pennington County Road T512, about 0.6 miles west and south of Interstate 90, Exit 116. Although the Interstate is visible in the distance, the site is in a rural area without other development around it. Historically under Air Force ownership, Delta-09 occupied ninety acres: eighty acres of concurrent use and ten acres of exclusive use, with one acre located within the security fence. Delta-09 is surrounded on the north, west, and south sides by the open land of Buffalo Gap National Grassland, under ownership of the United States Forest Service. In the distance are geological formations similar to those found in Badlands National Park. The launch structures are concentrated inside a rectangular area surrounded by a chain-link security fence. A double gate is located on the east side of the security fence. A gravel access drive leads from the double gate to the nearby county road.

The area inside the enclosure has been graded to form a level, earthen platform that is elevated a few feet above the surrounding terrain. The platform has a gravel surface, and was specifically planned to provide maneuver space for the truck-like transporter-erector vehicles that hauled and emplaced the Minuteman missiles. The missile launcher and LF support building are located near the southern end of the maneuver space platform, with most of their structural elements underground. A smaller rectangular area at the north end of the platform outlined by four, low, small concrete corner pylons served as a landing pad for helicopters. Floodlights mounted atop two wooden utility poles at opposite corners of the maneuver space provided illumination for nighttime maintenance activities at the site. Two remnants of the concrete-base pad from the earlier outer zone security system antennas remain at the site: a square
concrete pad with four reflector mount pedestals is located to the southwest (rear) of the missile launcher and a clutter monument and footing of the antenna pedestal are located to the rear (south) of the launch support building.

**Missile Launcher**

The missile launcher was designed to serve as a temperature- and humidity-controlled, long-term storage container, protective enclosure, support facility, and launch pad for a Minuteman ICBM. The launcher consists of an underground launch tube (silo), surrounded by a cylindrical equipment room and covered by a hardened, ballistically actuated closure door. A heavily secured hatchway connected to the equipment room allowed Air Force personnel to enter the launcher and step down a metal rung ladder into the upper and lower equipment rooms surrounding the missile to conduct routine maintenance activities.

The launch tube is essentially a reinforced-concrete cylinder lined with a quarter-inch steel plate. It measures twenty-five feet in diameter (inside dimension) and approximately eighty feet deep. The tube rests atop a four-foot-thick, reinforced-concrete foundation, with its lower forty-six feet encased in approximately ten inches of heavily reinforced concrete. A two-inch-thick steel plate on the floor of the tube serves as a blast deflector for the missile’s exhaust.

Welded to the walls of the launch tube, about twenty-one feet above the floor, are pulley blocks for the three-point suspension system that supported the installation’s Minuteman missile. The suspension system consists of a free-floating, steel missile-support ring attached to three wire cables. The cables pass over the pulley blocks and fasten to large, coil spring-type shock absorbers fixed to the base of the silo.

Encircling the upper portion of the launch tube is a cylindrical, two-level equipment room, built of heavily reinforced concrete with a steel liner. The equipment room is about twenty-five feet by fifteen feet and twenty-eight feet deep, with a four-foot-thick slab foundation, and walls two feet thick. A six-inch-wide “rattle space” between the equipment room and the launch tube allows the two structures to move independently.

The lower level of the equipment room contains a motor generator and supports for twelve large storage batteries. The batteries themselves were removed from the missile launcher during deactivation in 1993. An electrical surge arrestor room is located on the southeast exterior wall of the lower level. The numerous surge arrestors inside were designed to prevent electronic equipment inside the launcher from being damaged by electromagnetic pulses resulting from nuclear explosions. On the south side of the lower level, the cylindrical ballistic actuator that opens the launcher closure door during the launch sequence stands upright and extends through the upper level floor.

The upper level of the equipment room consists of a steel-framed platform covered with a rolled-steel deck plate. Cast into the east outer wall is a narrow, steel-faced bench, calibrated with compass bearings. Part of a complex optical alignment system, the bench originally supported an “autocollimator” (no longer in place) that was used to align the missile’s guidance system. Directly above the bench is a canted cylindrical porthole (sight tube) glazed with bulletproof glass that is now permanently welded shut. This sight tube is aligned so as to point through the open access hatch, which allowed guidance technicians to establish visual references to a pair of azimuth markers (surveyors’ benchmarks) located on the surface outside of the security fence.

The northwest one-third of the upper-level floor is suspended from a series of coil-spring shock struts attached to the ceiling. Attached to the shock-mounted floor are racks of electronic equipment used to monitor and troubleshoot the missile, communicate with the LCC, and conduct the countdown.
Mounted on the wall adjacent to the equipment racks are two cylindrical, stainless-steel chemical tanks. These tanks originally contained a sodium chromate solution for cooling the Minuteman missile’s guidance system. Maintenance workers could gain access to the missile and the bottom of the silo by removing the hatch plates from the side of the launch tube, lowering the access door or “diving board,” and installing a motorized cage. The two-person work cage could reach the circumference of the launch tube and also could lower workers sixty feet to the bottom of the silo.

The underground launch tube and equipment room are covered by a massive, reinforced-concrete roof slab, known as the launcher closure. The top of the slab is level with the surface of the maneuver area. The roof slab is roughly teardrop-shaped in plan, with its apex pointing toward the northwest. The reinforced-concrete closure door is three and one-half feet thick and weighs more than ninety tons. If a missile had been fired the launch enclosure would have been blown open with great force. A concrete approach apron on the north side of the launcher closure with steel transporter erector pylons and transporter erector jack pads was used to align and support the transporter erector while the missile was emplaced. Transporter erector landing gear pads are also located just north of the apron.

The area directly south of the missile launcher is approximately three and one-half feet lower than the gravel maneuver area, exposing the south edge of the roof slab. Cast into the southern edge of the roof slab is a pocket-like opening for the launcher’s horizontally sliding closure door. A low, buttressed concrete wing wall on each side of the door opening separates the maneuver area from the ground below. A concrete track apron is directly behind the launcher closure with a center track rail and side closure or maintenance tracks. The launcher closure rolls open on two wide steel tracks mounted atop deep reinforced-concrete beams cantilevered out from the launcher. The closure door’s steel-sheathed leading edge is shaped like the cowcatcher on a steam locomotive and is designed to clear debris from the tracks when the ballistic actuator flings the door aside. The grade slopes slightly south from the apron to provide drainage away from the launcher. If the missile or one of its major components had to be removed or replaced, maintenance workers would use a hydraulic pipe pusher mounted on a caged rail in the middle of the track apron to jack the closure door open.

For more routine maintenance activities, workers entered the silo through the personnel access hatch in the northeast corner of the roof slab. The access hatch is a heavily reinforced, steel- and-concrete vault door, operated by two hydraulic cylinders. The door opens into a cylindrical shaft that descends to the lower level of the equipment room. Fitted into the shaft is the “B-plug,” a piston-like, steel security door operated by an electro-mechanical actuator. The silo cannot be entered until the B-plug is retracted.

Slight modifications have been made to Delta-09 to prepare it for interpretation as a static display. The launcher closure has been permanently fixated in a partially open position, in agreement with the START Treaty, and a glass and aluminum viewing enclosure was installed over the opening in 2001. A deactivated training missile was installed in the launch tube in 2001. The glass viewing enclosure allows visitors to see into the launcher to view the training missile. (For further discussion of Delta-09 modifications see Section III, Chapter 3: Minuteman Missile National Historic Site)

Launch Facility Support Building
Located adjacent to the missile launcher on the southeast is the 1963 LF support building, which contains an array of mechanical, electrical, and environmental equipment. This box-like underground structure has its roof about one foot above ground level. Constructed entirely of reinforced concrete, the building is rectangular in plan, measuring roughly sixteen feet wide, twenty-five feet long, and eleven feet deep. At the north end of the structure is a narrow rectangular areaway, covered with steel grating and a steel entry hatch. A ladder mounted on the interior wall provides access through the hatch down into the building.
Two removable steel hatches in the middle of the roof of the support building allowed maintenance crews to quickly install large pieces of equipment or remove them for repairs.

The support building contains electrical distribution equipment; a diesel- fueled emergency generator that supplied electrical power when the commercial source was unavailable; a brine chiller unit that provided cold water to the launch equipment room air handler, which in turn, provided the electronic racks and launcher with temperature and humidity- controlled air; a hydraulic pump for the personnel access hatch; a temperature control air compressor; and various panels for mechanical, security, and communications systems.

**Associated Structures**

Delta- 09 includes five structures historically associated with the launcher, two of which are antennae. The improved minuteman physical security system (IMPSS) antenna, a white fiberglass monopole, rises from the base of the roof slab on the east side of the closure- door opening. This antenna is part of the IMPSS that was installed at the launch site in 1989. IMPSS is a microprocessor- based surveillance system designed to detect outer zone intruders. It replaced troublesome older security systems so sensitive that they could be set off by “elk, rabbits, [or] even high- jumping grasshoppers.”

A hardened UHF antenna, installed c.1968 to link the LF with the SAC's airborne launch control center, is located a few feet to the northwest of the silo opening. It rests atop a thirteen- foot- diameter, reinforced- concrete base, shaped like an inverted saucer. The antenna itself is housed inside a cast- steel frustum capped with a conical, gray fiberglass weather dome.

Three other structures are located at Delta- 09 outside the security fence. A cathodic protection rectifier installed in 1982- 83 is located on the south side of the access drive, approximately 160 feet east of the security fence. Its aboveground portion consists of a galvanized steel electrical box mounted on a wood pole protected with a small fence. The below ground portion consists of a well approximately 220 feet deep, containing eleven graphite anodes. Two azimuth markers, used in conjunction with the autocollimator to align the Minuteman guidance system, are each located approximately one thousand feet from the launcher—one to the north- northwest and the other to the north- northeast. Each azimuth marker consists of a cylindrical concrete pylon, three feet in diameter and eight feet deep, set vertically into the ground. The visible portion of each pylon is approximately eighteen inches in diameter and four feet high. A disc- shaped aluminum alloy survey plate is set into the top of each pylon. Two HICS marker posts are located to the south of the chain link security fence. The wooden posts are about twelve feet tall with orange bands around the top and directional arrows to mark the location of the underground HICS.

**Conversion to Minuteman II**

Between 1971 and 1973, facilities at both the Delta- 01 and Delta- 09 sites were modified slightly when Ellsworth replaced its arsenal of Minuteman I missiles with the more advanced Minuteman II. The most important changes associated with this conversion were contained within the missiles themselves, since Minuteman II featured a more powerful propulsion system and a more accurate guidance system than its predecessor. Changes included installation of new electronic ground- support equipment in existing racks at both the LCF and the LF; and the installation of electronic filters, seals, and circuit- breaking equipment at both sites to protect the facilities against damage from the electromagnetic pulses released by atomic blasts. Because the Minuteman II was slightly longer than the Minuteman I, the missile support ring inside the LF silo was lowered by lengthening suspension cables. The optical alignment system was adapted to work with the new missile by welding stops to the autocollimator bench to limit the instrument’s range of motion. The retractor mechanism for the umbilical cable was relocated, and several
other cables and fluid lines within the Missile Launcher were rerouted. No structural changes were required at either the LF or the LCF to accommodate the new missile. 297

After conversion to Minuteman II, Delta Flight experienced only minor modifications as it continued to fulfill its mission. Changes at the LCF support building included new steel siding and replacement windows, the addition of a women's latrine, air conditioning, and interior redecorating. Alterations to the LCC included the installation of carpet, Velcro-attached fabric acoustical ceiling panels, a curtained sleeping compartment (called a modular bed storage unit), an updated latrine, and a new privacy curtain to accommodate mixed gender crews.

Delta-01 and Delta-09 were among the remote facilities where the men and women of Ellsworth lived and worked. They were designed for security and functionality. They were designed, in the final analysis, for a function each hoped would never be needed. Let us now turn to those men and women, to their duties and their lives, and to the culture of the missileers and the missile crews.
Minuteman Missile National Historic Site

Historic Resource Study

Plate 37. Aerial view of Delta-01 (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-A-2)

Plate 38. Aerial view of Delta-01 highlighting the aboveground buildings used by missile crews (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-A-1)
Plate 39. Site plan, Launch Control Facility - correction to text: the Minuteman II system was taken off alert on 27 September 1991 (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50- sheet 1)
Plate 40. View of Launch Control Facility Support Building, Delta-01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)

Plate 41. Main entrance and security bay of Launch Control Facility Support Building, Delta-01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 42. Interior plan view of Delta-01 (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-A-sheet1)
Plate 43. Line drawings of interior of Delta-01 Launch Control Center (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-A-sheet 2)
Plate 44. Interior side of blast door, Delta-01 (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-A-56)
Plate 45. Launch Control Center at Delta-01 (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineering Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Plate 46. Delta-01 Missile Commander’s Launch Control Console (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-A-69)
Plate 49. Site plan and cut-away view of Delta-09 Launch Facility (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-C-sheet 1)
Plate 50. Topside view of Delta-09 Launch Facility with missile launcher and personnel access hatch

(Photograph by National Park Service)
Plate 51. Personal access ladder into missile launcher, Delta-09 (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-C-24)
Plate 52. A Delta Flight missile being emplaced in the Transporter Erector (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD- 50- C- 18)
Plate 53. Interior of Delta-09 silo showing launch tube encircled by electronic equipment

(Courtesy of National Park Service, Photograph by Richard M. Kohen)
Plate 54. One of two azimuth markers located outside the Delta-09 security fence used by guidance technicians to align the missile’s guidance system (Photograph by Mead & Hunt, Inc.)
Chapter 5: Missileer Culture: Day-to-Day Life (1960s–91)

Trained and dedicated officers, troops, and technicians managed the awesome destructive force embedded within each Minuteman missile on a day-to-day level. Their lives while on three-day or twenty-four hour alert tours became intertwined with their machines and their mission. Minuteman’s Launch Control Facilities (LCF) in South Dakota were operated by Air Force personnel who lived and worked at the sites. Each staff member had their own responsibilities to support the overall function of the LCF, though their primary duty was to support the missile combat crew in the underground Launch Control Center (LCC). Personnel assigned to reside at the LCF included a facility manager, flight security controllers, security alert team members, and a missile rations cook. Maintenance crews occasionally stayed overnight at the facility as well. Activities and duties of the crews evolved over the nearly three decades of Minuteman in South Dakota. The general description of the duties and procedures described below may not reflect all the varying experiences of the Air Force personnel over the years.

While on duty, the staff worked, ate, slept, and relaxed at the LCF. For Air Force personnel, the grounds became a second home for the duration of the tour. Many of the facilities were equipped with recreational facilities such as basketball hoops, ping-pong and pool tables, and weight rooms. They all had a television and some even had satellite televisions and videocassette recorders. In this sense, the sites ceased to be uniform almost immediately upon use, as crew alterations and tastes transformed the LCF into unique living and working environments. Working as a team and frequently serving the same tours, many LCF personnel and teams formed special relationships. In the late 1970s, for example, LCF personnel from Delta-01 of Ellsworth Air Force Base called themselves the “Delta Dogs” and painted a bulldog on the wall. Although the mural has since been painted over, the legacy of the “Delta Dogs” still exists in the minds of the men and women who served at the Ellsworth Air Force Base Delta Flight.

Many Air Force personnel who worked in operations or maintenance at the LCFs went through the Personnel Reliability Program, a psychological screening program that evaluated missileers and support crew. Crew members were not permitted to serve alert tours if something was hindering their ability to think clearly, including medications and marital situations. Commanding officers, coworkers, and friends were asked to report strange behavior and emotional upsets of LCF and LCC personnel that may affect their job performance.

Air Force personnel involved in the Minuteman missile, not just the missileers, were well aware of the seriousness of their mission and the potential consequences of their use. When Martin Pietz, who served on the electro mechanical team at Ellsworth, was asked, “Did it bother you at all that the missile you were supporting, if it were ever used, likely meant the end of life as we know it?” Pietz responded, “You’re torn when you work. I mean you have exercises where you have scenarios where you have practice war, in case it, God forbid it ever happened, it wouldn’t, you wouldn’t sit there and think about ‘what am I doing, what am I doing?’… So after, I mean you’d go home that night and you’d think about ‘man, what are we doing?’ So yeah, did you ever think? Yeah, absolutely! You tried to stay in the mode. It was your job to have things ready to go and hope it never got used.”

David Blackhurst, a former missile crew commander recalled that they took their job very seriously and described it once they were in a routine in the following manner, “After awhile we had a saying it was kind of like hours and hours of sheer boredom punctuated by seconds of panic. But basically it was a serious job.” Former missileer Craig Manson continued to describe the mindset of a missileer by addressing one of the most difficult questions frequently asked of them. “And so the question frequently is, ‘well, you know, how could you do that job knowing that you might be called upon to participate in a war of nuclear devastation?’ And I think there’s a couple of things that people have to keep in mind. One, the
majority of missile launch officers, even though they’re fairly young officers, the majority are married and many of them have children and families, and that’s crucial to keep in mind. Two, although no one ever said to a missile officer, ‘we are categorically ruling out a nuclear first strike,’ because of their faith in American values, I think we were all convinced that America would act only in the best interests of America and the world and not in an unreasonably aggressive posture for no reason at all.”

Following is a description of the principal assignments for each of the Air Force personnel assigned to a Minuteman LCF or LCC at Ellsworth Air Force Base.

At the Launch Control Facility

Facility Manager
One facility manager was on duty during each three-day alert tour. While the facility managers were accountable for managing the facility and supervising the topside crew, they were ultimately responsible to the crew commander on duty in the LCC. Facility managers were typically noncommissioned officers with excellent technical and managerial skills who were in their twenties and thirties holding the rank of Master Sergeant, Technical Sergeant or Staff Sergeant. Any Air Force personnel could have applied to serve as a facility manager, including maintenance crew, cooks, and administrative support. Once the Air Force selected an individual to become a facility manager, Strategic Air Command (SAC) required that they visit one of the sites and begin on-the-job training with an experienced facility manager. There was no formal training to become a facility manager. Rather, they learned their job primarily by performing the required tasks.

The facility manager’s primary duties included supervising and managing LCF personnel for the combat crew commander, maintaining support equipment, and responding to emergencies under the direction of the missile crew on duty. Also under this job description, however, were a host of additional duties, including everything from acting weatherman, mechanic, innkeeper, and groundskeeper, or essentially, anything needed to keep the LCF running smoothly.

Many missileers called the “jack-of-all-trades” facility manager their “house mouse.” The phrase derives from the concept that the LCF performed much like a small hotel serving as a location away from home where security personnel, cooks, and missile crews, and sometimes missile maintenance crew ate, slept, and relaxed, in addition to worked. Despite the frequent lightheartedness of the personnel at the LCF, the facility manager had a difficult and potentially stressful job. In an article published in 1974, Sergeant Roger Wang stated that the primary reason for facility managers is to “support the two guys who someday may have to turn the keys to fire the Minuteman.” The purpose of a strategic missile site, to defend the nation by offering a constant and vigilant threat of counter-attack, was rarely far from the minds of such airmen.

After arriving at the LCF, the facility managers used the day’s code to get onto the site. Although the LCF security staff knew the facility manager was coming, everyone accessing the site—even those recognized—had to be authenticated before entering the site as a precaution against sabotage or attack. This emphasis on security was included even in routine activities. If the facility manager needed to go down to the capsule, for example, he would first have to authenticate the codes received from Ellsworth Air Force Base with the combat crew. One facility manager, serving at Delta-01, once read his code backwards to the combat crew. Realizing his mistake, the crew asked if he was sure this was the way he wanted to state the codes. Unfortunately, the facility manager did not understand their hint, and was forced to return to Ellsworth Air Force Base to reverify his codes.
After arrival at the LCF, the facility manager’s first task would be to walk the facility and the grounds with the manager on-duty for a briefing, where the work performed by the previous alert tour, and the work required for the next, would each be detailed. Every day at the facility offered similar duties. After rising in the morning, the facility manager would phone in a weather report to the helicopter pilot on-duty at Ellsworth Air Force Base. Following breakfast, the facility manager took care of other daily responsibilities. Morning chores included inspection of the LCF grounds, including the water treatment tank, the power generators, and the sewage lagoon. After the daily inspections, the facility manager typically spent much of the day maintaining the facility and repairing support equipment, including replacing light bulbs and refueling vehicles. In the summer the facility manager was responsible for mowing the yard and in the winter he or she shoveled the drive.  

Facility managers were also responsible for meeting any individual that entered the LCF property, including everyone from branch chiefs, maintenance crews, and local law enforcement to family members and local ranchers. All visitors needed approval to visit a site, including family members. Visitors could be sponsored by Air Force personnel who prepared a request letter that was then reviewed and approved through the chain-of-command. The facility manager was effectively never off-duty while on an alert tour. If a maintenance crew was scheduled to arrive in the middle of the night for a Remain-Over-Night (RON), for example, the facility manager was required to brief the visitors on safety and arrange for their meals and living quarters.

The facility manager also had the job of calling in stand-by or personnel replacements as needed. Three days in close quarters sometimes prompted disagreements between LCF personnel. In such cases, the facility manager had the authority to send the aggressor back to base and call in a replacement to finish the alert tour. Emotional problems and medical emergencies at the base or at home also warranted the facility manager to call in stand-by personnel. Although never off-shift while on alert tour, being facility manager offered unique rewards. The manager was the only LCF personnel assigned a single room. Other topside crew shared a room with as many as three others. Some facility managers even had a private television in their bedroom, though again, the amenities of Minuteman II LCFs varied by the time the system came off-line.

**Flight Security Controllers**

Every three-day alert tour at the LCF included two flight security controllers. The flight security controllers were typically noncommissioned officers with the rank of Sergeant (now Senior Airman), Staff Sergeant, or Technical Sergeant, typically in their twenties. Regulations demanded the presence of one security controller in the security control room at all times, and therefore, each of the three days of the alert tour was split into twelve-hour shifts with one controller manning each shift. The security controller on-shift monitored the LCF grounds, as well as all ten Launch Facilities (LF) in their flight area. The security control room featured windows overlooking the entrance gate and grounds. From this station, the security controllers would check identification of visitors or replacement crews entering the site. A security team’s first duty upon arriving at the LCF was a changeover process with the security staff on-duty, including inspections of the building and grounds. The previous security controller would brief the new team on what LFs were down and which ones were under maintenance. The changeover procedure was always the same between shifts and rarely changed.

Each security controller also supervised a two-member security alert team. If the missile combat crew received indication that security was breached at one of the LF sites, they would notify the security controller who would dispatch the security alert team to investigate. The security controllers were also responsible for storing and issuing weapons and ammunition to personnel at the LCF. Weapons were stored in a locker located in one of the security bedrooms and the weapons cage in the security control center. The Air Force equipped the security controllers with M-16s, the military’s standard rifle after its
introduction in 1964, with 240 rounds of ammunition or an M-60 machine gun. While on alert tour, but off-duty, security controllers would often spend time playing games, working out, resting, and relaxing. The windows in the security bedroom were darkened to enable controllers assigned to the night shift to sleep during the day.

**Security Alert Team**

Two security alert teams were assigned to each LCF. The two-person team typically included a Sergeant (now Senior Airman) and an Airman or Airman First Class ranging in age from eighteen to the mid- to-late twenties. The two-person security alert teams rotated being on-duty during the three-day alert tour. The security alert teams, under the supervision of the flight security controllers, were responsible for periodic site inspections and responding to any security breaches that occurred in the flight area, including the LCF and all ten LF.

It was their duty to secure an LF, for example, following an alarm or security breach and remain at the LF until the site was secure and alarmed. Although Air Force records do not indicate any potentially dangerous breaches of security at a Minuteman LF, the security controller frequently dispatched security details to the LF to verify the integrity of the site. Each LCF and LF was equipped with an alarm system that sounded, if tripped, in the LCC. To combat sabotage the systems were unusually sensitive and the alarm was often set off by squirrels, rabbits, and even grasshoppers.

Some of these dispatch-call incidents proved unusual experiences for security teams. As reported in *LIFE* magazine in 1964, in one instance in South Dakota, an alarm buzzer indicating an LF breach sounded in the LCC and the commander phoned the topside flight security controller who immediately dispatched a security team to the site. The armed security team hurried to the site, where to their surprise they discovered two camels rubbing against the fence. The animals had escaped from a nearby Passion Play.

Another incident proved to be a prank. After realizing security teams would respond to such innocuous occurrences as cows grazing near the fence, one local threw a raccoon inside the fence. The local prankster was eventually caught and released after questioning.

Not everything was life or death at the Minuteman sites, and local residents learned not only to coexist with the sites, but also to share the plains with Air Force personnel. “They were usually a bunch of fresh faced kids sent to God’s forsaken half acre or something,” rancher Gene S. Williams recalled, “I know a couple of times when it was a hundred degrees and there were boys that were stationed up there [a Launch Facility] and my mom took ice tea up to them . . . I suppose now they would have gotten into great trouble because they could have been drugged or something, but you know, that’s just how it was.”

The security alert team was also responsible for escorting maintenance teams onto the LF grounds. Getting access to the grounds, just as accessing an LCF, required a valid authentication number. Personnel who required authentication received a number and a table of numbers with corresponding letters from Ellsworth Air Force Base. The maintenance personnel would state what table he was working off of and call out the letters that corresponded with his number using a phonetic alphabet. If they had the wrong number or read the code wrong, the standard procedure was for the security to “jack them up” against a fence or wall and check their identification. In order to access the missile launcher, two sets of codes were needed—A side codes of security personnel and B side codes of maintenance personnel. On some occasions, when repairing the launch system or security system proved time-consuming, the flight security controller would send a two or four person “camper team” from base to the LF, capable of working and securing the site overnight, until maintenance completed the necessary repairs.

In addition to their security duties, the security alert team was also responsible for assisting the facility manager in housekeeping duties at the LCF. Their typical areas of responsibility included the hallways, office, day room, bathroom, and their bedrooms.
**Missile Rations Cook**

One cook was scheduled for each three-day alert tour at each LCF. Missile rations cooks typically held ranks from Airman First Class up to Staff Sergeant and were typically in their twenties. The cook was required to prepare requested meals for the personnel and visitors of the LCF. The cook also assisted the facility manager in responding to emergencies and in standard housekeeping duties. The cook’s primary responsibility was for the cleanliness of the kitchen, dining room, and bedrooms.394

The cook was responsible for serving four meals per day, including breakfast, lunch, dinner, and a midnight meal. The cook not only served topside crew, but also had the responsibility of taking meals to the missile combat crew in the capsule, and was required to go through the authentication procedure with codes every time they entered the capsule. Most meals were prepared at another site, packaged in foil, and then frozen. The cooks simply heated the foil packs in the oven. Some cooks showed remarkable creativity in completing their tasks, however, making soups or stews out of leftover foil packets, or making seasoned croutons for the salads out of bread.395 At some facilities, the cook would even barbeque for LCF personnel. After collecting money from the crew, they would have the security team stop at a local store to pick up chicken, steaks, or hamburgers when they were sent off the grounds on other errands.396 The Delta-01 facility often had fresh breakfasts with eggs sold to them by a nearby rancher, in yet another display of the way missile crews integrated into the daily life of local residents.397

**Maintenance Crew**

Although maintenance crews did not serve regular alert tours at the LCFs, they routinely entered the LF and LCF grounds to perform inspections, conduct routine upgrades, or make necessary repairs. The maintenance force was responsible for ensuring that all systems were operable and on ready status by following precise technical orders written by Air Force engineers. The rank of the maintenance crew varied depending on the experience and responsibilities of the team, and could range from Airman up to Captain.

Each Minuteman wing included a deputy commander for maintenance who operated the base maintenance complex and was responsible for planning, scheduling, and directing all maintenance of LCF and LFs in their wing. Air Force maintenance included four divisions and two squadrons. The Field Missile Maintenance Squadrons (FMMS) and the Organizational Missile Maintenance Squadrons (OMMS) were responsible for the actual maintenance of the Minuteman missiles and support equipment.398 The FMMS maintained hydraulic and pneumatic systems, site support equipment, and test equipment. This squadron also performed periodic maintenance at the sites. The OMMS had a mechanical and electrical branch that were responsible for the transportation, installation, and removal of missiles, the reentry vehicles and systems, propulsion system rocket engines, and the emergency rocket communications systems. The OMMS also repaired electrical, surveillance, and access systems.399 Despite routine maintenance and inspections at the LFs, the deputy commander for maintenance routinely received notification of equipment faults at LFs and LCFs directly from the missileers in the LCC.399

A maintenance team chief, responsible for supervising the crew, attended every maintenance call. Even with the presence of a security alert team on all maintenance missions, the maintenance team chief was responsible for authenticating their access with the missile commander in the LCC. The team chief was accountable for all activities at the site while they were performing maintenance duties.399 As of 1963 maintenance teams at LF sites were required to be in contact with the LCF a minimum of every thirty minutes.399

Maintenance crews transported their equipment in “U-vans” or utility vans. This van was a three-quarter-ton pickup with a utility box on the back. The utility box had several different compartments that organized the equipment and tools needed to make repairs at the LFs or LCFs.395 Work on an LF
frequently required access to underground facilities. To do this the maintenance crew had to pass through “formidable mechanical barriers” in a process that sometimes took up to an hour. First the security pit weather cover was removed, a combination was entered, and the security pit vault door was removed. These security procedures allowed retraction of the locking shaft and operation of the controls for the pump and two hydraulic cylinders used to slowly raise the steel and concrete primary door (personnel access hatch). After securing a metal ladder, the crew descended a few feet down the cylindrical shaft and entered another combination into the secondary door (B- plug) and retracted the locking bolts. After a preset timed interval, the large steel plug would lower to the level of the upper equipment room. The crews could then climb down the equipment room surrounding the launch tube, lower their equipment, and begin their maintenance tasks. Two shotguns, ammunition, and gas masks were placed in each silo in 1978 to increase security at the site. Maintenance crews were only permitted to be in the field a total of sixteen hours on a dispatch to ensure a level of alertness. After completing pre-maintenance tasks, including vehicle and equipment checks and briefings, the team drove to the site, went through the authentication process, and began accessing the underground missile. Since the sixteen hours must include time to return to Ellsworth Air Force Base and go through the pre-maintenance tasks in reverse order, a maintenance team may only have five hours to perform maintenance at the LF. Due to the distance of many of the missile silos from Ellsworth Air Force Base, maintenance crews often remained at the closest LCF overnight on RON.

Although maintenance was usually routine, crews sometimes faced unexpected circumstances. In one unusual incident in 1975, for example, a maintenance crew was dispatched to a Minuteman LCC at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to help free four trapped missile crewmen. The incident occurred when two missile crewmembers arrived at the LCC to relieve the crew on duty. They entered the LCC and proceeded through the changeover process, only to discover that the blast door would not open. Maintenance responded to the call of the missile commander for assistance, but the blast doors were designed to resist force from the outside. Through a small hole, maintenance passed technical instructions to the four crew members to dismantle panels from the door. It took eight hours to remove the necessary panels and to dislodge the first of four three-inch pins. Several hours later only one pin remained in place, but it would not budge. A special welding team arrived at the site, and spent an additional four hours cutting through the door. After thirty- and forty-two-hour alert tours, respectively, the two crews were finally free to exit through the twelve-foot by twelve-foot hole. The blast door at Minot, described above, is not the same configuration as Ellsworth’s blast door.

In the Launch Control Center: Missile combat crew
Finding the right individuals to serve as missileers in the LCCs posed a paradox for the Air Force that was described in a 1963 Saturday Evening Post article, “the job required a reliable, stable, intelligent officer who could be counted on to fire the Minuteman in the chaos of nuclear combat—and not before. But the more intelligent the man, the quicker he would be bored by the capsule routine.” Colonel Richard Butler of SAC’s personnel branch told the Saturday Evening Post, “We needed a kind of hermit, but a hermit would not have the main characteristics we needed.”

Missileers completed a rigorous training program prior to their assignment to a missile crew. Chanute Air Force Base in Illinois began hosting a Minuteman program training center for new Air Force recruits on 21 June 1959. Students arrived at Chanute ready to study the safe operation of the Air Force’s latest weapon. Training focused on classroom instruction at the Chanute Technical Training Center in three six-hour shifts. Classes included both general training for incoming missileers and specialized training in the complex systems controlling Minuteman, such as targeting or electrical systems. After completing
courses at Chanute, graduates were assigned to Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, where they received Operational Readiness Training. This training provided them with real life experience learning launch and maintenance techniques. After graduating from the training school at Vandenberg, the missileers and technicians received assignments at an operational Minuteman missile wing.

Even after completing basic training for the Minuteman program, crews underwent scheduled training and evaluations once or twice a month to make sure that they continued to perform to the strict standards. Missileers at Ellsworth Air Force Base went for regularly scheduled “rides” in the Missile Procedures Trainer (MPT), also known as “the box” or “simulator,” which simulated a Launch Control Center at Ellsworth. The MPT at Ellsworth was located in the large hanger known as the Pride Hanger. Crews emerged from the training, which typically took one to two- and- half hours, having honed their skills for Minuteman procedures. Missileers completing an evaluation practiced their skills and received a score ranking their competency. Those receiving low scores (lower than four on a five- point scale) received additional training to improve their performance.

During the first years of the Minuteman program, combat crews worked thirty- six- to forty- hour alert tours, with eight- to twelve- hour shifts in the LCC, separated by a rest period in the LCF. While topside personnel at the LCF normally pulled a three- day alert tour as a team, the two- person missile combat crew worked a thirty- six- to forty- hour alert tour and averaged five tours in a month. The length of the tour varied for each crew depending on the distance of the LCC from Ellsworth Air Force Base and some facilities were nearly one hundred miles from base.

In July 1977 the shift was changed to a single twenty- four- hour shift, with the crew being replaced by a new missile combat crew dispatched from Ellsworth Air Force Base. Former missileer Craig Manson recalled that he was happy with the change to a single twenty- four- hour shift,

“The forty- hour alert system was really draining physiologically, just difficult because your schedule was all crazy. You’d go out there, you’d pull eight hours downstairs, during which you were not supposed to sleep, and then you’d go upstairs to sleep, or watch TV or do whatever for eight hours, then you’d change- over downstairs again for another eight hours. You did this until you had a total of twenty- four hours in the hole and sixteen hours upstairs. The last eight hour shift before changeover was the night shift. And so your body clock was all off and then you’d have to be alert enough to drive home. If you were at some of the sites, you know, some of the sites were as much as 150 miles away, and so then you’d have a three hour drive after [laughs] being up all night. So I personally found it horrible, the forty- hour alerts, and I think a lot of people did. They just didn’t like it.”

When the tour duty changed to twenty- four hours in the LCC, the missileers averaged approximately eight tours per month. A shift did not include time driving to and from the facility or the changeover briefing before and after the shift. The two- person crew included a deputy missile combat crew commander and a missile combat crew commander. Only officers could be assigned to a combat crew, and generally, first lieutenants with a minimum of a year- and- a- half of experience as a deputy commander in the LCC qualified for promotion to the position of crew commander.

The most important responsibility of the missile crew was constant vigilance and preparation to launch the missiles under their control. Other duties included coordinating maintenance and inspections of the missiles and monitoring alert status of the missiles and their support systems designed to ensure the readiness of their missiles. Additional responsibilities involved monitoring the systems of the LF and maintaining missile equipment logs.
After arriving at the LCF, a missile crew had their identification examined by the flight security controller and then began the authentication procedure with the on-duty missile crew. After they cleared security, they descended down the elevator to the LCC, also known as the “no-lone zone,” because one could never enter the capsule alone. After arriving at the blast door a voice would shout “clear” from inside the capsule. The oncoming crew shouted back and the eight-ton door slowly swung open.

Once inside the capsule, the missile crew’s shift began during a process called changeover, a formal procedure that allowed for the changing of crews in the LCC. The changeover included a ten-minute briefing on the weather report, call signs, a classified advisory on the day’s war plan, and the placement of each crew member’s padlock on the metal box that secured the launch keys. The changeover concluded with each departing crew member handing over three items to the deputy and commander—a three-by-five inch card encased in plastic and framed in metal with the day’s top secret code to decipher commands from SAC; a key to be inserted into the console and turned in order to fire the missiles; and a .38-caliber revolver. The gun, worn in a holster, was for protection in the unlikely event of intruders. The missile combat crew was prohibited from taking off the holster while in the capsule.

After the capsule door closed, a new crew would check the maintenance logs and inspect support equipment. The duration of their shift was spent running practice drills or reviewing procedures to prepare for SAC’s random Operational Readiness Inspections, an examination performed by an Inspector General to determine the effectiveness of the combat crews. The crew had very precise procedures for every task. If they ever received a launch command, both crew members would open the locked box that contained “cookies,” or the authentication codes. Once the crew members agreed that the command was authentic they would insert the keys and turn them at the same time, launching a missile.

To launch a missile, an Emergency War Order (EWO) would have come over the SAC radio with a message that the crew had to authenticate. After they agreed that the message was authentic, they unlocked their padlock on the red metal box that contained two keys for launching the missiles. Each crew member would then buckle into their seats and the commander would count down. The deputy commander then flipped a row of “arming” switches for each of the missiles, making them readied for immediate launch. The commander opened the plastic cover over his launch control panel in front of him exposing the area for the launch key, and the deputy commander removed the plastic cover over the cooperative launch switch. Each crew member would insert their key and a “conference call” is ordered where the crew speaks via phone and headset to the squadron command post for readiness reports on other Minuteman capsules. The command post then issues a command to “launch on your count.” On the commander’s count, both crew members would have to turn the keys at the same moment. The two ignitions are situated far enough apart that one person alone could not reach both keys and single-handedly provide the go ahead to launch a missile. The Minuteman missile cannot be launched without a corroborating signal from another LCC, providing the second vote. Launch procedures were modified slightly in later years when a launch enable control group signal panel was added to the Deputy Commander’s Control Console. An unlock code was required to be inserted into the “code inert thumbwheel switches” of the launch enable control panel to enable missiles for launch.

Day-to-day activities for the crew varied. Some days proved to be very slow and other days kept the crew extremely busy. While there were always unexpected maintenance indicators and outer zone security violations at the LCFs, there was also scheduled maintenance at each of the ten LFs under control of the LCC. Weekdays were typically busier than weekend shifts in the capsule because of scheduled maintenance. During the course of a shift there were often procedures for the crew to practice and review. In addition there was frequent communication from base and SAC, including messages from Looking Glass, the flying command post that kept a SAC general in the air in case ground command posts were out of commission, to make sure all stations were on alert.
To combat boredom, missileers often took advantage of the quiet time to study or rest. Each LCC included a sleeping compartment, where one crew member could rest. His or her partner would naturally remain at their console during such times. Outside of their duties in the LCC, missile crews underwent training several times a month, including courses in weather systems, codes, EWOs, and missile simulation training. SAC offered the opportunity for missileers to pursue academic degrees while on alert to boost morale and as incentive for crewmembers to remain in the Air Force. Many missileers possessed a bachelor’s degree and used time in the capsule to work on homework and to fulfill the requirements of a master’s degree. In one case missileers referred to such activities as “frontline defense against alert boredom.”

In another effort to combat boredom and keep in touch with the world above, former missileers have relayed that there were instances of tapping into the radio communication system to listen to radio programs and football games on the same system that unannounced radio checks were received from SAC. In one case missileers pulling alert at two different LCC facilities worked together to allow one of the missileers to listen to a football game without being caught. A missileer at another LCC agreed to respond to the radio check from SAC posing as the other missileer and then to call him via telephone to relay any information.

At the end of every shift the missile crew proceeded through the changeover process with the incoming crew. After the procedure they traded salutes with the new crew and rode the elevator thirty-two feet to the LCF, carrying with them bags of classified trash to be burned in the code-burner on the grounds as a security precaution.

Although Minuteman missiles were never launched in anger, President Carter did transmit a message over the SAC radio once in 1977. In the midst of a typical shift, the SAC controller unexpectedly warned the combat crews to “standby for a message from the president of the United States.” With their hearts pounding, waiting for the authentication code to launch Minuteman, the president said, “Hi, you all. I’m here at the SAC command post and I wanted to see how this thing worked.” Although crew members can laugh about it now, the threat of a nuclear attack was very real to them at that moment in 1977.

During active duty, the Minuteman missile and the life of the missileer in the LCC was not as secretive as one might have guessed. In a few cases, national reporters were allowed into the LCC to complete articles and news stories about the missileers and life in a LCC. These events were unusual in that they allowed the public and the Soviet Union to see our military defense systems. However, SAC had a history of showing off our military and technological strength. For example, a massive media campaign accompanied the activation of Project Looking Glass, as reporters received tours of the plane and some even went on test flights.

In the early years of the active Minuteman program, LIFE magazine ran an article titled “How it Feels to Hold the Nuclear Trigger.” Reporter Richard Stolley and a photographer Bill Ray spent twenty-four hours in an LCC in South Dakota with a SAC escort officer and Minuteman missile crew commander Allen Lamb and deputy commander William Christians. The resulting article and photographs in the 6 November 1964 issue documents the routine activities of the crew at the Lima-01 LCC. This article may have been one of the first to give the country and the world a direct look into the LCC and the duties of a missileer. In January 1978 NBC’s The Today Show was producing a series of stories on SAC and they were sent to Ellsworth Air Force Base, a base with both missiles and bombers, to film. A missile crew, including Gary Andrews and Craig Manson, were hand picked to be filmed performing an alert tour in the LCC at Alpha-01. The reporter, Eric Burns, and the film crew received a visitor briefing prior to being brought down to the capsule to film. Former missileer Craig Manson recalled the following discussion during the briefing, “And part of that briefing was, ‘If you hear that warble tone coming out of the box up there, then you must turn off your cameras, go to the back of the capsule, turn around and face the blast...’
Now being journalists, they were highly aggravated at this. And Eric Burns said, ‘You mean, we can’t film what you do?’ And we said, ‘no.’ And he said, ‘Well, what will you be doing?’ And I said, ‘We will be determining whether or not we have to take emergency action under an Emergency War Order.’ And he said, ‘Well this would be great history. We want to get that on film. We’ve got to be able to see that.’ I patted my .38 and said, ‘no’”.

Prior to the visit by the film crew the missile crew received its own briefing from Air Force Public Affairs. The missileers were instructed to give the following response if they were asked a question about nuclear weapons. “And they said, ‘Here is your response to the question about nuclear weapons: I can neither confirm nor deny the existence of nuclear weapons at this installation.’ ” Manson recalled, “And the reason we could say that is because it was true.” Manson continued to explain that some missiles had communications and some had warheads and that was what was secret. As it turns out the reporter did not ask about nuclear weapons.

Manson also recalled that, “At Ellsworth, for several years—not always, but for several years—Delta-09 did not have a warhead on it. And I knew that. It was classified at the time, but I knew that. But I didn’t know which other ones might not. And Delta-09 didn’t for a number of years because Delta-09 was known as the off base training element.” When asked about common misperceptions about serving in the missile business, Craig Manson stated that a minor irritation was that “everybody talks about a button. It’s not a button, it’s a key.” On the more serious side, Manson stated, “… because of television and movies and in part because of the image the Strategic Air Command cultivated for itself, people have the idea that missile launch officers were somehow bloodthirsty killers with few morals and no soul and ready to kill millions of people with the turn of that key. And that’s just not so. One of the things that’s made America great is that we do not have a warrior class in America like some ancient civilizations or some societies today. Our military is drawn from ordinary people living in ordinary communities, growing up with the same values that they perceive around them and missile launch officers come from that same group of people—ordinary Americans with mainstream values.”

Changes in Missile Culture

Early on in America’s missile era, SAC employed only experienced aviators to staff the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos. However, as these missileers were deployed for service in Asia, SAC began recruiting less experienced Air Force personnel from agencies such as the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC). Therefore, by the 1970s missileers were typically between the age of twenty-two and thirty, and only a handful had any flight experience. During this time, as many as nine hundred new missileers were trained yearly to staff the 1,054 operational ICBMs.
female missileers
The rank of crewmembers was not the only staffing change over the years. The Air Force restricted its female members to noncombat positions until the late 1970s. Fighting against the policy, Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire pushed for the integration of women on missile crews, stating that it was unlikely that women would be exposed to enemy fire in a position launching missiles. In 1977 reporter Andy Plattner asked, “Should women be assigned as missile launch officers, who potentially would be firing nuclear missiles in the event of war?” SAC funded several research studies in the 1970s to determine public sentiment on this question and the views of male crew members already serving. The results showed that the public, as well as Air Force personnel, felt that women have the mental and physical attributes required to be a missile combat crewperson. However, male crew members felt the integration of women would call for several modifications to their time spent on alert. Furthermore, many wives of crewmembers preferred that the crews were either all-female or all-male.

Women began serving on missile crews for the first time in 1978 on the Titan II missile system, though with some important distinctions. Citing privacy, moral and spousal concerns, SAC took the recommendations of the research studies and required missile combat crews to be either all-female or all-male. Forty-two women served on Titan II crews in this manner until deactivation of the missile system between 1984 and 1987. Soon thereafter, SAC was directed by the U.S. Air Force Headquarters to begin integrating women as Minuteman missileers, but with the same stipulation, only all-female crews could serve.

Women were assigned to “topside” duty at Ellsworth’s fifteen LCFs beginning in the mid-1980s; however, the underground LCCs continued to be staffed entirely by men until all female missile crews were allowed by the Air Force in 1986. Ten women were assigned to Ellsworth and served as five all-female Minuteman missile crews. The use of single-gender crews was not without its problems, however. For example, if a female missileer was unable to pull duty for any reason and there were no female replacements available, a male crew had to replace the female crew, leaving it potentially serving more alert tours. After several studies and surveys, SAC began allowing male/female missile crews on 1 January 1988. This not only reduced scheduling issues, but it also increased the opportunities for women in the Air Force. In August 1989, First Lieutenant Michael A. Harbison and First Lieutenant Lisa A. Atkins served Ellsworth’s first mixed-gender alert tour at LCC India-01. Once women integrated with men on missile crews, SAC required that missile operations were tasked to guarantee equal career progression for women and men. Pointing out that the training and the standards were the same for both men and women, one former female missileer felt that there were no biases based on gender when she served at Ellsworth Air Force Base in 1991 and 1992.

Race Relations on Base
In 1949 the Air Force became a fully integrated branch of the armed services when President Truman ordered on 26 July 1948 that “there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” Four years later, in 1952, the Air Force was, in practice, completely desegregated.

The Air Force made proactive efforts to deal with race relation issues to alleviate or eliminate potential problems. Training programs, such as “social actions” (remembered by a former missile crew member), were instituted to prevent discrimination. Oral interviews with past personnel of Ellsworth Air Force Base during the late 1960s through the early 1990s offered a positive view of race relations on base. Ken Bush, an African American who served at Ellsworth in the mid-1970s, recalled that race relations within the Air Force “were pretty good at the time I was there.” Former site manager David Burris who served
at Ellsworth in the late 1970s and early 1980s stated that he believed that there was very little racial divisions on base and it may have been less than the general society, “because you all worked together and everything.”

No matter their gender, race, or age, each missileer and each member of their support team was charged with one overriding duty—the maintenance and control of the Minuteman missile. Even stationed in rural South Dakota, they were in a real way on the Cold War’s front lines. They considered themselves defenders of freedom and the American way of life. Chief Master Sergeant Martin Pietz, assigned to the 44th Strategic Missile Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base from 1972 to 1994, described his mission as the following, “Our mission, the way we saw it was, even though we were located in the middle of South Dakota, we were defending the United States from Russian aggressors. The Soviet Union, I mean basically, that was it. We were…looking at defending our country from the Soviet Union.”

Other segments of American society considered themselves veterans of the Cold War as well, including those who found the Minuteman’s very existence both abhorrent and a danger to global peace. Having focused on Delta-01 and Delta-09 and the men and women of Ellsworth, we now shift our focus to Cold War dissenters, the Cold War’s climax, and the ways American society has begun the process of remembering this half-century conflict.
Plate 55. Day room in Launch Control Facility Support Building at Delta-01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)

Plate 56. Day room in Launch Control Facility Support Building at Delta-01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 57. Kitchen in Launch Control Facility Support Building at Delta- 01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)

Plate 58. Facility Manager’s bedroom at Delta- 01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 59. Delta-01 Launch Control Facility, Security Control Center (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-30-A-50)
Plate 60. Delta Flight Peacekeeper vehicle used by security personnel (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD- 50- 15)
Plate 61. Delta-01 sleeping quarters (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 62. Missile art in vestibule of Launch Control Center, Delta- 01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 63. Blast door, Launch Control Center, Delta-01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 64. Delta-01 Launch Control Center with crew (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD-50-A-57)
Plate 65. Deputy Commander Control Console, Launch Control Center, Delta- 01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 66. Missile Commander Control Console, Launch Control Center, Delta-01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 67. Launch enable control panel, above Deputy Commander Control Console, Launch Control Center, Delta-01 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 68. Launch Control Center, escape hatch (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number HAER SD- 50- A- 84)
Plate 69. Oscar-01 Launch Control Center, Ellsworth Air Force Base (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)

Plate 70. Launch Control Center art, Ellsworth Air Force Base (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Plate 71. Launch Control Center art, Ellsworth Air Force Base (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Section III – Peace Movement, Nuclear Disarmament, and the Future

Chapter 1. Opposition to Nuclear Armament (late 1950s–90s)

The National and International Debate

After installation of the missile silos in the farm fields of South Dakota’s Western Plains, the missiles went largely unnoticed. Housed underground, the missiles were largely inconspicuous. By the end of 1963 three Strategic Missile Squadrons (SMS) each with five flights of ten Minuteman missiles stood on alert across 13,500 square miles of the Western Plains of South Dakota. Additional Minuteman missiles in Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska formed a vital component of the United States’ nuclear deterrent force.

In the early days of Minuteman facility construction and deployment, discussion about the implications of the mass deployment of nuclear missiles in American communities remained minimal. Most residents generally accepted the nearby missile sites, and whether driven by patriotism, lack of information, indifference, fear of the missiles themselves, or preoccupation with daily life, local residents mostly ignored the missile presence. According to one North Dakota resident, Jody McLaughlin, people “chose not to know. The attitude was, ‘I don’t want to think about it. I don’t want to talk about it or acknowledge it.’ ” Organized opposition to the placement of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from local residents during this period was virtually nonexistent.

Not everyone accepted the presence of nuclear missiles, however. Acts of resistance against America’s nuclear defense program began in the late 1950s and included both solitary protests and organized groups. Individual protests tended to be carried out by local residents, while the early group actions were typically organized by national groups. In 1958 a lone protestor held an anti-nuclear/peace sign at the dedication of F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, as an Atlas site.

An early group action occurred in Cheyenne when the Committee for Non-violent Action, a Philadelphia-based group, mounted a consciousness-raising campaign in the summer of 1958, which sought to stop the construction of Atlas missile sites in the Cheyenne area. The campaign, dubbed “Appeal to Cheyenne,” sought to encourage local residents to oppose the construction of the new Atlas site at the F.E. Warren Air Force Base and to raise the level of public awareness and concern about nuclear weapons. Additional campaigns mounted against the missile silo sites and the United States nuclear arsenal included actions by the War Resisters League. In 1959 this group’s “Omaha Action” drew national attention to the early Atlas ICBM deployment in Nebraska. The War Resisters League distributed pamphlets encouraging Nebraskans and others to protest nuclear weapons.

The intensity of anti-nuclear activism varied depending on the political climate. Public debate over nuclear weapons in America remained virtually nonexistent during much of the 1960s. The signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963 appeared to reduce the public’s concern over the nuclear weapons issue, as nuclear testing went underground. Nuclear weapons development and testing continued unabated, however—the United States conducted more tests in the five years after the test ban treaty than the five years before its signing—the perception of the nuclear threat lost its immediacy. From the mid-1960s until the early 1970s, many local and national peace groups shifted their focus, concentrating instead on the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War. The anti-
nuclear movement was not reinvigorated until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Europe and the United States experienced a resurgence of concern over nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{390}

In Europe the renewed activism centered on anxiety over the arms build-up during the Reagan administration and the proposed deployment by the United States of short and medium range nuclear missiles in continental Europe. These anxieties sparked numerous European protests against the arms race that helped inspire the dormant American anti-nuclear movement.\textsuperscript{390}

Activists in the United States shared the European’s concerns over the nuclear deployments in Europe. Greater public concern in the United States over nuclear missile silos also coincided with the emergence of the nuclear freeze movement, which attracted strong support in the United States.\textsuperscript{391} The height of this movement, from 1982 to 1987, encompassed the years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency and the years when the United States and the Soviet Union entered a period of renewed tensions, which included a new emphasis on production and deployment of nuclear weapons. This period saw the renewed activity of the national peace movement, as well as the formation of anti-nuclear groups at the state and local levels. For example, the South Dakota Peace and Justice Center, which had been established in 1979, became active in protesting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This group organized events at Ellsworth Air Force Base and at specific silos to “protest the nuclear arms race.”\textsuperscript{392}

The reaction of Allen and Lindy Kirkbride, ranchers near Cheyenne who had three MX missile silos on their sixty-five thousand-acre ranch, illustrates the increased public awareness concerning nuclear missiles during this period. The couple played reluctant hosts to the new MX ICBMs, developed in the 1980s by the United States in response to the increasing accuracy of the Soviet ICBMs. Allen Kirkbride, speaking to \textit{USA Today} in 1986, said of the new MX ICBMs on his land “I sit here, and I think I’m in Utopia…[It] really chaps me when one of our elected public officials begs to get one of these projects in my backyard.” Lindy Kirkbride equated having the missile silos in her backyard with being kicked by a horse.\textsuperscript{393} Her husband’s sentiments also illustrate divisions between state politicians, who saw the economic activity brought by the increased military presence as beneficial, and the negative views of some of the ranchers who lived beside the missiles.\textsuperscript{395}

The number and scope of missile silo actions increased in the 1980s as the anti-nuclear/peace movement gained momentum. Anxiety over new missile systems, such as the mobile MX missile, drew 400 people to an anti-MX rally at silo Q5 outside of Cheyenne, Wyoming, in the late 1980s. The furor over the MX deployments focused attention back on the Minuteman as well. Peace actions occurred at Minuteman II and III missile sites in Colorado, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming during this period. Though no two were alike, protests typically involved vigils, praying at the site or on the silo cover, trespassing, damaging the surface installations by either hammering on the covers or pouring blood on the site to produce a symbolic disarming, or the delivering of statements from the activist to the military. Such statements commonly referred to international laws, such as the Geneva Convention, which bars attacks on civilians, and the Nuremberg Charter, which bans attempts to annihilate whole populations, as the rationale for disarmament. The activists argued that since the effects of nuclear weapons cannot be limited or controlled that they will harm civilians, thus violating these international laws.\textsuperscript{396}

Although a number of anti-nuclear/peace activist groups were based on the east or west coasts, individuals from around the country participated in actions at the missile sites. One such action, performed by members of a Ploughshares group known as the Silo Pruning Hooks, involved people from Wisconsin and Minnesota. The activism of Ploughshares organizations is based on religious convictions that oppose war. The Silo Pruning Hooks members were two Catholic priests, a writer, and a mental health worker. Their action, performed in 1984, involved breaking into silo N-05 in Missouri by cutting...
the fence around the silo site, hammering on the silo cap with sledge hammers and jack hammers, and hanging a banner on the gate that read “Why do you do this evil thing? Your brother’s blood cries out to me from the earth.”

The activities of the Silo Pruning Hooks group raised the level of awareness about existing Minuteman sites at a time when the majority of public attention focused on the possible deployment of the MX mobile ICBM. For members of the Silo Pruning Hooks, the potential dangers and destructive power of the nuclear missiles justified their actions.

The actions of members of the Silo Pruning Hooks inspired other groups like Nukewatch, based in Luck, Wisconsin, to undertake consciousness-raising projects of their own. Nukewatch’s Missile Silo Project, which resulted in the mapping of one thousand missile silo sites across the country, was intended to be a high profile project capable of furthering public discussion on nuclear weapons. Jay Davis, a local peace activist, participated in the mapping of the rural missile sites in South Dakota and described an encounter with Air Force security personnel at a missile silo,

“. . . eventually we came to a missile silo right near State Highway 34 and there was a semi truck backed up right onto the pad inside the perimeter of the fence and there were a couple of soldiers, from the Air Force I suppose, with machine guns guarding the missile silo and the semi truck. And we stopped there and, I mean, it was obvious they weren’t unloading furniture and this one soldier with the machine gun came over to my car as I was writing down the directions to that silo and also giving it a name and he said, can I help you with anything when I rolled down the window. And I said no thanks we’re just tourists. And of course he knew we weren’t tourists, but the point was we had a right to be out there driving on the back roads whatever it was we were doing this is supposed to be a free country.”

During the mapping of the missile sites in South Dakota, Delta-01 was assigned the name of “Mike and Beth’s Launch Control Center” after Mike Sprong and Beth Preheim, peace activists that mapped the Delta Flight. Delta-09 was believed to be assigned the name “Cassandra’s Missile” for Cassandra Dixon, a peace activist with Nukewatch.

Nukewatch published the book, Nuclear Heartland, which mapped missile silo sites by state and provided an overview of the history of ICBM deployment and the development of national and local resistance movements. As stated by Sam Day, founder of Nukewatch, in the introduction to Nuclear Heartland, the goal of this project was to raise awareness and spark a critical debate of the dangers of the continued presence of these weapons and the real threat of a nuclear war. The organization also hoped their maps and information might prompt public visits to the sites by concerned citizens, other activists, or even vacationers.

Throughout the protests of the 1970s and 1980s, relations between the protestors and the military personnel guarding the silo sites largely remained professional and civilized. Young guards often displayed some nervousness around the activists, perhaps because they didn’t know what to expect. Protests were often planned and announced in advance, which contributed to a more controlled response from both sides of the protest line. In the words of John LaForge, an activist with Nukewatch, “the people [guards] in charge generally understood that we weren’t a threat to them.” A level of understanding seems to have been reached between the guards and protestors at most actions. For example, LaForge relates a story that happened during a protest at a missile silo site on Martin Luther King’s birthday in the early 1980s, “I was in custody [and] our protest was on a Martin Luther King Birthday, this was before it was made a national holiday, and we all had Dr. King buttons on and I was in
the Air Force squad in the back with the cuffs behind my back and one of the MPs asked me if he could have the button and I just thought that was a nice breakthrough at the time because everybody wanted to celebrate Dr. King no matter what side of the fence you’re on with nuclear weapons.” LaForge gave the button to the MP.404

Activist Groups – Beliefs and Mission

Individuals and groups protesting the nuclear build up during the Cold War acted for a variety of reasons. Some, such as Joe and Jean Gump, participated in actions that damaged silos in Missouri in 1986 and 1987. The Gumps and other individuals did not have any organizational affiliation and protested out of personal religious conviction.405 Some organized groups also acted out of religious beliefs. The Ploughshares organization based its activism on the biblical reference to hammering swords into ploughshares.406 The group’s activism lay grounded in its members’ belief that nuclear weapons were and remain instruments of mass murder.

Some activists objected to nuclear weapons for fear of the environmental consequences of a nuclear accident involving the nuclear material or concerns with future cleanup of nuclear waste. Others, like John LaForge and Nukewatch, adhered to the legal argument that the proliferation of nuclear missiles, with their ability to annihilate whole populations, violated the Geneva Convention and the Nuremberg Charter.407

In general, anti-nuclear groups endorsed nonviolent actions aimed at increasing public awareness of the potential dangers of nuclear weapons. Activists hoped that increased awareness would result in the public outcry necessary to disarm nuclear weapons arsenals. Their typically pacifist views, which recalled non-violent protests in Gandhi’s India or America’s own civil rights marches as models, contributed to the generally peaceful and non-confrontational tone of their protests.

Efforts in South Dakota (1980-90s)

South Dakota’s peace movement did not agitate to the same extent as its neighbor North Dakota. In reflecting on the beginnings of anti-nuclear peace activism in South Dakota, long-time peace activist and resident of Rapid City, Jay Davis stated, “The nuclear arms race specifically organizing against that really started to gain steam during the Reagan presidency at the very early 80s and really continued throughout the Reagan presidency and then when President Bush came in 1989 it wasn’t long after that you had the end of the Cold War and all that. Which made this particular issue somewhat moot. It’s easy to forget how intense the people felt and how scary things were at times during the 80s.”408

Jay Davis also reflected that residents of South Dakota and Rapid City in particular have generally been very supportive of their Air Force base. Residents of the state are keenly aware of the economic benefits they enjoy as the result of the military presence on the state’s Western Plains, and the military program received substantial local and statewide political support. Peace movement adherents in South Dakota recognized quite early that they were outnumbered by those who supported local military installations.409

It is difficult to determine the number of South Dakota residents that identified with or joined the peace movement. Jay Davis stated, “Well we never had as much [activism] in South Dakota as the more urban states so we had that perspective. We were kind of the country cousins to a peace movement that was
much more prominent on the east and west coasts in bigger cities. We certainly had our own branch of it and I’d say it maybe hit its peak from about 1982 to about 1987. So that would be most of the Reagan era.\(^4\)

Local support of the increased military presence at Ellsworth Air Force Base was not universal, however. Individual acts of resistance included rock art symbols placed at the end of the runway at Ellsworth by Marv Kammerer and fellow activists. Kammerer, described by Jay Davis as a “rancher for peace,” owns land adjoining Ellsworth Air Force Base.\(^5\) During the Cold War, Kammerer placed three symbols on his land at the end of the runway to signal his objection to nuclear weapons—a peace sign, a Native American earth symbol, and an ecology symbol.

The South Dakota Peace and Justice Center, an organization of “preachers, teachers, and social workers,” arranged missile silo demonstrations throughout the state during the 1980s.\(^6\) They were responsible for coordinating Easter Sunday protests at missile silo sites, events that involved prayer vigils and communion. After the services ended, a small group of pre-selected activists trained in nonviolent action trespassed onto the silo sites, sometimes placing an Easter lily on the silo cap. These events were intended to raise the level of public debate about the weapons and to make a statement about the appropriateness of building and maintaining these weapons systems.\(^7\)

The Easter Sunday protests occurred at numerous missile launch facility sites in South Dakota, including at Delta-09 in 1987. Four people trespassed onto the silo site that day and were arrested. The federal magistrate decided to make an example of this group of protestors, fining them $525 each, for a total fine of $2,100. Members of the South Dakota Peace and Justice Center felt obligated to help the protestors pay their fine. However, according to Jay Davis, the South Dakota Peace and Justice Center did not have money in the bank to cover the fines, placing the burden of payment on the members. These fines caused protestors in South Dakota to rethink their methods, and effectively put an end to trespass actions in South Dakota.\(^8\)

When asked to describe the overall impact of the anti-nuclear protests in South Dakota, Jay Davis responded, “Well, I think if we hadn’t been there people would have absolutely taken the missile silos for granted. Those silos are there to preserve peace. At worst, they’re a necessary evil. At best they help our local economy and by having protests which were broadcast to the state and to the community and the news media people at least became aware of the fact that there is another side to the story. …So we provided balance in a conservative area of the country during a very conservative time.”\(^9\)

**Continued Activism**

Over the years, protestors met with a mixed reaction from the public and anti-nuclear/peace groups in the United States and Europe. The public remained divided on the issue of maintaining the United States’ nuclear force, while peace groups could not agree on either the utility or the ethics of damaging government property. Local press coverage ranged from matter-of-fact to openly hostile, accusing the protestors of being unpatriotic or un-American.\(^10\)

Individuals and groups protested the Cold War’s nuclear buildup and continue to oppose the very existence of nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons. Religious, legal, and environmental arguments remain central to the agitation for American and international disarmament. The 550 ICBMs still in the ground remain a focus for the peace activists.\(^11\) Today, debate continues to rage throughout the activist community over the usefulness of employing tactics involving property damage to missile silo sites or trespassing onto the sites. European activists have raised concerns over the jail sentences received by
American activists and question the effectiveness of a peace movement that suffers from having many of its leaders in jail. For example, the long sentence of Helen Dery Woodson, a member of the Silo Pruning Hooks who received an eighteen-year jail sentence for trespassing onto a silo Launch Facility and damaging the silo, illustrates the toll of the peace movement on the lives of individuals.⁴⁸

A new tactic employed by the activist groups since the 1990s centers on posing as weapons inspectors and they have attempted to inspect weapon sites in Europe and the United States. To John LaForge, of Nukewatch, these inspections “highlight the hypocrisy of these first world nuclear arm states as well as a way to bring attention to the deployment of the weapons all over the place.”⁴⁹ For peace activists opposing nuclear weapons, the battle for disarmament continues.

The Cold War, however, has ended. Gone with it are the bipolar tensions that divided the international system for nearly a half century. We next turn to the dismantling of those international tensions and the concurrent dismantling of Minuteman.
Plate 72. Peace March in Peetz, Colorado, Good Friday 1988. Nukewatch founder Sam Day (left) is holding the banner (Courtesy of Nukewatch, photograph by Peetz News Weekly)

Plate 74. Word War II munitions bunkers now used to store farm produce and equipment, near Bronson, Nebraska, 1988 (Courtesy of Nukewatch, photograph by Barb Katt)
Chapter 2: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Disarmament of Minuteman II (1990s)

End of the Cold War

Having spent incalculable resources constructing their respective nuclear arsenals, world leaders subsequently spent much of their time and energy in efforts aimed at reducing the risks of nuclear war. Disarmament was one such effort. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford negotiated and signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II Treaties) with the Soviet Union in the 1970s with the intent of reducing each country’s levels of nuclear arms. SALT I limited anti-ballistic missile installations (ABMs) to two ABMs per country, which, according to historian Michael Kort, rendered them functionally useless and derailed a possible race to develop a missile defense.\(^{420}\) The SALT I Treaty also put limits on numbers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The subsequent SALT II Treaty, although never ratified by either Congress or the Soviet government, placed additional limits on nuclear arsenals and slowed, but did not end, the arms race.\(^{421}\) A slowing of the arms race and a reduction in nuclear armaments had to wait until the early 1990s and the end of the Cold War.

As the political and economic structure of the Soviet Union crumbled during the late 1980s, the lengthy Cold War period came to an end. The Solidarity movement in Poland, a reform effort which began in Poland’s dockyards and spread, through the aid of global attention from such luminaries as the Polish-born Pope John Paul II, into a national call for political and economic change, highlighted the new spirit of innovation sweeping through Eastern Europe. By the end of the decade, the Berlin Wall fell, Germany had been reunified, and a number of former Eastern Bloc nations had replaced their Communist regimes with democratically elected governments. As the Soviet Union’s republics began asserting their independence, the faltering world power found itself unable to retain its satellite states. Facing increasing isolation, the Soviet Union’s political structure disintegrated rapidly.\(^{422}\)

The Cold War formally ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which President Ronald Reagan had once called the “evil empire.”\(^{423}\) During the conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a race to attain military supremacy. The massive nuclear buildup that resulted from the arms race diverted trillions of dollars that might have been spent on domestic programs, but a hot war had been averted.\(^{424}\) Once the Cold War came to a close, the United States faced the daunting tasks of reducing its nuclear arsenal while simultaneously planning for the nation’s continued security.

START Treaty

On 31 July 1991 President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), which limited the number of ICBMs and nuclear warheads either country could possess. The agreement restricted the United States to approximately 8,556 nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union to approximately 6,449 nuclear warheads.\(^{425}\) Weapons in excess of the agreed upon number would be disarmed and Launch Facilities destroyed. Congress ratified the START Treaty in October 1992. A month after the signing of this treaty, political dissenters attempted a coup against Soviet leader Gorbachev and the fast unraveling Soviet Union finally collapsed.\(^{426}\)
The signing of the START Treaty concluded disarmament talks that had begun almost a decade earlier in the early 1980s. The START Treaty established limits on the number of ICBMs and their Launch Facilities (LFs) and warheads; SLBMs, their launchers and warheads; and heavy bombers and their weapons. The terms of the treaty established a three-phase arms-reduction program. Phase I included preparatory tasks prior to the ratification of the treaty. These tasks included provisions for inspections of the missiles and bombers covered by treaty provisions to verify their technical characteristics and gather basic information on the weapons. Phase II initiated continuous monitoring and inspection activities thirty days after ratification of the treaty to verify treaty compliance. Phase III provided for a continuation of monitoring and inspections during the time the treaty remained in force to ensure that both countries did not exceed the number of weapons allowed by the treaty. Reciprocal onsite inspections conducted by both countries assured compliance with the treaty.

As part of the agreement, both the United States and the Soviet Union could disarm and preserve a certain number of weapons or facilities for interpretation of Cold War history. Museums or sites to recognize the Cold War are being developed in the Ukraine and Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 complicated implementation of the START Treaty. The centralized Soviet government no longer existed, and Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia, as former Soviet republics, all possessed Soviet nuclear weapons covered under the treaty. Negotiators immediately concerned themselves with solidifying the START Treaty. To their relief, the four newly independent states agreed to comply with the treaty and in 1991 negotiated the Lisbon START Protocol, which stated that the Soviet successor states would “make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty’s limits and restrictions.” Under the protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were to return their nuclear weapons to Russia. Due to Belarus’ concerns about receiving compensation for its nuclear stockpiles and the safeguarding of the relocated missiles, the exchange was not completed until 1994. The countries also signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states, thereby formally pledging not to acquire nuclear weapons in the future.

Deactivation of Minuteman II Sites

In the United States, the START agreement coincided with growing Air Force disenchantment with the escalating costs associated with repairing and maintaining the older Minuteman II system. Rather than upgrade Minuteman II facilities to Minuteman III technologies, the Pentagon decided to deactivate the entire Minuteman II force to help comply with provisions of the arms-reduction treaty. On 27 September 1991 President George H.W. Bush announced on national television a dramatic “plan for peace,” designed to reduce the tensions of the nuclear age. As one component of his plan, he called for “the withdrawal from alert within seventy-two hours, of all 450 Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missiles.”

After the signing of the START Treaty and the stand down ordered by President Bush, the Air Force began the deactivation of Minuteman II ICBM sites, including the 150 Minuteman II LFs and fifteen LCFs at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota. Additional Minuteman II installations were associated with Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. At Whiteman Air Force Base, all 150 of its Minuteman II LFs were imploded by 1997, but the underground Launch Control Center (LCC), Oscar-01, located on base, was retained for public interpretation. The 150 Minuteman II sites at Malmstrom Air Force Base were converted to Minuteman III systems and the necessary missiles were transferred from the Grand Forks Minuteman III installation, which was then deactivated.

A complex system governed the deactivation and dismantlement of the LFs and the LCFs. The individual Air Force bases executed the technical part of missile site deactivation, removing the missiles and other
sensitive equipment and then they turned the LFs and LCFs over to the Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) and its consultants to begin the demolition of the sites. The Army Corps managed the demolition of the missile sites, much as they had overseen the construction of the sites. The Army Corps contracted the demolition and salvage work to private-sector companies, but these companies needed to comply with procedures governed by the START Treaty. Following the dismantlement, the sites were returned to the Air Force for property disposal.

The landmark START Treaty governed the removal of the Minuteman II missiles and the destruction of the LFs. LF elimination began with the opening of the silo door. From this point forward, the process of deactivating the LF took less than 180 days. A series of agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union allowed the weapons-grade nuclear material from the warheads to be either used for fuel in nuclear reactors or disposed of along with other high-level radioactive waste. Hazardous materials were then removed from the site and contractors salvaged steel and other equipment. Destruction of the silos could be accomplished either by implosion to at least six meters (twenty feet) below ground level or by excavating the former silo to a depth of at least eight meters (twenty-six feet). The silo site then had to remain open for ninety days to allow Soviet satellites time to verify that the removal complied with treaty provisions. After the ninety-day period, crews covered the silo with a concrete cap and graded the top of the silo opening with gravel. Elimination of the LCFs followed the dismantling of the LFs. Communications systems were dismantled and removed, equipment was salvaged, and hazardous materials removed. The Hardened Intersite Cable System (HICS) was severed to render it inoperable and the underground LCCs were welded shut and the elevator shafts were filled in.

Deactivation of Ellsworth Air Force Base’s Minuteman II Missiles

The Minuteman II ICBMs at the 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) at Ellsworth Air Force Base became the first missile wing in the country to have its Minuteman II missiles removed under the START Treaty. The deactivation began on 3 December 1991 with the removal of the missile from the Golf-02 silo near Red Owl, South Dakota. The removal of the Air Force’s first Minuteman II at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota marked the beginning of the country’s Minuteman II disarmament effort. The last Minuteman II missile in South Dakota was removed from its silo in April 1994. The Air Force conducted numerous studies to minimize economic and environmental impacts on the state and conducted public meetings to solicit input on proposed procedures from residents. The Air Force also disseminated information on silo deactivation through the public meetings and newsletters.

A group of Air Force missile maintainers known as the “Black Hills Bandits” held the responsibility for deactivation of the Minuteman II LFs and LCFs at Ellsworth Air Force Base between 1994 and 1997. This group of trained missile technicians worked to develop deactivation procedures customized to the needs of the 44th SMW, including lists of items to save, building maintenance plans, and procedures for handling hazardous waste. The procedures were based on guidelines for deactivation developed by the Air Force. The group developed the “44 MW Deactivation Maintenance Plan” that set out a fifteen-day schedule for Minuteman II deactivation. Some challenges specific to the 44th SMW included developing techniques for handling hazardous materials, such as polychlorinated biphenols (PCBs) or mercury bulbs. A plan also had to be developed for the removal of the weapon guidance and authentication system. On the eleventh day, the SMW turned the LF or LCF over to the base civil engineering squadron to complete deactivation procedures, including the shutdown of the electrical system.

In addition to the deactivation activities described above, LF sites also required imploding the silos, abandoning or removing the azimuth markers located on private land, filling the silo with rubble, and capping the silo with a concrete lid. Crews also filled sewage lagoons and removed diesel storage tanks at
Minuteman Missile National Historic Site

Historic Resource Study

LCFs. The silo door was buried in a fourteen- to twenty-foot deep hole. The site was then graded to pre-demolition contours and resurfaced with gravel. Non-gravel surfaces were graded and seeded and cathodic protection wells were capped four feet below ground surface. Following deactivation of the fifteen-day deactivation schedule, the sites were placed in caretaker status until the site was turned over to the dismantlement contractor. While in caretaker status Air Force crews maintained the sites, mowing lawns and repairing security fences. Following dismantlement, a second caretaker status ensued until the site was sold to an adjacent landowner. Deactivation procedures were modified for Delta-01 and Delta-09 as they were going to be preserved for interpretative use (see Section III, Chapter 3: Minuteman Missile National Historic Site for more information).

Landowner Issues

Prior to the dismantling of the silos, a controversy ensued in South Dakota over the best method of removal. The Air Force proposed to implode the silos to a depth of six meters below ground surface, the most economical of the two options specified in the START Treaty. Local ranchers expressed concern over the use of this method, fearing vibrations from the explosives would harm the quality of their water in underground wells. Many ranchers preferred the second acceptable option allowed by the treaty, which required the mechanical excavation of the silo to eight meters. The ranchers felt that the second option had less possibility of disturbing the underground water supply. In a state plagued by low annual rainfall, the integrity of the water system formed a rallying point for property owners.

Ranchers’ concerns for their water supply and other aspects of deactivation resulted in the resurrection of the South Dakota group, the Missile Area Landowners Association (MALA), a local ranching interest group that had been active during the early years of Air Force land acquisition for silo construction. MALA made property rights and potential civil problems they feared that might result from deactivation central issues in their negotiations with the Air Force. The group focused on potential damage to wells, the release of easements for the HICS on private land, and establishing the right of landowners to have the first opportunity to repurchase land once the Air Force was ready to sell the LF and LCF properties. Other issues included the disposal of gravel from the sites, which was a concern for landowners near Red Owl, in northern South Dakota, because it was expensive to get gravel to their part of the state. MALA also presented the option of retaining the silos for grain or water storage; however, this alternative violated the START Treaty and could not be pursued.

Gene Williams and other members of MALA worked to bring attention to their cause and several national newspapers, including The New York Times and San Francisco Chronicle, and national television shows, including ABC Nightly News, CBS Evening News, and The Today Show, sent reporters to South Dakota. Williams summarized the group’s efforts to protect their rights by stating, “It sure looked like we had an opportunity, maybe, to cut some deals for ourselves if we were going to give $100 million to the Ukraine we should be able to give some gravel to the guys around Red Owl.”

MALA successfully lobbied South Dakota representatives to pass legislation specific to the deactivation of the LFs and LCFs, requiring the Air Force to give land owners the right of first refusal to purchase former silo sites located on their property at fair market value. Because the missiles at Ellsworth were the first ICBMs removed as part of the START Treaty, the land purchase rules established for South Dakota set the standard for missile sites across the country.

MALA did not successfully change the method used to destroy the silos. The Air Force had already established stringent specifications for vibration and sound for the implosion that would protect adjacent property. In addition, the Air Force had conducted studies to show that local wells and aquifers would remain intact during the implosion. The Air Force identified two sites for the contractor to demonstrate compliance with these specifications and many people observed the implosion of the first silo which proved to be uneventful. Many landowners were given the opportunity to push the button to implode the
silo adjacent to their property. As part of the deactivation process, the Air Force also released its easements for HICS buried on private property. HICS is a hardened, pressurized, buried cable that allowed the LCFs and LFIs at the 44th SMW to send messages between facilities. The release of over 2,800 easements for HICS suggests the number of property owners affected by the placement of this cable on their property.  

The Air Force clearly spelled out procedures by which landowners might purchase former LFs and LCFs adjacent to their property. If multiple landowners held land adjacent to a missile site, the land was offered for sale to these owners in separate parcels. The General Services Administration (GSA), which coordinated the sale of the LFs and LCFs for the Air Force, offered these parcels to landowners at fair market value. If a landowner opted not to buy the land, the property was offered to government agencies first and if a government agency did not purchase the land, the property was offered for private bid. Property owners received written notice from GSA of the terms of the sale and had thirty days in which to accept the offer.

Owners who purchased the former LF sites received a level graded parcel covered with gravel and surrounded by a chain link fence. The former silo stood underneath the gravel, but the silo was filled with rubble and sealed with a reinforced-concrete cap. Deed restrictions on these former LF and LCF sites prohibit installing wells, digging below two feet in depth at LFs or digging over the capsules or elevator shaft at LCFs, and a requirement to maintain drainage on the property. In addition, the new owners of the LCFs could keep the buildings associated with the facility and gained the right to move the buildings, or reuse them for their own needs.

Once the Air Force completed deactivation of the 150 LFs and fifteen LCFs at Ellsworth Air Force Base, the missile sites began to be sold as excess government property. The last Minuteman II LF in South Dakota, Kilo-06, was imploded on 13 September 1996 and the Army Corps completed their deactivation work at the LFs and LCFs on 16 March 1999. After these activities were complete, the Air Force began environmental documentation at the sites in preparation for offering them for sale to adjacent landowners. Beginning in August 2001, the Air Force began selling the first former LF and LCF sites. By 2002 the LCFs had been sold to adjacent landowners, with the exception of Mike-01, which is in the process of being transferred to the Bureau of Land Management. Buildings at all fifteen of the LCFs remain, and one LCF support building complex is currently being used as a residence. The Air Force anticipates selling the remaining LFs by the end of 2003.

The Minuteman Legacy

With the implementation of the START Treaty, only Delta-01 and Delta-09 of Ellsworth Air Force Base and the Oscar-01 LCC at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri remain as examples of Minuteman IIs. A comparison of the Whiteman facility and former Ellsworth facility reveals some significant differences. First, Oscar-01 at Whiteman reflects the “controlled response” era of Minuteman design, with its ground support facilities hardened belowground. In contrast, the Delta-01 LCF, formerly of Ellsworth, belongs to the earlier period of massive retaliation, as indicated by the “soft” siting of its support facilities aboveground. Second, the Whiteman site is located on the Air Force Base proper, instead of being dispersed, like the Ellsworth sites, in a remote missile field, as was more typical of the Minuteman basing configuration. Third, Whiteman’s Oscar-01 is not a complete Launch Complex. Not only does it lack a LF, but it also lacks an aboveground LCF support building. In a typical Minuteman Launch Complex, such as represented by the former Ellsworth Site Delta-01, the LCF support building provided accommodations for Air Force personnel stationed in the missile field, and served as a security control center. Since the surrounding air base provided Whiteman’s Oscar-01 with these services, a separate LCF support building was considered unnecessary. The Delta Flight Launch Complex in South Dakota is the only surviving intact example of the original Minuteman configuration, designed to implement the Cold War era’s Cold War strategy.
War policy of massive retaliation and is also the only intact formerly operational Minuteman II site remaining in the United States.

Since the successful completion of the START Treaty, the United States and the Russian Republic have continued their efforts aimed at further arms reductions. A 1994 agreement between the two countries resulted in reprogramming the targeting system of United States and Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. This important though largely symbolic policy shift meant that United States and Soviet nuclear missiles were no longer aimed at each other. The START II Treaty, ratified in 1996, mandates elimination of all land based ICBMs with multiple independently targeted warheads and a sixty-five percent reduction in each country’s remaining nuclear arsenal. The signing of the Helsinki Protocol by the United States and Russia in 1997, better known as START III, established a framework for future arms reduction negotiations that aims to reduce the number of nuclear weapons held by these two countries by an additional thirty to forty percent.

Clearly the international legacy of the Cold War, at least in terms of its nuclear component, remains. The first two generations of Minuteman, however, do not. Having negotiated an end to the Cold War, Soviet and American leaders recognized a need to remember this crucial moment in global history. Minuteman Missile National Historic Site is one such piece of the past and place of memory, and in the next section we will explore this site’s origins as a public space.
Plate 75. Berliners sing and dance atop The Berlin Wall, perhaps the most powerful symbol of the Cold War, on 10 November 1989 to celebrate the opening of East-West German borders (AP/World Wide Photo)

Plate 76. President George H.W. Bush (left) and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (right) signing the START Treaty at the Kremlin in Moscow, 31 July 1991 (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library)
Plate 77. Transporter Erector positioned to remove missile, Delta Flight (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, HAER SD- 50- C- 7)
Plate 78. Missile silo implosion, South Dakota (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Plate 79. Missile silo being filled after implosion, South Dakota (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Plate 8o. Launch Facility after completion of deactivation, South Dakota (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Chapter 3: Minuteman Missile National Historic Site (1990–present)

Site Selection

In creating Minuteman Missile National Historic Site, the American government has transformed what was once a secret and well-guarded location into a public space. As a component of the National Park System, the site will be preserved for future generations to learn first hand of the Minuteman missile’s role in the Cold War. This was the hope of Soviet and American leaders even at the end of their bitter bipolar standoff. The terms of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), allow both the United States and the Soviet Union to preserve examples of their Cold War armaments as static displays for public education purposes. The Minuteman II installations of the 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) at Ellsworth Air Force Base drew the attention of the National Park Service (NPS) and the Air Force during the deactivation of Minuteman II ICBMs, since the Launch Facilities (LFs) and Launch Control Facilities (LCFs) in the 44th SMW displayed original technology developed for the early Minuteman I ICBM system. The LFs and LCFs of Ellsworth Air Force Base remain largely as originally constructed, and reflect the massive retaliation strategy that governed the first Minuteman I installations. For these reasons, the NPS focused on the South Dakota Minuteman LFs and LCFs when selecting an LF and an LCF for preservation.

In 1993 the NPS and the Air Force selected Delta-01 LCF and Delta-09 LF of the 44th SMW for preservation. Delta-01 and Delta-09 were chosen over other sites in South Dakota for the physical integrity of the LF and LCF and for their location near other historic sites, federal lands, and Interstate 90. Minuteman Missile National Historic Site is located within easy driving distance of Badlands National Park, Mount Rushmore National Memorial and the Black Hills National Forest. Buffalo Gap National Grassland is adjacent to the LCF and LF, providing a protected natural setting for the historic site.445

The NPS’s Rocky Mountain Regional Office and the Air Force entered into a series of Interagency Agreements to coordinate the effort to convert Delta-01 and Delta-09 into static displays. The first such agreement, signed in 1993, committed the NPS to completing a Special Resource Study to determine formally that Delta-01 and Delta-09 were the best choice for preservation of a Minuteman II LCF and LF. This study considered the suitability and feasibility of developing Delta-01 and Delta-09 into a National Historic Site and investigated alternatives for managing the site. The study also considered the environmental and socioeconomic conditions in the area and what effect the new historic site might have on these variables.446 Funding for the Special Resource Study came from the Department of Defense’s “Legacy Resource Management Program,” which awarded the NPS a $150,000 grant to study alternatives for preserving examples of America’s Cold War history.447 The NPS completed the Special Resource Study in 1995.

Delta-01 and Delta-09 Deactivation

The work to deactivate Delta-01 LCF and Delta-09 LF differed dramatically from the procedures followed for the other Minuteman II missile sites in South Dakota. The Air Force deactivated both sites but did not dismantle them. Instead, the NPS and the Air Force began planning for conversion of these two sites into monuments to the Cold War and the nuclear threat that existed during the second half of the twentieth century. The Air Force prepared special supplemental orders for these two sites. At the same time, deactivation of Delta-01 and Delta-09 needed to be completed in compliance with the START Treaty. Some of the deactivation tasks included those on the standard Air Force deactivation list, for example removing classified information and hazardous materials. The Air Force removed the
Minuteman II missile at Delta-09, severed the Hardened Intersite Cable System (HICS), disconnected or removed other military communications equipment, and disconnected alarm systems used during the Cold War. The technical order for Delta-01 required severing and removal of a one-foot section of the HICS to prevent any future restoration of communications between Delta-01 and Delta-09, overwriting of the Weapon System Controller/Digital Store and Processor, removing all classified information from the site, installation of non-functioning radio control panels, and the replacement of any missing face plates to cover exposed drawer openings. Diesel storage tanks were also removed. Mechanical equipment such as the electrical system, air filtering systems, and heating system remained intact and interior furnishings, including tables, sofas and chairs were retained. The deactivation procedures checklist for Delta-01 was completed on 11 May 1993, however it is not known if this is the last day crews were on the site, or if they had left Delta-01 earlier. Delta-01 and Delta-09 continued in caretaker status until they were transferred to the NPS.

During the period of caretaker status, both NPS and Air Force personnel performed basic maintenance at Delta-01 and Delta-09, upgraded fire and security systems, and installed a viewing enclosure over the missile launcher at Delta-09.

After deactivation, the NPS and the Air Force continued to work together to assure that the proposed Minuteman Missile National Historic Site became a reality. Interagency Agreements between the two organizations continued to coordinate the activities related to the historic site development. In 1995 Historic American Engineering Record documentation for the two sites were prepared with funding from the U.S. Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program. In 1996 the NPS and the Air Force developed a conversion plan to convert Delta-09 into a static display and the two agencies also finalized plans which included a viewing enclosure to allow future visitors the opportunity to see into the silo. Construction on the enclosure began in 2001. Other activities included the Air Force’s sponsorship of a draft National Historic Landmark nomination that was not submitted to NPS for designation.

Enabling Legislation
South Dakota Senators Tom Daschle and Tim Johnson introduced a bill to establish Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in 1998 and Congress began hearing testimony on the bill that same year. The bill failed in 1998 and was reintroduced the following year to the 106th Congress. Representatives from the NPS and the Air Force testified in favor of establishing the site. By 1999 both the House and Senate passed legislation creating Minuteman Missile National Historic Site and the federal budget for that year included $5 million to help preserve Delta-01 and Delta-09. The law describes the purpose of Minuteman Missile National Historic Site as:

To preserve, protect, and interpret for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations the structures associated with the Minuteman II missile defense system;

1. to interpret the historical role of the Minuteman II missile defense system—
   a. as a key component of America’s strategic commitment to preserve world peace; and
   b. in the broader context of the Cold War; and
2. to complement the interpretive programs relating to the Minuteman II missile defense system offered by the South Dakota Air and Space Museum at Ellsworth Air Force Base.
After the federal government officially endorsed the creation of the historic site, the NPS and the Air Force began preparations for the opening of the LF and LCF to the public. Once the legislation was passed, the specific plans to convert Delta-09 to a static display were formally presented to the START Compliance Review Group in Washington, D.C. for approval. Moreover, the new law gave the NPS funds to produce a general management plan for the site. A general management plan attempts to establish a clear management philosophy and provide direction for interpretive themes, resource preservation, and visitor use.

The NPS began work on the general management plan for the site in the spring of 2001 and hosted a series of public meetings to gather input from interested groups and individuals on their vision for the new historic site. The general management planning team included representatives from the Air Force, Forest Service, South Dakota Air & Space Museum, Badlands National Park, NPS Midwest Regional office, NPS Denver Service Center, and NPS Harper’s Ferry Center. The general management plan is expected to be available for public comment in the summer of 2004 and finalized in late 2004 or early 2005.

**Development and Future of the Historic Site**

While the NPS occupied itself with the general management plan for Minuteman Missile National Historic Site, the Air Force worked on the conversion of the Delta-09 LF to a static display to comply with the START Treaty. This conversion was necessary prior to the transfer of ownership to the NPS. The Air Force worked to acquire an unarmed training missile and refurbished and painted the missile prior to shipping it to Delta-09. Procuring the display missile proved no small task for the Air Force staff working on the site with the NPS. Intense competition for training missiles and/or static display missiles existed, as military museums also desired their own Minuteman II ICBMs for their exhibits. Additionally, many of the high level officers who once staffed the Air Force’s six operational missile wings had moved on after their wings were deactivated. These colonels and generals had supported the establishment of a monument to the Cold War and their transfer or retirement reduced high-level support for the new historic site and made obtaining a deactivated Minuteman II ICBM more difficult.

Once Air Force staff at Ellsworth had located the component parts of a training missile at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, technicians at Hill Air Force Base refurbished the object. On 12 June 2001 the Air Force emplaced the missile in the Delta-09 silo using a Transporter Erector vehicle designed to emplace Minuteman Missiles. Missile crews from 90th Logistics Group at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, many of whom were based at Ellsworth during the Cold War, assisted in the installation of the training missile. Local media were invited to the emplacement, increasing the profile of Minuteman Missile National Historic Site.

Construction of a viewing enclosure for the missile silo began shortly thereafter. The design of the enclosure represented a joint effort between the NPS and the Air Force and met START Treaty requirements and interpretive needs. The enclosure allows viewing below grade with minimal visual impact to the site. To complete the viewing enclosure and platform, the Air Force opened the silo door one-foot past halfway and welded and grouted the door in place. Crews then placed a glass enclosure and stainless steel railing around the silo opening. Future visitors will be able to approach the silo and peer down at the Minuteman II display missile in the silo. By 15 August 2001 the viewing enclosure was largely completed. After the installation of the static display missile and the completion of the viewing enclosure, a Soviet inspection team traveled to South Dakota on 21 May 2002 to verify that Delta-09 complied with the START Treaty’s specifications for static displays.
The Air Force and the NPS conducted a formal transfer of ownership of Delta-01 and Delta-09 to the NPS after the work of converting Delta-01 and Delta-09 was complete. On 27 September 2002, exactly eleven years to the day from stand down, the Air Force officially turned Minuteman Missile National Historic Site over to the NPS at a ceremony at Delta-09. The festivities included a B-1 flyover, presentation of colors by the Ellsworth Air Force Base Honor Guard, a performance by the Rapid City Central High School Marching Band, speeches by Fran Mainella, Director of the NPS, and Lieutenant General Robert Hinson, Vice Commander Air Force Space Command. Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Department of the Interior and former missileer, spoke of his memories as an officer of the 44th SMW at Ellsworth. Colonel James Kowalski, Commander of the 28th Bomb Wing, then transferred the keys to Delta-01 and Delta-09 to William Supernaugh, Superintendent, Badlands National Park.

As of 2003, minor modifications had occurred to Delta-01 and Delta-09 in preparation for their opening as Minuteman Missile National Historic Site. New security and fire detection/suppression systems were installed at Delta-01 and Delta-09. Delta-01 remained largely as it was when it was deactivated and care has been taken to keep as much of the original mechanical equipment and historic furnishings at the site. The NPS plans to open Minuteman Missile National Historic Site to the general public, following the completion of an interpretive visitor center, anticipated in 2006.

If not for the dedication of many individuals, both at the Air Force and the NPS, Minuteman Missile National Historic Site site would not have become a reality. For the Air Force and former missileers, the establishment of the historic site provides the opportunity for the public to view their contribution to winning the Cold War. Former missileer Craig Manson stated that the preservation of Delta-01 and Delta-09 “is a most fitting idea because, for this reason, the Cold War dominated the last half of the twentieth century, and some will not believe this or accept this, but most of American life, in one way or another, was defined by the Cold War.”
Plate 81. The training missile in the transporter erector prior to emplacement in the Delta-09 silo

Plate 82. Convoy transporting training missile for emplacement at Delta-09
Plate 83. Transporter Erector ready to emplace the training missile at Delta-09 (Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Plate 84. Training missile emplacing, Delta-09 silo (Photograph by Staff Sergeant Melissa Phillips, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, U.S. Air Force photo)

Plate 85. Training missile emplacement team (Photograph by Staff Sergeant Melissa Phillips, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, U.S. Air Force photo)
Plate 86. Line drawing of Delta-09 viewing enclosure
(Courtesy of the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base)

Plate 87. Missile viewing enclosure, Delta-09 (Photograph by Mead & Hunt)
Plate 88. Ellsworth Air Force Base Honor Guard, Minuteman Missile National Historic Site dedication ceremony (Courtesy of Public Affairs Office, Ellsworth Air Force Base)

Plate 89. Lieutenant General Robert Hinson, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command (right) and William R. Supernau, Superintendent, Badlands National Park (left) during the dedication ceremony (Courtesy of Public Affairs Office, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Plate 90. Colonel James Kowalski, Commander, 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base and William R. Supernauhg, Superintendent, Badlands National Park conduct the official transfer of ownership for Delta- 01 and Delta- 09 (Courtesy of Public Affairs Office, Ellsworth Air Force Base)
Conclusion

Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in South Dakota, including Launch Control Facility (LCF) Delta- 01 and Launch Facility (LF) Delta- 09, will be preserved for future generations to learn about our past and reflect on our country’s future. The site encompasses not only the history of the men and women of Ellsworth Air Force Base that maintained the missiles at a ready alert, but in a larger context the history of the Cold War which was a defining period in American history. The Cold War, as many historians have noted, affected every aspect of American life. Its history is vital to understand, especially as we enter a new century, and a new period of international relations. As historian Derek Leebaert has written, “Many of the attitudes and institutions that America is taking into the new century have their roots in an adventure that cost more and shaped more lives than any other in history. Today’s world has been molded by the Cold War, as has the world of skill levels, technology, business, and finance. Debates about missile defense, energy, taxes, and terrorism all reflect the experiences of these decades just past.”

Isolated on the South Dakota Plains, the Minuteman I and later Minuteman II missiles stood at ready alert to deter Communist or Soviet aggression. They were on the front lines of the Cold War, a conflict with battle lines drawn shortly after World War II, continuing until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the signing of the Treaty Between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) in 1991, and thereafter the crumbling of the Soviet Union. The Cold War ended with these events. It never escalated to a “hot war” involving direct combat between Soviet and American troops, the type of combat that, unlike the proxy wars fought by both sides throughout the Cold War, could easily have escalated into a devastating full-out nuclear conflict.

What must be understood in evaluating this period and the contribution of a program such as the Minuteman is that victory in the Cold War did not just happen. It was instead the product of dedication by military personnel and civilians alike, from analysts in Washington, to missile designers in California, and the cook at the LCF. Former employees at the missile sites are proud of how they served our country and have commented that they are anxious to “bring their grandchildren” to Minuteman Missile National Historic Site so they can show them where they once lived and worked in dedication to our country’s freedom. Their work left a legacy for future generations, and the place they worked remains a legacy for us all. With the placement of the training missile in the silo, the 90th Logistics Group at F.E. Warren Air Force Base placed a plaque in the silo dedicated to the memory of the men and women who worked and maintained the missile system over nearly three decades. The plaque reads, “rest easy old friend your targets are covered.”

Today, the Minuteman II missiles have left little impact on the physical landscape. The landscape has largely been returned to its pre- Cold War state. Following the signing of the START Treaty, the 150 former LF sites in South Dakota, with the exception of Delta- 09, were dismantled and a simple chain-link fence surrounding the grassy landscape marks their former boundaries. Components of many of the fifteen LCFs remain.

Even without a thousand- odd missiles beneath the American plains, the images and the effect of the Cold War remain a part of our everyday life, culture, and history. The Berlin Wall stood for generations as a physical symbol of the Cold War, a symbol of a continent divided, and of a people restrained. Project Looking Glass, the Strategic Air Command’s airborne command center, flew continuously in the skies from 1961 to 1990 on ready alert to take over command of the nuclear arsenal, if needed. Its very existence illuminated the constant terror of nuclear attack. Generations grew up in fear of Communism and the Soviet Union, and school children learned “duck and cover” techniques to hide under their desks in the
event of a nuclear attack. For their homes, the federal government published “how to” brochures on the construction of bomb shelters and some families built shelters and stored supplies in the hopes of surviving a nuclear attack.

East-West tensions were also a rallying cry, and sometimes a warning. In the later years of the Cold War, a nation cheered as the United States Olympic Hockey Team beat the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Lake Placid, New York during the 1980 Olympics. Their “miracle on ice” went beyond a sporting event, with sentiment against the Soviet Union rooted in the decades of the Cold War. Movies addressed the Cold War both through sarcasm, such as Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, and through the portrayal of what life may be like after a nuclear attack, as in the 1983 television movie *The Day After*. All of these events and cultural icons have shaped our nation and our collective memory. They are who we are.

The Cold War is in the past, but it has a lasting effect on the present and future. It was a time in the life of our nation and the experience of many individuals that may be unmatched. Minuteman Missile National Historic Site offers the opportunity to reflect upon this significant period in our nation’s history and to remember all of the aspects of the times. The opening of these sites to the public will facilitate a public dialogue on the Cold War, nuclear weapons proliferation and disarmament, the role and dedication of Air Force personnel, and the nation’s political and military future.

The power and potential destruction of the missiles was and remains incomprehensible for most of us. It is important to remember this past, while simultaneously recognizing that the end of the Cold War did not bring about the wholesale destruction of nuclear arsenals. Minuteman III and subsequent generations of missiles remain throughout the nation’s landscape. As a result, peace activists remain committed to the cause of nuclear disarmament, to them a symbol of social injustice as much as of potential destruction. As activist Jay Davis from Rapid City explained, “People ought to ask themselves what’s a more important contribution from the Midwest to the world, to feed hungry children and raise their standard of living and start to deal with the problem of world population and all the economic and social issues that revolve around that, which one of our own famous political leaders is pushing? Or is it more important for us to spend our resources on nuclear weapons and on what we think is our national security? And I think that’s a pretty stark choice.”

The stark choices presented by military programs such as the Minuteman I and II left their mark on the men and women who operated them as well. General George Lee Butler, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command, reflected on his role as the head of the United States Air Force and United States Navy Strategic Nuclear forces from 1991 to 1994. For him, the life and death decisions required for the operation of the country’s nuclear arsenal were real as perhaps for no other. Butler stated, “I lived for three years, every day of my life, with the requirement to answer a phone within three rings and be prepared to advise the president on how to retaliate with respect to the real or perceived threat of nuclear attack. I found it extremely sobering.”

General Butler clearly knows first hand what nuclear weapons can do. Since his retirement from the Air Force he has become an advocate for the banning of these weapons.

No matter what personal opinions one has on the Cold War, nuclear weapons, and the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union, all must recognize that the Cold War’s lasting social, economic, political, and cultural legacy is a significant part of the nation’s history that needs to be understood. The optimism and security that the country felt with the end of the Cold War has been shattered somewhat by the events of 11 September 2001. The United States is now facing new challenges and conflicts within the world. This new adversity provides further proof of the necessity of understanding the work and the
lessons of generations’ past, as inspiration and guidance for the future. The Cold War is over. South Dakota’s role on the frontlines of this international conflict has ended as well, however efforts at Ellsworth Air Force Base continue currently battling our nation’s current war on terrorism. With Minuteman Missile National Historic Site, the Plains might again assume their role in the service of the nation, this time as vessel for its memories.
Notes

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59 Lonnquest and Winkler, *To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program*, 70.
61 Neal, *Ace in the Hole*, 27.
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